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This book has been produced to serve a number of needs. Most importantly,
there is always a need to bring students and teachers of politics up to date with
the great political issues of the day. By their nature, such issues are constantly
changing in character, the political agenda is moving on and critical events can
change the political landscape. This book, therefore, seeks to review the state
of political issues early in the twenty-first century, when New Labour is in its
second term of office.
As part of the updating process it became necessary to choose which political
issues are important. Clearly it would be an enormous volume which sought
to cover every conceivable issue. Choices have, therefore, to be made. In this
case the rationale has been to include the main issues which appear in current
Advanced Level Politics syllabuses. In the case of Edexcel, which offers a
specific political issues option in its A2 specification, all the specified issues
have been included. In addition there are some chapters dealing with the
process of constitutional and political change which are issues in themselves.
Thus we have included material on constitutional reform (incorporating the
recent development of human rights in Britain), and devolution.
With Citizenship now a part of the National Curriculum for key stages three
and four, the book will make a useful companion to those teachers who wish
to enrich their teaching of the subject with a fuller understanding of political
issues and the European Union.
The book also covers the kind of issues which will be of interest to more general
readers. The student of politics needs to have a grasp of how substantive issues
are developing, even if they are not specific parts of his or her field of study. He
or she may also need a general introduction to the British political landscape.
Politics is, after all, important, because of what its processes achieve, or fail to
achieve. There may also be some who come to politics simply out of interest and
who need to be able to take a detached and informed view of how such issues
have developed. This book will be of value and interest to them.
A substantial section of the book deals with the European Union and Britain’s
relationship to it. Again there is more than one reason for this. Current A level
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syllabuses all require students to have a thorough knowledge of various
aspects of the European Union. There are four elements to this section: an
understanding of how the European project developed and the conceptual
ideas which have underpinned it; a description of the institutions of the EU,
how they are organised, what their functions are and what issues have
emerged concerning their operation and powers; a review of the main issue
facing the EU currently; and finally an account of how Britain’s involvement
with the EU has developed and what problems have resulted from this process.
A second reason for having a substantial section on Europe is simply that it is
now extremely important to British politics. Most issues now have a European
dimension. Furthermore, a wide variety of decisions are now made in EU insti-
tutions, with British political bodies playing a marginal role. Finally, it must be
emphasised that Britain’s relationship to the EU is in itself a political issue
which has fundamentally changed the party system.
The general approach taken on each topic is to examine the following aspects:
1 a description of the background information, sometimes stretching back to
World War II, sometimes returning only to the period when the issue
became central in British politics;
2 analysis of how the issue has developed, its main features, including
landmark events and periods of change;
3 a further analysis of the nature of the issue today, including an examination
of how parties and other political groups have approached it;
4 where appropriate, a certain amount of speculation concerning the immediate
future of the issue, identifying those aspects which require solutions.
Where necessary, summary boxes, lists of main events, statistical tables and
definitions have been included to guide readers and help students learn
factual material in an organised way.
Clearly, political issues are, by their nature, constantly evolving and fresh
events alter their nature. However, this book is designed to give a framework
of knowledge and conceptual understanding into which such changes can be
incorporated. Thus, for example, if there are significant developments in social
security, police powers or the political system of the EU, the changes can be
reviewed and understood in the light of the principles explained in the book.
There is, therefore, something for everybody who needs an analysis and
review of modern British political issues, whether they be teachers, students
or general readers.
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POST-WAR OVERVIEW
The end of Empire
At the end of World War II it became clear that the best days of the British
empire were over. For a number of reasons, policy makers had to face up to the
fact that British economic prosperity could no longer rely upon the advantages
of controlling a wide range of colonies. 
The lesson of two world wars for Britain was that the maintenance of a far-
flung empire was no longer feasible in both economic and military terms. The
onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s polarised the world into two great
power blocs and Britain could certainly not stand alone in this new world
order. She had to shelter under the nuclear umbrella provided by the United
States. Defending an empire in the face of Soviet and, later, Chinese power,
was not going to be possible. At the same time a Labour government had been
elected in 1945. On the whole the party was ideologically opposed to imperi-
alism. Although the pragmatic elements in the Labour party recognised the
economic benefits of clinging on to the colonies, the political will to remain as
a great imperial power was weakening.
India was granted independence in 1947. There was a moratorium on the
independence movement for ten years or so (corresponding to the return of
the Conservatives to power), but the dismantling of the empire resumed at the
end of the 1950s. The disaster of Britain’s failed attempt to maintain its
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dominance of the Middle East in the 1956 Suez crisis and the advent of Harold
Macmillan as a realistic, pragmatic prime minister in 1957 provided a spur to
this process. During the late 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s most of the empire
in Africa, South-East Asia and the Caribbean was granted independence.
Put simply, the empire had underpinned British prosperity for over a hundred
years by providing both a source of cheap raw materials and ready markets for
her own manufactured goods. Although preferential trade agreements were
made with the former colonies to protect Britain’s privileged economic
position, things would never be the same again. When Britain joined the
European Community at the beginning of 1973, it had to give up these special
trade agreements, and so the benefits of empire were finally lost.
What this meant for the British economy was essentially twofold. First, the
country would now have to pay the full price for its raw materials in world
markets (except for the temporary trade agreements referred to above).
Secondly, Britain would have to compete on even ground with all the other
industrial powers for markets for its manufactured goods. There was an
economic dividend arising from the loss of empire in that defence expenditure
could be cut back drastically, but the net effect on Britain was detrimental. The
problem was exacerbated by the post-war recovery of the western European
economies and the ‘economic miracle’ which Japan was enjoying.
The management of economic decline
As a result partly of its imperial status, and partly the sophisticated industrial
infrastructure built up over two hundred years, Britain retained its position as
a leading economic power into the 1950s. Thereafter, however, the story has
been one of relative economic decline, when British performance is measured
against its main competitors.
This is not to say that this was the fault of successive British governments. To
some extent the relative decline can be seen as inevitable. What it has meant,
however, is that governments have had to deal with this reality and to try to
reduce the effects of the process. The repercussions of decline were considerable.
Among them were the problem of maintaining public services, maintaining
capital investment when the profitability of British industry was declining, the
difficulty of staying competitive in a world where competition was intensifying
and, perhaps most seriously, of dealing with poverty which inevitably resulted
from the decline of traditional industries in several specific regions. 
From the 1950s until the 1990s economic management in Britain can be
viewed very much in this vein. For two generations the country was forced to
adjust to its new, lower, economic status. Governments could not realistically
hope to reverse British fortunes. All they could do was to ameliorate the effects
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of relative decline. So, for example, the Labour governments of Harold Wilson
in 1964–70 attempted to modernise British industry, but this largely failed in
the face of a number of economic crises. The development of the Concorde
aircraft at that time was a typical example. British science and engineering was
capable of producing the world’s first supersonic airliner, but it never reached
full-scale commercial production. The same happened to an infant computer
industry which was easily overcome by American and Japanese competition.
Membership of the European Community (later European Union) provided
one possible long term answer to this process. However, it was not until the
1990s that the benefits of European integration began to show real progress. 
European integration
When Britain became a member of the European Community in January 1973,
there were genuine fears that the inherent weaknesses which by then existed
in the economy would bring special problems. Faced by membership of a free
market, with more intense competition for overseas customers, it was felt by
many that Britain would suffer. Among the problems of the economy were lack
of capital investment, low levels of labour productivity, unsettled industrial
relations and poor management. Britain seemed to lag behind its European
partners in all these areas. Worse still, the British market was now thrown
wide open to European exporters.
The new economic structure
While Britain was moving from being a world imperial power to a European
player, the nature of its economy was also changing. The old, traditional
industries steadily declined and were replaced by new, service-based or
‘tertiary’ activities. The manufacturing infrastructure, which had been the
basis of British prosperity, began to disappear. Staple industries such as
textiles, iron and steel, shipbuilding and coal mining all suffered gradual
decline. In increasingly free global markets, British heavy industry could not
compete with the rest of Europe, Japan, parts of the Third World and the new
‘Asian tiger’ economies such as Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia. The diminishing
importance of these industries can be seen in table 1.1.
Table 1.1 Decline in manufacturing industry in the UK
Year % of male workforce % of female workforce
1981 32 17
1991 25 12
2001 22 8
Source: Office for National Statistics.
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The most serious effects of this process were experienced in the 1970s and
1980s. The economy failed to adjust to the new realities and economic decline
worsened. Towards the end of the 1980s, however, progress began to be made.
Partly as a result of the reforms of the Thatcher era, which are described below,
and partly fuelled by the strength of the higher education system (a legacy of
the growth of this sector in the 1960s), Britain was ready for the emergence
of new industries. Such sectors as finance, leisure and entertainment,
technology, computer software, communications and electronics were
growing in Britain as quickly as anywhere else in the world. In these fields
Britain could and did compete successfully with Far Eastern powers, the USA
and Germany. This shift in the ‘balance’ of British industry is shown clearly in
table 1.2.
Table 1.2 Table shows the percentage of the workforce employed in
distribution, hotels, catering, finance and other services
Year Men Women
1981 45 73
1991 44 83
2001 59 86
Source: Office for National Statistics.
This is not to say that manufacturing disappeared completely. In the 1990s
Britain became an attractive subject for inward investment. Foreign
companies, particularly from the Far East, set up factories all over the country,
producing cars, electrical equipment, telecommunications equipment and
computer technology. The decline of trade union power, resulting in more
settled industrial relations, relatively low wage levels and large government
grants and subsidies helped to attract such multinational corporations as
Toyota, Nissan, Honda, General Motors, Siemens and Motorola to Britain. 
The net result, by the 1990s, was that the British economy had drastically
changed its structure. There was still a large manufacturing sector, but it was
now largely foreign owned. The service and technology sectors, on the other
hand, were growing fast and were largely home grown. 
Globalisation
The governments of the 1990s were forced to face up to a new challenge beyond
that of European integration. This was the reality that all markets – in products,
commodities, labour and finance – were becoming increasingly global. 
The effects of globalisation are yet to be fully revealed, but some certainties
have already emerged. In order to survive in world markets it has become
clear that Britain will have to develop a number of economic qualities. Among
them are a well educated, trained and flexible workforce, management which
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is geared to world-wide competition, a willingness to respond to intense
competition, higher levels of capital investment, leadership in the field of
information technology and full involvement with international institutions
such as the European Union, World Trade Organisation, World Bank, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, G7 and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD).
The management of economic success
As we have seen above, much of the story of post-war economic policy making
has been concerned with relative decline. During the 1990s, however, when
Britain emerged from the world recession in better shape than Japan, the Far
East and her European partners, a new set of circumstances became apparent.
Many of the inherent and seemingly incurable problems of the British
economy began to respond to treatment. As we have already seen, industrial
relations had improved during the 1980s. In addition, labour productivity
began to rise and Britain became known for low, rather than excessively high,
wage costs. The new ‘tertiary’, service and technology industries were finding
a leading place in world markets. Above all, however, the recurring problem
of inflation receded in the second half of the 1990s. The record of British
economic management had reached an all time low in 1992 when the country
was unceremoniously dumped out of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism
– the ERM – (of which more below). This event, known as ‘Black Wednesday’,
was the culmination of several years of indecisive attempts to adjust to the
new European and global realities. Since 1992, more responsible governments
under John Major and Tony Blair have understood that it was necessary to
conquer the British economy’s natural tendency to rapid inflation in order to
compete successfully.
From the mid-1990s onwards, therefore, Britain has enjoyed a number of
years of almost unprecedented low inflation, low interest rates and low
unemployment. Economic growth was consistently healthy and there were
rises in investment in public services. Relative prosperity was, however, to
present as many problems for government as economic decline.
The principal dilemma faced by politicians in this period has been how to
distribute the new-found wealth. Those in the centre and to the left of the
political spectrum wished to see rises in expenditure of public services such as
education, social security, housing, public transport and health. They have
also demanded reductions in tax levels for the poorer sections of the
community. In this way the inequalities in standards of living may be reduced.
On the right of politics, however, economic growth is seen as an opportunity
to reduce taxation for all. This, they suggest, will increase incentives, reward
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initiative and so safeguard future growth. This political tendency is not
concerned with inequalities in wealth within the population. For them higher
disposable incomes can take the pressure off state-run public services and the
private sector can expand to compensate. 
Not surprisingly, politicians in all the main parties have tended to gravitate
towards the centre of this conflict, suggesting that both of these objectives can
be achieved at the same time as long as some compromises are accepted. This
new ‘consensus’ will be the subject of further discussion below.
THE KEYNESIAN CONSENSUS 
The economic beliefs of Keynes and the Keynesians
The economist John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) was a prominent British
academic and political figure in the 1920s and 1930s. His economic beliefs,
however, did not gain full acceptance in the political arena until after World
War II. In fact, it is likely that his policies would have been implemented
earlier had the war not intervened. Ironically, Keynes died before he could see
the practical fruits of his work.
What became known as ‘Keynesian economics’ has many technical aspects
beyond the scope of this book. There are, however, a number of principles
which are relatively easy to understand. But before studying them we need to
examine briefly what had gone before.
So-called ‘classical economics’ had flourished for about a century, from the
1830s to the 1930s. This tradition believed that the economy would inevitably
suffer from ‘periodic cycles’, moving regularly from boom periods, when there
was rapid economic growth, to periods of slow-down or slumps in which
growth was slow or even ceased altogether. Governments, the classical econo-
mists argued, should not interfere with these natural processes. Indeed,
excessive interference would be detrimental. Rather, the periods of slump
would correct themselves. The process would be that, as there was little
economic activity, wages and prices would stop rising and might actually fall.
The falling prices would encourage consumers to buy more and companies to
invest more in capital. The lower wages would mean that more labour would
be employed. The effect of these changes would be to kick start the economy
into renewed growth and the recessions would come to a natural end. The role
of government was to do nothing except to ensure that the currency remained
stable by controlling the amount of money in circulation.
These beliefs held up until the Great Depression of the 1930s. In that period
the theory ceased to work. The economic recession would not end even
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though governments obeyed the golden rule that they should not attempt to
interfere. Keynes’ theories, however, provided an explanation for the new
phenomenon.
He suggested that, in the modern economy, there is no reason why economic
activity should pick up spontaneously as the classical economists suggested. In
short, recessions like this one could recur and grow worse. Keynes offered a
new set of policy options. Governments should intervene, he argued. They
should take positive steps to boost the level of aggregate demand in the
economy. Aggregate demand consists largely of consumer spending,
government expenditure and capital investment by companies. By ensuring
that consumers, companies and government all spent more money in the
economy, the recession could be ended, as industry expanded to meet the
higher level of demand. At the same time, by careful adjustments, many of the
recessions could be avoided in the first place.
How could this be done? In direct opposition to classical economic beliefs,
Keynes argued that, by lowering the level of taxation, and by increasing
government spending, the overall level of aggregate demand would rise. Even if
the policy led to government debt, it could still be justified by the positive
economic results. Future generations would be able to pay off the debts out of
the increased prosperity which his policies would bring. His ideas became known
as demand management, underpinned by active fiscal policy. The classical
economists were sceptical, but by the 1940s Keynes’ policies had won the day.
The consensus in action
For the sake of neatness we can say that the keynesian consensus lasted from
1950 (when many of the immediate economic effects of the war had begun to
recede) until about 1979, when Margaret Thatcher was first elected prime
minister. So we are dealing with a period of about thirty years.
Economic policy making is a complex business, with many variables being
manipulated by government. However, the great age of the consensus can be
reduced to a few basic principles, as follows:
 The main way to try to manipulate economic activity was to control the
level of demand.
 Demand was best controlled through levels of taxation (especially income
tax) and government expenditure.
 When economic activity slowed down it was normal for government to
reduce taxation levels and raise government expenditure (typically on
social security and pensions or on building projects). This usually resulted
in a growth in government debt, financed out of borrowing from banks or
the general public in national savings schemes.
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 When economic activity was growing fast and there was a danger of
inflation arising or too many imports being attracted in, the opposite
measures were used, i.e. higher taxation and reduced public spending.
Both the Conservative and Labour parties based economic policy making on
these principles, with only minor variations.
Competition between the parties was not, therefore based on principles, but on
how effectively they could manage the economy on keynesian lines. Elections
were fought less on how best to run the economy than on other issues such as
competence, foreign policy, industrial relations policy, the running of public
services and which party was best for the business community. There was also
some disagreement over how taxation was to be distributed among the
population. Clearly Labour tended to favour higher levels of tax on high
income groups, while the Conservatives opposed high taxes on business profits
or on property. Labour also adopted, after 1965, a policy of direct legal
controls over excessive rises in prices, wages and business profits. The Conser-
vatives were less enthusiastic, but even they followed the Labour lead on this
issue under Edward Heath in 1971–74.
So there was inter-party competition between the parties in this period. There
was not a consensus on all issues. But the fundamental ideas of keynesian
theory were shared by the al the main parties.
THE END OF CONSENSUS AND THE RETURN 
OF NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS
The first cracks: Edward Heath
Faced by the prospect of a third successive defeat at the 1970 general election,
the Conservative leadership took a decision to engage in a complete re-think
of the basis of economic policy. In 1969, at the Selsdon Park Hotel in Surrey,
this group produced a blueprint for radical change. Or, rather, they proposed
a reversion to classical economic ideas as described above. With another crisis
apparently looming, the Conservatives won the election and Edward Heath
found himself in power with a commitment to the new policies.
He immediately announced that controls on price and wage rises were to be
removed. There was to be no aid for failing industries and the government was
to disengage itself from strict economic management. In other words there was
a return to the pre-keynesian theories. The consensus seemed to be at an end.
By the end of 1971, however, the new policy was in tatters. Inflation was rising
alarmingly, as was the level of imports. British industry began to suffer from the
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effects of rising wages and prices and several large companies were threatening
to go out of business. When Rolls-Royce went bust, the writing was on the wall.
Heath did what he said he would never do and stepped in to save Rolls-Royce
with government money. He also imposed a six-month freeze on wage rises, to
be replaced later by strict controls. His Chancellor, Anthony Barber, was forced
to raise taxation in order to control aggregate spending and price inflation. The
dramatic change of policy was known as Heath’s ‘U-turn’ and the brief pause in
the economic consensus was over. Keynesian policy was back.
Nevertheless, the experience left a deep impression on some Conservatives,
not least two of its leading figures. One was Keith Joseph, one of the party’s
leading intellectuals. The other was the education minister, Margaret
Thatcher. The seeds had been sown for what was to happen after 1979. 
Margaret Thatcher and monetarism
It is normal for economic commentators to take 1979 as a watershed year in
British history and this is certainly logical as it saw the election of perhaps the
most radical prime minister of the twentieth century. Nevertheless that year
did not mark a dramatic change in the nature of economic policy making.
There were two main reasons for this. 
Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, the country was entering a deep and
enduring recession. Both inflation and unemployment were rising alarmingly
(which defied keynesian logic) meaning that radical measures were not
feasible. Secondly, Mrs Thatcher herself was far from politically secure in her
first three years in office. A number of senior members of the Conservative
party were firmly opposed to a departure from traditional policies. These were
the so-called ‘wets’ and they included such key figures as Lord Carrington,
Francis Pym and Peter Walker. However, her victory in the Falklands conflict
in 1982 gave her the political confidence to remove her opponents from the
cabinet.
So the real watershed came in 1982–83 as the economic climate began to
improve and the prime minister was more able to dominate the political scene.
By then, however, the seeds had been sown and it is important to identify
those seeds. The main element was the theory of monetarism. This repre-
sented the basis for what was to come.
Monetarism has two main elements. The best known is the principle that the
most effective way to control the economy is to ensure that the money supply
(i.e. quantity) does not rise faster than the growth in economic activity. This
practice of responsible financial management is designed to ensure high
inflation is avoided and that industry can operate within a stable economic
environment. At the same time monetarism, as a philosophy, implies that
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governments should not interfere with the rest of the economy. In this sense it
is a liberal theory as it proposes minimum state activity.
So it was at the beginning of the Thatcher era that the government largely
withdrew from active economic management. Unemployment rose unchecked,
but it did have a positive aspect. Wage increases moderated as workers faced
intense competition for scarce jobs. The influence of the trade unions also
began to wane. The level of strikes fell (a normal situation in times of
unemployment) and industrial activity started to pick up. In other words
unemployment became a price worth paying for economic recovery, though the
inhabitants of the dole queues would not agree!
But it was not until 1982–83 that the next phase of the Thatcher revolution
was to begin. We may describe this period as the supply-side stage. Indeed
supply-side economics has dominated policy making ever since.
Supply-side economics
Keynesian economics was characterised by the need for governments to
control the level of aggregate demand, notably through the manipulation of
levels of tax and public expenditure. Supply-side economics returns to the
classical principle that such control is counter-productive and that there is a
natural process whereby such problems as inflation, or high interest rates will
correct themselves automatically. However, this process depends on the ability
of the economy to adjust to these mechanisms. In particular the ‘supply side’
(i.e. production and distribution of goods and services) needs to be both
flexible and dynamic.
Margaret Thatcher and her advisers were of the opinion that the long-term
problem of the British economy was that the supply side was neither dynamic
nor flexible. She therefore saw the role of her governments to correct these
faults. The main objectives of policy were the following:
1 To make labour markets more flexible. That implied that wages could freely
rise or fall according to market conditions, workers would be able to adapt
quickly to new technologies and growing industries and there would be real
incentives to work and improve output.
2 To create more incentives for entrepreneurs. By making it an attractive
proposition to set up new businesses or to expand existing ones, it is assumed
that the economy can expand quickly. 
3 Free competition is seen as a means by which businesses will be forced to
become efficient.
4 Regulation by the state should be minimised. Too much control over such
factors as wages, prices, profits and production systems is believed to stifle
business expansion. The most dramatic form of regulation occurs in nation-
alised industries, so they became a major target of reform.
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Most economic policy from the 1980s onwards was, therefore, directed at
achieving these ends. As we have seen above, most of the practical measures
could not be implemented until after the 1983 general election when the
Conservative party was returned to office with a huge parliamentary
majority.
TAXATION
One decision had already been made four years before the 1983 landslide.
This was the reduction in the level of income tax, effected in 1979. The basic
rate fell from 33 per cent to 30 per cent and the higher rates of tax from 83
per cent to 60 per cent. By 1988 there were only two rates of income tax: 25
per cent and 40 per cent. These were almost the lowest rates in western
Europe. The reductions in tax revenue which resulted were replaced by an
increase in VAT from 8 per cent to 15 per cent and later by increasing revenue
from North Sea oil and the privatisation programme.
The purpose of this change was to create greater incentives by allowing entre-
preneurs and their employees to retain a much higher proportion of their
incomes. The idea that business activity is crucial to wealth creation and must
be encouraged through generously low rates of tax on incomes and profits has
remained central to economic policy making by both Conservative and Labour
administrations. Indeed, as we shall see, Labour governments after 1997 have
continued the process of reducing the basic rate of income and corporation tax
for just this reason.
There was also a general reduction in other forms of direct taxes such as inher-
itance and capital gains tax. But Conservative governments after 1979 failed
to achieve their greatest ambition which was to seriously reduce the overall
level of taxes. Indirect taxes, such as duties on petrol, alcohol and tobacco
continued to rise as taxes on income were falling.
Tax incentives were only the first element in the change in policy direction.
More radical measures were soon to follow. The key developments were as
follows.
PRIVATISATION
The process of transferring industries from public ownership and state control
to private ownership (i.e. from nationalised industries into public limited
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companies owned by shareholders) was seen in the 1980s to incorporate four
main advantages. 
Firstly, it was expected that they would become far more dynamic as their
managers pursued higher profits to satisfy the shareholders and to further
their own careers. These incentives had been lacking when the industries had
been state run. Secondly, it presented an opportunity for a wider range of the
population to own shares, including the workers in the privatised industries
themselves, and so give them a vested interest in their economic success.
Thirdly, the sale of these industries would bring in much needed revenue to
the government who could use it either to pay off some accumulated national
debt or to finance higher public spending without having to raise taxes. By
1990 the sales of publicly owned assets had yielded nearly £20 billion.
Above all, however, this disengagement of the state was very much at the heart
of what has become known as ‘Thatcherism’. Classical economics assumed
that state interference was nearly always negative and Margaret Thatcher
always considered herself to be a modern heir to the that classical tradition.
So her ideas can be described as ‘neo-classical economics’.
The most celebrated privatisation was also the first – that of British Telecom
in 1984. It was greeted with loud opposition from the Labour party, but the
public’s imagination was caught by the prospect of owning shares in this huge,
growing industry, and by the promise of cheaper phone calls as fresh
investment was to pour into the new private enterprise. When the new shares
began to be traded freely on the stock exchange and their price rose sharply,
the public were hooked and ready for more. The high point of national
excitement was reached when the gas supply industry was put up for sale. A
massive advertising campaign was launched to encourage the public to take
up the share issue and once again there was a successful flotation with
thousands of new shareholders being created and quick profits realised on the
rising share price. ‘Privatisation fever’ was beginning to set in and the
government was riding the crest of this wave of enthusiasm. More was to
follow. Electricity generation and supply, water, coal, steel, British Airways,
British Petroleum and Rolls-Royce Engines were among the principal
examples. Under John Major possibly the most significant – and most contro-
versial – of all the privatisations took place when the railways were sold off
in 1996. 
As we shall see below, privatisation was not only a policy of the 1980s. It is a
process which continued into the twenty-first century. The Labour party was
converted to privatisation by the time it came to office in 1997, thus
abandoning one of its most cherished principles – the public, democratic
control of the commanding heights of the economy.
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COMPETITION AND LIBERALISATION
The nationalised industries, apart from being state controlled, were also
mostly monopolies. Serious competition was forbidden by law in such indus-
tries as coal, steel, electricity, telephones, gas and water supply. After privati-
sation, therefore, there remained the problem of how to ensure that the indus-
tries remained competitive when they did not have to contend with normal
market forces. Two kinds of response were introduced.
The first was simply to introduce competition: to allow other private firms to
compete. This is what occurred with British Airways, municipal public
transport, and steel and coal. In other industries, however, competition was
not feasible at first. These are the ‘natural monopolies’ where there would be
major disruption if more than one firm were operating in the same market.
Utility industries such as telephones, gas, water and electricity are clear
examples. They required a second type of solution. This was to introduce
regulatory bodies which would force them to operate as if they were in a
competitive market. This spawned a whole raft of new quangos such as OFTEL
(office of telecommunications), OFWAT (Water), and OFGAS (gas supply)
which would protect consumers from monopoly power. In due course,
genuine competition was introduced in these utilities, but in the 1980s they
suffered much criticism for their monopoly status, despite the growth of
regulatory bodies.
In the existing private sector steps were also taken to create competition. Most
importantly, financial services were de-regulated in 1986, allowing greater
competition in the stock market and among banks and building societies. This
had several effects. Firstly, it reduced banking costs generally. Secondly it made
finance more easily available for consumers, house purchasers and business in
general. Thirdly, it reinforced London’s position as the leading financial centre
in Europe. The professions were also forced to engage in real competition so
that dentists, opticians and even lawyers were allowed to advertise themselves
and adjust their charges to attract more business. In general, too, the laws on
competition were stiffened and the Office of Fair Trading was given wide
powers to ensure that consumers were given a fair deal. 
There were also partial privatisations in the 1980s which were usually
described as liberalisation. The main example was the introduction of
compulsory competitive tendering (CCT). The scheme forced many state run
services to compete with private companies to retain their contracts. This
mainly applied to local government activities such as refuse collection,
building maintenance, parks and gardens care and road repairs. CCT was also
applied to some central government departments with parts of the health and
prison service. Indeed some prisons have since been privatised altogether.
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The effects of CCT were twofold. It promoted efficiency and competitiveness,
but also had the effect of reducing wage levels in many sectors of the economy.
Private companies, when bidding for contracts from the state, tended to offer
lower wages than the state, so that high paid workers were often replaced by
people on lower pay levels. During the 1980s and 1990s increasing numbers
of services were subjected to CCT until the incoming Labour party abandoned
the scheme after 1997.
LABOUR MARKETS
Supply side economics demands that wage levels are free to rise and fall
according to employment conditions. When there is high unemployment,
wages (at least in real terms) should fall and vice versa. The same applies to
regional variations in economic activity. Wages should be significantly lower
in depressed regions than in successful ones so that employers should be
attracted to invest where they can reduce their labour costs.
In the 1980s Conservative governments under Margaret Thatcher saw high
wage costs as perhaps the most difficult problem to overcome. Their perception
of the problem was that organised labour, mainly in the form of trade unions,
was simply too powerful. They therefore aimed to alter the balance of
economic power between employers and employees. 
The first solution was very much of Mrs Thatcher’s own creation. She made it
clear to workers’ leaders that she believed that excessive wage demands simply
led to unemployment. This was particularly true in economically depressed
areas such as the north east, Merseyside and the Clyde valley in Scotland.
Unlike previous governments, however, she asserted that her government
would not take measures to combat unemployment. This was to be the price
which workers would have to pay for demanding high wages – they would run
the danger of losing their jobs. By 1986 unemployment had reached 3.4
million, the highest level since the 1930s. The medicine was severe, but she
believed it would cure the disease of high wage costs. Certainly, in the mid-
1980s the number of strikes began to fall and wage demands were moderating.
Secondly her government abolished most of the wages councils after 1986.
These councils, made up of union and employers’ representatives, operated in
a variety of industries. One of their tasks was to set minimum wage levels in
the industry. The effect was to protect the interests of the workers, but also to
prevent wages falling below a certain level when there was a labour surplus.
This led to persistent unemployment in some sectors and regions. By getting
rid of them, the government struck a blow for more flexible labour markets.
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Thirdly, levels of social security benefits, notably for the unemployed were
steadily reduced in real terms. Over-generous social security was seen as a disin-
centive for people to seek work. In other words they meant that workers were
unwilling to work for low wages as they would be better off relying on social
security. This method of using a ‘stick’ to beat people into work was certainly
effective. However, as we shall see below, it was to become one of the main
issues of contention between the Conservative and Labour parties in the 1990s.
But these three policies did not compete with Margaret Thatcher’s principal
assault on organised labour. It was her struggle against the unions which was to
set the tone for both economic and industrial relations policy for twenty years.
Margaret Thatcher and the unions
There can be little doubt that the outcome of the conflict which occurred
between the trade unions and the governments of the 1980s dramatically
altered the economic and social landscape of the country. It was also to set the
scene for the transformation which was to take place in the Labour party after
1987. There were two strands to Thatcher’s attack on the unions. One was a
generalised confrontation with their leadership and the other was a
programme of legislation designed to curb their power.
Confrontations
Mrs Thatcher was fond of lecturing union leaders and the workers whom they
represented about the realities of supply-side economics which are described
above. She also looked for opportunities to set the forces of the state against
those of organised labour. Many conflicts occurred, but two are worthy of note
as perfect illustrations of how and why she was so determined to win victory
in what she saw as the frontline of economic reform.
The first concerned a series of disputes which broke out in the printing
industry. Two newspaper owners – Eddie Shah and Rupert Murdoch – wished
to break the power of the unions in their industry. Unions held a stranglehold
in the printing industry, enforcing closed shops whereby only union members
were allowed to work, and preventing the introduction of labour-saving
technology. In both cases Thatcher made it clear that she backed the
employers and was prepared to introduce legislation to reduce union power.
Ultimately, and partly as a result of political backing, Murdoch and Shah
prevailed. The printing conflict demonstrated two of the problems of union
power as perceived by the supply side theorists. One was that powerful trade
unions tend to lead to over-manning as, not unnaturally, they wish to see as
much employment for their members as possible. The other was resistance to
technological progress. Unions can be conservative bodies, suspicious of
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changes in working practices and unwilling to welcome more efficient
equipment if it leads to job losses. So the printing employers’ victory led to
rapid advances in technology as well as – as the unions had feared – severe
redundancies in the industry.
The second battle was more dramatic. This was the great miners’ strike of
1984–85. A programme of pit closures had been instigated and, as expected,
the miners’ union chose a national strike as their way of expressing opposition.
Led by the marxist Arthur Scargill, the miners, all members of the National
Union of Mineworkers, blockaded the pits, preventing non-unionised labour
from replacing them. The police were mobilised to keep the pits open and the
courts were in almost continuous session prosecuting miners who were
accused of breaking laws restricting picketing and mass demonstrations.
Throughout the winter, police, encouraged by the strong backing of the prime
minister, battled with enraged miners and their leaders. Public opinion
polarised on the issue. It became a symbol of a wider conflict between the free
market policies of the government and the fear that the interests of the
workers was being sacrificed for the sake of economic dogma.
It is part of Conservative party folklore today that Mrs Thatcher won a
resounding victory. The miners were forced back to work and the pit closure
programme continued. This, together with her stand against the Argentine
invasion of the Falkland Islands two years earlier, earned her the title
‘Iron Lady’. 
LEGISLATION
The legal reforms which were effected during the 1980s, and into the 1990s
under John Major, completely altered the balance of power in the industrial
relations field. They also changed the nature of trade unionism for ever. Before
considering the consequences, the legislation should be reviewed:
 1980 Employment Act. Forced unions to hold secret, democratic ballots in
order to take industrial action (mainly strikes). It also introduced secret
ballots for union leadership elections. Before this Act union leaders were
able to force even reluctant members to take industrial action and leaders
were not democratically elected.
 1982 Employment Act. This made it more difficult for unions to enforce
closed shops, i.e. they could no longer force workers to join unions in order
to be given employment.
 1984 Trade Union Act. The main piece of legislation. Before this Act unions
could not be sued for compensation if industrial action led to losses by
affected businesses. The legal immunity of unions has always been one of
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their most cherished privileges. The loss of this immunity was the most
serious blow to their power. After the Act it was possible for firms to sue
unions if a strike or other industrial action was called without a
democratic, secret ballot. The Act also enabled union members to opt out
of allowing some of their union dues to be paid to the Labour party, thus
weakening Labour party–Union links.
 1986 Wages Act. Reduced the ability of Wages Councils to set minimum
wages in some industries.
 1988 Employment Act. Union members refusing to take industrial action
could no longer be disciplined. Closed shops were further undermined and
most of them disappeared. Union funds could effectively no longer be used
for political purposes.
 1990 Employment Act. Further losses of legal immunities for unions. It also
made it virtually impossible for unions to take industrial action for political
reasons: i.e. industrial action was legal only if it was directly concerned
with the wages and conditions of members.
 1993 Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act. This finally abolished
wages councils and gave workers rights to join or not join a union of their
own choice.
There were a number of consequences of this onslaught on union powers and
immunities:
1 Union membership began to fall. To some extent this was caused by the
decline in traditional industries where membership had always been high.
However, the outlawing of closed shops, the greater freedom of workers to
join or not to join a union and their reduced influence also resulted in a
leakage of members.
2 Labour markets did indeed become more flexible. Over-manning was
reduced in many industries, productivity of workers rose and in some
industries wages actually began to fall, thus reducing costs. In other words,
the legislation had exactly the effects which supply side economists had
expected.
3 The number of strikes and other forms of industrial action fell dramatically.
This was partly the result of higher unemployment, but mostly resulted
from tighter legal controls and loss of immunity.
4 The reduction in membership cut off a major source of funding for the
Labour party. This forced them to search for corporate funding, which may
have begun to influence policy making.
5 It forced the Labour party to re-evaluate its long-standing and close
relationship with the trade unions.
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The Thatcher / Major economic reforms summarised
• Laissez-faire policy towards industry and unemployment, allowing the free market to
make its own adjustments.
• Concentration on controlling inflation as the main priority.
• Privatisation of many major industries such as telecommunications, gas, electricity
generation and supply, railways, steel, car industry, water.
• Less reliance on fiscal policy, more on monetary controls – interest rates, money
supply and sterling exchange rates.
• Reduction in trade union power to make labour markets more flexible.
• Reductions in direct taxes on personal and corporate incomes, replaced by higher
indirect taxes.
• Reductions in welfare benefits to reduce the ‘dependency culture’ and force people into
work.
• Stricter controls on monopoly power to promote competition.
• Forcing industries and professions, such as banks, building societies and other
financial institutions, legal profession, opticians, dentists, some postal services, public
transport, to open themselves up to competition. 
LABOUR’S REACTION TO THE END 
OF CONSENSUS
The reaction of the Labour party to the economic reforms of the 1980s and
early 1990s was to dominate the course of politics in Britain in the final twenty
years of the twentieth century. For convenience we can divide Labour’s
reaction into two parts: 1979–87 and 1987–97.
1979–87: trauma
Labour’s election defeat in 1979 had partly been caused by the so-called
‘winter of discontent’ of 1978–79 when a wave of public service industry
strikes hit Britain over wage controls. Nevertheless, the left wing of the party
was convinced that the reason for the loss was that the party was not socialist
enough in its economic outlook. Led by such senior figures as Michael Foot
(leader from 1980 to 1983), Tony Benn and Barbara Castle, the Labour left
forced the party to adopt a number of proposals which were to shift it
markedly away from the Conservative government, which was moving to the
right.
The Labour left wished not only to reverse the reforms made by the Thatcher
administrations, but to adopt some socialist policies which had not been
implemented by previous Labour governments. Among the proposals were the
following:
Understanding British and European political issues18
 the privatised industries to be re-nationalised and new candidates for
nationalisation to be considered;
 restoration of a steeply progressive direct tax system so that there would be
a re-distribution of real income from rich to poor;
 large increases in expenditure on welfare, including generous social
security increases;
 the introduction of a national minimum wage;
 the restoration of the powers and immunities of trade unions;
 curbs on company profits and shareholders’ dividends;
 the re-introduction of keynesian economic demand management.
These economic policies were added to a range of other radical proposals in
defence, foreign policy, law and order and social policy. Together they mark
the period in British political history when political opinion was at its most
polarised. Consensus politics seemed a distant memory in the mid-1980s.
The verdict of the electorate on the left-wing policies of the Labour party was
a resounding rejection. The Conservatives won landslide victories in the 1983
and 1987 elections. To make matters worse for Labour, the economy began to
improve markedly after 1986 and a mini-boom (especially in house prices)
ensured that their reactionary policies would find little favour. The party was
at its lowest ebb since before World War II.
The right wingers in Labour fought a rearguard action against the lurch to the
left. Indeed many leading members formed the breakaway Social Democratic
Party (SDP) which fought the two general elections of the 1980s, winning
many votes but relatively few seats in parliament. Such leading Labour figures
as David Owen, Roy Jenkins, Shirley Williams and Bill Rodgers left the party,
never to return.
But some moderates stayed in the party, notably the new leader, Neil Kinnock
(who had replaced Michael Foot in 1983). Kinnock, who had considered
himself a left winger until he became leader, realised after 1987, that the
British people had no stomach for socialism. However many criticisms there
were of the policies of the Thatcher governments, the electorate did not want
a return to the pre-1979 economic system.
Backed by younger supporters for reform such as John Smith, Gordon Brown
and Tony Blair, Kinnock began the long road to changing the Labour party
for good.
1987–97: reform
Neil Kinnock, his successor John Smith (leader 1992–94) and Tony Blair
(leader after 1994) instituted a process of reform which was to culminate in
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1996–97 with the emergence of what became known as ‘New Labour’.
Kinnock’s ideas can be summarised as follows:
 Free market capitalism was working. It was therefore unacceptable to the
people that excessive state interference or public ownership of industry
should threaten economic success.
 Though some union power could be restored, there could be no return to
the days when unions were able to hold up economic progress in the
pursuit of their own interests.
 Re-nationalisation of most industries was not feasible. Apart from being
too expensive, most of the privatised industries seemed to be relatively
successful. Privatisation was popular on the whole and it worked.
 High income and corporate taxation was indeed a disincentive to economic
dynamism. The levels of before 1979 could therefore not be restored.
 The growing inequalities which were resulting from the operation of free
markets could be tolerated provided there was a robust social security and
welfare system to protect the less well off. The interests of workers could
be protected by a minimum wage system and appropriate legislation to
protect workers’ rights. 
 The state should continue to offer high levels of expenditure on pensions,
social security, health and education and general taxation levels would
reflect this. However, any increased tax burden would largely rely on
indirect taxation (i.e. VAT, duties etc.).
The reforms represented both a pragmatic attitude to economic management, and
a compromise with those Thatcherite policies which had proved to be successful.
The changes in Labour’s economic stance came too late to win them the 1992
general election, even though there had been nearly three years of deep
recession. But the die was cast. Kinnock gave way to John Smith and then to
Tony Blair following Smith’s early death in 1994. Blair set about turning party
reform into full-scale transformation. Hence the development of the idea of
‘New Labour’. He denied that his policies were merely pragmatism or
compromise. Coined by Anthony Giddens, a prominent Labour supporter from
the London School of Economics, the term ‘third way’ expressed the idea that
economic (and other) policies of New Labour were neither socialism nor
Thatcherite neo-liberal. They were claimed to be a fresh start.
NEW LABOUR AND THIRD WAY ECONOMICS
Prelude: Britain and the ERM
The development of Labour’s economic policy in 1996–97 can be better under-
stood in the light of Britain’s experience with economic recession in the early
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1990s, and particularly of her ejection from the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) in 1992.
In some ways the final piece in the Conservative party’s jigsaw of supply side
economics was the manipulation of Britain’s foreign exchange rate. The
argument went like this: Britain had been fundamentally uncompetitive for
decades. This was borne out by the periodic balance-of-payments crises which
had been suffered (notably, 1964, 1966–67, 1975–76). The country had been
cushioned from the effects of being less efficient than her main trade
competitors by a steadily falling value in the exchange rate of sterling. The
effects of the falling international value of the pound is to make British exports
artificially cheaper. This has enabled Britain to trade with the rest of the world
successfully despite her lack of efficiency and therefore competitiveness. The
price to be paid is that low sterling values also means high import prices. As
Britain heavily depends on imports (about one-third of total consumption),
rising import prices has also created nagging inflation.
Margaret Thatcher, and particularly her Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel
Lawson (1983–89) were of the view that, if Britain were no longer protected
by the low value of sterling, the British economy would be forced to be more
competitive. She would have to compete on equal terms and, as a benefit,
import inflation would be controlled.
Lawson’s plan was to ‘shadow’ the deutschmark. This meant keeping the value
of sterling ‘pegged’ to the value of the German currency, then considered to be
Europe’s strongest and most stable. The way this was done was to raise
interest rates when the value of sterling was to go up, and reduce them we
wanted it to fall. In other words the basics of the British economy were forced
to ‘copy’ what was happening in Germany. 
Lawson was removed as Chancellor in 1989 and replaced by John Major.
Major persuaded Thatcher to join the European Exchange Rate Mechanism.
This tied the British currency to all the leading West European currencies, not
just the deutschmark. This was an even more severe discipline for the
economy. When recession struck Europe, however, in 1990 it was clear that
the value of sterling was too high in the ERM and that the economy could not
survive under these circumstances. After disastrous delay, now the responsi-
bility of the new Chancellor, Norman Lamont, Britain was forced out of the
ERM in September 1992 (an event known as Black Wednesday). The value of
sterling fell dramatically in the months which followed, relieving the pressure,
but causing mounting inflation. 
Britain’s ejection from the ERM was a huge humiliation and an indictment
of Conservative economic policy. It is ironic that the effects were beneficial in
the medium term. The inflation subsided, exports picked up because of the
low value of sterling and economic growth improved. But these events were
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to be to the advantage of New Labour rather than John Major’s Conservative
government.
Labour, especially Gordon Brown, learned some lessons from the ERM disaster.
Most importantly, it was seen that attempts simply to force the economy to be
more competitive would not work on their own. Positive steps would have to
be taken to improve efficiency. Secondly, and in the longer term, attempts by
politicians to control the economy as a whole were usually compromised by
political considerations. Thirdly, Brown also understood that inflation was not
an acceptable price to be paid for other economic policies. These three lessons
were to make a significant impact on New Labour’s economics of the third way. 
Fundamentals of the third way
When Labour took power in 1997, its first Chancellor, Gordon Brown, was
very clear as to what economic principles to adopt. They were as follows:
1 Supply-side economics is, in general, effective. However, it is not enough to
assume that the production side of the economy will grow satisfactorily if
left to its own devices by government. There have to be positive steps of a
micro-economic nature to underpin the effects of free market economics.
Micro-economic policy includes measures designed to give a direct boost to
different sections of the economy (such as the labour force, individual
industries, regional economies etc.), rather than attempting to control the
economy as a whole, which is described as macro-economic policy. The
precise nature of these micro-economic policies is described below.
2 The social security system should play a positive role in encouraging the
unemployed to find work. It is not sufficient simply to set benefits at such a
low level that people prefer to work than to be on benefit. Rather, the social
security system should provide incentives for people to enter the world of
work. In other words, benefits should be a carrot rather than a stick.
3 On the whole politicians should not interfere with the workings of the
macro economy, either with monetarist or keynesian policies. They are
usually reluctant to take decisions which might be good for the economy,
but bad for the fortunes of the government, and are always tempted to take
popular measures which might damage the economy. Thus they like to
reduce interest rates and tax levels but raise public spending before
elections, but have to reverse these measures if inflation begins to rise too
quickly. Macro-economic policy, therefore, should be taken out of the hands
of politicians and given to independent, non-political bodies. As this is done
by two of the world’s most successful economies – those of Germany and
the USA – the evidence in favour of the principle is compelling.
4 The operation of free markets may be beneficial on the whole, but problems
arise if there is not genuine competition in the these markets. It is the role
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of government, therefore, to ensure that there is genuinely free competition
to ensure the best interests of consumers are served and that British
industry remains competitive with the rest of the world.
5 The long-term success of the economy is dependent on eliminating the wild
fluctuations in economic growth, unemployment and inflation from Britain
had suffered for forty years or more. What Gordon Brown called the ‘boom
and bust’ economy had to be replaced by long-term stability.
These policies were in part an extension of past Conservative policies, but also,
in some regards, a departure from them. The details below indicate where the
continuities and the divergences lie.
Continuities
● Free market capitalism is the best way to create wealth and economic growth. 
● Measures to stimulate the supply side of the economy are more effective on the
whole than management of the demand side.
● Inflation is the most serious problem for the economy. It causes unemployment,
lack of competitiveness and reduces business and consumer confidence.
Economic policy should concentrate, therefore, on inflation control.
● Excessively high levels of tax on incomes and company profits are a disin-
centive to economic enterprise and so should be avoided.
Divergences
● Conservatives are less enthusiastic about interfering with the economy on the
micro-economic level. 
● Conservatives oppose excessive measures to promote competition. They
oppose regulation of industry and business in principle.
● Conservatives are wary of the idea of a national minimum wage. They reluc-
tantly accepted it after 1997, but would set it at a very low level as they believe
it may cause unemployment if set too high.
● There is a fear among Conservatives that the Bank of England is too limited in
its function of setting interest rates to control inflation. They believe it should
have a wider role in controlling economic factors, including foreign exchange
rates of sterling.
● The Conservatives remain more determined than Labour to reduce the overall
burden of taxation, even if this may mean reductions in spending on public
services in the short run.
● Where public services are seen to be failing, Conservatives generally favour
outright privatisation, whereas New Labour prefers the solution of creating a
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partnership between public and private sectors, in other words only partial
privatisation.
● The greatest divergence between Labour and Conservative attitudes to
economic policy concerns the European Union. This is examined in more
detail below, but it revolves mainly around opposition to the adoption of a
single European currency and a fear that economic policy making is falling
increasingly into the hands of distant, undemocratic bureaucrats and bankers.
A new consensus?
At first sight it may appear that there are a significant number of differences
between Conservative and Labour attitudes to economic policy. Closer exami-
nation, however, reveals that, if we consider basic principles, there is a large
measure of agreement. Distinctions are largely confined to detail and
emphasis. For example, there is now agreement that the Bank of England’s
Monetary Policy Committee should set interest rates independently, but
Conservative want to widen its role. Similarly, the national minimum wage is
now accepted on all sides, but the parties will disagree on the level at which
it should be set.
The Liberal Democrats have introduced some fundamental dissent since
1997. They place much less importance on the level of taxation, believing
that governments should not fear rises in direct taxation if this is necessary
to maintain a good level of public services. The Liberal Democrats are also
much less enthusiastic about the involvement of the private sector in
services such as education, health and public transport than either Labour
or the Conservatives.
But the general picture does suggest a new economic consensus, at least in the
domestic sphere, which is as solid as the old keynesian certainties of the 1950s,
1960s and 1970s. It is in the European dimension where genuine divisions exist
and consensus remains a distant prospect, at least until the controversy over
British participation in the single European currency is resolved.
ECONOMIC POLICIES SINCE 1997
We can now examine the main developments which have occurred since 1997
in more detail. The most important decisions were taken at the beginning of
Labour’s administration and have proved to be the most radical changes which
have occurred since the end of the keynesian consensus.
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Macro-economics: monetary and fiscal policy
Monetary policy 
Gordon Brown made two immediate decisions which were to dominate policy
for years to come. The first, and most important, was to grant operational
independence to the Bank of England and to establish a Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC) which was to set base interest rates.
The committee has nine independent members, none of them politicians, who
meet every month to set the base interest rate of the Bank of England, thus
effectively determining mortgage and other main rates on loans and savings.
The committee was to publish details of its deliberations and even the internal
voting is revealed. It has only one task which is to set interest rates to keep the
inflation rate within a maximum set by the government. This is based on the
assumption that raising interest rates will curb inflation by reducing
borrowing and therefore spending. Conversely, if inflation is falling, indicating
a slow-down in the economy, spending can be stimulated by reducing the
interest rate.
Initially the ceiling rate was a stiff 2.5 per cent and was still in place in 2002.
Should the rate rise above this, or fall below a floor of 1.5 per cent the
committee must write an open letter of explanation and, of course, put the
matter right as soon as possible. There can be no political interference and no
considerations, other than inflation, can be taken into account.
At first sight this might seem a minor detail of policy. In fact it has been viewed
as one of the most important economic decisions to be taken since World War
II. Its significance can be summarised as follows:
 It provides a stable economic platform, free from interference by politi-
cians. This inspires confidence among consumers, the business community
and financial markets.
 If politicians do try to over-expand the economy dangerously through
keynesian fiscal management they will simply be thwarted by the
Monetary Policy Committee which will raise interest rates to keep inflation
down.
 It demonstrated the government’s determination to behave in an econom-
ically responsible manner.
 It put a key element of economic policy into the hands of neutral experts
who would not be influenced by short-term political considerations. 
The immediate reaction among Conservatives was to oppose the introduction
of the MPC. Very quickly, however, they came to see the sense of it and finance
spokesman, Michael Portillo, soon accepted it. However, as we saw above, the
Conservatives remain concerned that the MPC has too narrow a role, and
should take factors other than inflation into consideration. Opposition was
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futile, in any case, when the operation of the committee proved successful,
with inflation remaining within target throughout New Labour’s first term.
Fiscal policy
Gordon Brown had gone halfway towards removing macro-economic policy
making from political hands with the introduction of the MPC. But this was
not enough for him. He also wished to see an end to governments’ tendency
to run up huge borrowing during recessions (by reducing taxes and raising
public expenditure). He wanted a straitjacket placed around fiscal policy. He
was influenced heavily by the fact that he had inherited a huge burden of
public debt from the previous government. His response was the so-called
‘golden rule’.
The golden rule, whose official name is the ‘Code for Fiscal Stability’, states
that a government should not borrow money for the purpose of simply
spending more than it is raising in taxes (i.e. for current account debt). Rather,
there can be borrowing only to finance investment, that is, projects which will
have lasting benefit such as roads, schools or hospitals. What this effectively
means is that a government cannot simply spend and borrow its way out of a
recession without breaking the rule.
To demonstrate his determination, Brown risked unpopularity by tightening
public spending for the first three years of the new government’s term. Public
spending as a proportion of national income (i.e. the economy’s total output)
fell from 41.2 per cent in 1996 to 38.9 per cent in 1999. At a time when the
government as a whole was promising improvements in public services, he
was actually reducing public expenditure from £343 billion to £340 billion! As
a result, the government finances moved from a deficit (i.e. government
borrowing) of 3.6 per cent of national income in 1997 to a surplus (i.e.
repayment of government debt) of 2 per cent of national income in 2000 – an
improvement over three years of £40 billion.
This responsible attitude to government budgeting was underpinned by a
cautious stance on taxes. Brown also refused to court political popularity by
reducing the tax burden. But the Labour government’s policy on taxation as a
whole proved to be less coherent than its stance on macro-economics.
Taxation
The overall effects of tax policy after 1997 were largely neutral. There was a
small rise in the burden of taxation from about 36 per cent of national income
in 1997 to 38 per cent in 2000. However, most of this was caused by ‘fiscal
drag’ rather than policy changes. Fiscal drag refers to a natural process
whereby, as prosperity rises, which it did fairly rapidly between 1997 and
Understanding British and European political issues26
2001, the proportion of National Income taken in tax is bound to rise as
individuals and companies move into higher tax brackets. Increased spending
by consumers also raises more in VAT and various duties.
Having said that, Gordon Brown did make some important decisions. These
added up to a sizeable shift in the emphasis on taxes away from income tax
towards indirect taxes and other subtle or ‘hidden’ tax changes. A new income
tax bracket was introduced at 10 per cent instead of 20 per cent for many of
the low paid. Several million were also taken out of taxation at the bottom end
of the earnings scale. Tax credits (i.e. benefits paid through the tax system)
were made available for poorer families and there were reductions in the tax
burdens on businesses, especially small ones.
To pay for these reductions the government increased a wide range of other
taxes which became known by the Opposition as ‘stealth taxes’. This was
because most payers were not fully aware that there had been an increase. A
typical example was the loss of tax relief on many private pension schemes.
Tobacco and petrol duties also rose sharply and the married couples’ tax
allowance was abolished.
The general direction of Gordon Brown’s tax policies has been mildly socialist.
There has been a reduction in the burden of taxation on the low paid and
working families with children, including lone parents, have all done well.
However, he has resisted the temptation to raise the top rate of income tax
above 40 per cent or to introduce greater tax burdens on high levels of
business profits. But Brown had plenty of room to relieve tax burdens even
more on the low paid after 1999. Instead, he has chosen to pay off chunks of
the national debt and raise levels of expenditure on public services.
Micro-economic policy
As we saw above, New Labour moved supply-side economics a stage further
than the Conservatives by taking a number of direct, positive measures to
improve the efficiency and productivity of British commerce and industry. 
As with the Conservatives, the Labour government laid great stress on the
effectiveness of competition in promoting efficiency and there has been a
sustained drive to introduce market forces into such industries as telecommu-
nications, transport, electricity, retailing and the car industry. At the same time
the Office of Fair Trading was given increased powers in 1999 to outlaw
uncompetitive practices by large manufacturers who were attempting to exert
too much control over retail distribution.
Persistent problems in depressed areas such as the north east, south west and
north west were a further concern. Twelve Regional Development Agencies
were set up in 1998 to distribute public funds for regeneration of existing
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industry and to attract new investment into these areas. Although this has not
solved long-term unemployment in the regions, it has contributed to a steady
reduction in overall unemployment. 
But the main thrust of micro economic policy fell on labour markets. Union
powers were not, on the whole, restored in spite of intense pressure from the
left wing of the party. Although the national minimum wage was introduced it
was set at such a low level (£3.80 per hour), that employment was little
affected. Thus the downward trend in level of industrial unrest was maintained
and wage costs fell to be increasingly in line with the rest of Europe.
In the longer term, Tony Blair continually stressed the need for a more highly
trained and educated workforce. His clarion call for ‘education, education,
education’ in 1997 was not just for social reasons. He recognised that a higher-
quality labour force would be more able to compete and to handle new
technologies. So the drive for higher standards from pre-school to university
was as much about economics as it was about education. A Training and
Skills Council was also set up to organise more training on an industry-by-
industry basis. 
In common with his Conservative predecessor, John Major, Blair also saw
small businesses as the driving force of economic growth, so they were granted
substantial concessions on taxes and employment.
These micro-economic measures represented a continuation of Conservative
policies in the 1990s. However, they were now being conducted within a stable
macro-economic environment. Progress along these lines had been thwarted in
the past by the uneven nature of economic growth, Blair’s government hoped
that the healthier climate would enable Britain to compete in the long term.
EUROPE AND THE ECONOMY
The impact of the European Union on Britain is considered later in this book.
But some mention of Europe must be made here as British involvement has
had a growing effect on the conduct of economic policy making, especially
since the Single European Act came into force in 1987. This finalised the
creation of a single market in Europe. In other words the British economy was
thereafter strongly influenced by European events. The main effects on policy
can be summarised as follows:
 British interest rates are affected by the level of European rates which are
determined by the European Central Bank. The Monetary Policy
Committee of the Bank of England does not have to follow European rates,
but recognises that there may be an impact on British inflation.
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 The Labour government after 1997 has been committed to creating
favourable conditions for entry into the single European currency. These
are known as the ‘convergence criteria’, a set of conditions which will bring
Britain’s economy into line with that of the rest of the EU. They include low
inflation and interest rates, controlled levels of public debt and low
unemployment. Britain has moved steadily towards the criteria and had
achieved them by the end of 2000. In the event, the government would
probably have worked towards similar objectives, single currency or not,
but it has been a factor in the background of policy consideration.
 The exchange rate between sterling and the euro has been significant. The
weakness of the euro (and therefore the relative strength of sterling)
during 2000–1 made British exports to Europe expensive (but imports
have also been cheap – a great help with inflation control). The
government was able to do little to counteract this trend, but it has made
the competitiveness of British industry an even more pressing problem.
 Competition policy must conform to European rules. In fact this has
speeded the process as controls in Europe have traditionally been tighter
than in Britain. European policy has therefore suited the supply side stance
of New Labour.
Labour’s ‘third way’ economic policies since 1997 summarised
• Transferring control over interest rates to the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank
of England.
• Introducing the ‘golden rule’ establishing fiscal responsibility – no public borrowing
other than for investment.
• Making labour markets more flexible at the lower end through low tax bands and
welfare benefits for poorer families.
• Raising indirect taxes to fund spending on improved public services, but not direct
taxation.
• Encouraging partnerships between public and private sector enterprises to fund
investment in public services such as health, education and transport.
• Preparing the British economy to enter the euro-zone in due course.
• Increased spending for regional industrial development.
SUMMARY: SOME THEMES
We can identify several important features of economic policy in the period
since the 1960s.
1 The existence of a conflict and consensus on economic policy has ebbed and
flowed. There was a strong consensus in the 1950s, 1960s and most of the
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1970s. This collapsed in the late 1970s, culminating in an extreme schism in
the mid-1980s as the Conservative party moved to a right-wing, neo-liberal
position and Labour shifted dramatically to a left-wing, socialist position.
During the 1990s the two main parties, supported by the Liberal democrats
moved slowly back towards consensus. This was based on the success of New
Labour’s third way policies. In the early years of the twenty-first century,
however, this new consensus was threatened by divisions over the future of
Britain’s involvement with the European Union.
2 British economic policy making has been characterised by periodic recessions,
followed by rather shorter intervals of growing prosperity. Policy has,
therefore, usually been dominated by the need to combat the existing
recession or avoiding the next one. Recession policies are, ironically, rather
easier to develop than the decisions which have to be made when economic
growth is healthy. In times of economic slowdown, inflation has been low,
interest rates have fallen and the exchange rate of sterling drops, making it
easier for industry to export. The problems for policy makers are, therefore,
how to deal with unemployment and how to finance the public debt which
inevitably mounts up in a recession. It was also normal to reduce taxation at
such times to try to boost consumption, so governments were able to make
decisions which enjoyed short-term popularity.
3 Governments have conspicuously failed to maintain sustained periods of
economic growth, at least until after 1995. Tempted by the availability of
increased funds governments have tended to raise public expenditure and
reduce taxation dramatically in the good times. However, such measures have
typically created rapid inflation and have simply forced a clampdown in the
following years. This kind of cycle became known as ‘stop–go’ policy. This was
certainly the experience in the late 1960s, late1970s and late 1980s.
4 Faced by an unusually long period of sustained economic growth between
1995 and 2001 governments have found new problems in prosperity. Various
groups, for example demanded tax cuts, from poor families to motorists to
businesses. At the same time, calls on the public finances grew from different
groups who wanted their fair share of the prosperity. The obvious examples
are the health, education, law and order and transport authorities. But other
groups want some of the action too. Farmers, small businesses, local author-
ities and cultural or sporting bodies have demanded a bigger share. The more
cautious chancellors in this period – Ken Clarke and Gordon Brown – have
avoided the sins of their predecessors by keeping public expenditure under
control and maintaining tax levels, but have paid a high political price for
doing so.
5 The growing importance of Europe and the global economy will bring new,
longer-term pressures on economic policy makers. Certainly there is bound to
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be a loss of flexibility and independence as international forces exert an
increasing influence on the British economy. 
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 To what extent have New Labour’s economic policies been different
from those of other governments since 1979?
2 What was meant by Gordon Brown’s claim to have established
‘prudence with a purpose’? How has he sought to achieve it.
3 What have been the differing attitudes towards taxation and welfare
demonstrated by Conservative and Labour governments since 1979?
4 Has a new economic consensus emerged since 1992?
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This short chapter is designed to introduce the subject of the Welfare State as
a complete concept before we discuss some of its individual elements –
education, health and social security – in further chapters. The origins and
principles of the Welfare State will be discussed and the changing attitude of
the parties and their policy makers to it will be traced.
DEFINITION
There is no agreed definition of the term ‘welfare state’, though we can say
that the description became widely used in the early years of the twentieth
century. We can also make a clear distinction between a situation where the
state provides a wide variety of welfare provision and one where there is a
systematic arrangement for providing universal welfare through the state.
This distinction can be illustrated by referring to health care provision in
Britain.
Before 1946 health care was either privately supplied, in which case
individuals simply paid for their own health care, while others were offered a
state-subsidised system of health insurance. Those who did not take
advantage of the insurance scheme were left without such care unless they
could rely on charity and on local authority hospitals. Hospitals and doctors
would save lives without reference to ability to pay, but other forms of health
care were reserved for the well off or the state insured. Britain was, therefore,
a state which provided basic health care for all and a voluntary insurance
system, but the system was not universal. After the establishment of the
National Health Service in 1946, however, the state guaranteed to provide
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health care for all, on demand and according to need. At the same time
everybody in work was required to contribute through National Insurance
payments. The NHS was both universal and compulsorily funded. A small
private health sector remained for those whom preferred to pay for care.
We could apply a similar analysis to other services such as housing, education
and social security, to illustrate the difference between the Welfare State as
such and what had gone before. For our purposes we can identify a number of
features which define the Welfare State (see box).
The Welfare State
• Benefits are universal, supplied free according to people’s needs. Nobody is excluded.
• Contributions are compulsory, at least by those who are in work.
• The state guarantees to maintain certain minimum standards of welfare services. This
is to ensure that state-run services are not significantly inferior to those supplied by the
private sector.
WHAT IS INCLUDED
The term welfare is not a precise one so that a Welfare State may contain a
variety of different services. In Britain, where the system is broad based, there
is a large number of services included in the term. These are:
 The provision of personal health services, including medical research. These
are centrally organised.
 Public health provision such as protection from virulent diseases, mass
inoculation, services for the unborn child and young infants, provided by
local authorities.
 Social services at a local government level. These deal with such issues as
protection of children, including orphans, family support, care of the
elderly at home and support for single parents.
 Subsidised housing, again at local level. Rents were heavily subsidised and
local authorities were responsible for housing all residents and maintaining
the housing stock.
 Education (under the 1944 Education Act) was to provided free for all
those between the ages of 5 and 15 (later raised to 16), and for those who
reached a good educational standard at 16–18 years. Places on degree
courses were available for a small proportion of the most able. Later, post-
16 education was made available for all, and the number of university
places were greatly expanded.
 A comprehensive system of social security was established. There were a
wide variety of benefits available to all according to need. These included
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maternity benefits for pregnant women and nursing mothers, sickness
benefits to compensate those who lost wages through illness,
unemployment benefit, housing benefit for the very poor, family income
support, again for the poor, child benefits for all families with children up
to 16 years, free school lunches and uniform grants, old age pensions,
death grants for funeral expenses and widows’ benefit. In other words,
benefits for all kinds of need which may occur within a family.
BASIC PRINCIPLES
These are more difficult to establish than a clear definition. This is because
different political movements in Britain after World War II, while agreeing to
the establishment of the Welfare State, presented differing attitudes to welfare.
Here we shall examine three political traditions: Liberalism, Conservatism and
Democratic Socialism (i.e. Labour).
Liberalism
It was Liberal thinkers from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
such as T.H. Green, L. Hobhouse and T. Hobson who had proposed the ideas
that a civilised, modern state should provide some broad levels of welfare for
its people. This tradition (known as ‘New Liberalism’) provided the philo-
sophical grounding for early state welfare systems at the start of the twentieth
century. It was politicians such as Joseph Chamberlain (mayor of Birmingham)
and David Lloyd George (prime minister 1916–22) who introduced the first
practical measures.
Their view was that individuals could only be truly free if they were provided
with opportunities and relief from the worst excesses of deprivation. They
believed that people have a moral obligation to contribute to the welfare of
others and that this was best achieved through the state.
The synthesis of theory and action came to its height with the rise to promi-
nence of William (later Lord) Beveridge in the 1940s. A civil servant and later
Liberal peer, Beveridge produced a report on the future of social policy in
Britain in 1942. This was forever after known as the ‘Beveridge Report’ and
represents the origin of today’s Welfare State. The Beveridge principles, which
are also those of the modern Liberal movement, were as follows:
 A variety of social evils, including poverty, lack of education and un-
employment represented limits to the freedom of those who suffered them.
 It follows that the state should intervene in order to reduce these evils and
so enhance freedom.
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 All are entitled to a minimum standard of living.
 In order to ensure such a standard of living it is necessary that all members
of society should contribute to a pool of welfare.
 That all are entitled to draw from this pool according to their need.
Liberals and the Liberal Democrat party itself have supported the principles of
the Welfare State ever since Beveridge. They consider it a vital part of a
modern, civilised society.
Conservatism
Between the 1950s and the 1970s traditional Conservative thinkers and politi-
cians supported the Welfare State. Being a pragmatic movement, Conser-
vatism has accepted that this kind of welfare has improved the condition of
the people and has become a popular device for promoting the common
good. Though they may have had suspicions that a compulsory system of
welfare inhibits individualism, they have supported it as part of a popular
consensus.
When a new brand of Conservatism – the new right – emerged in the 1970s
and 1980s, led by Margaret Thatcher, attitudes to welfare changed markedly.
The new right feared that a ‘dependency culture’ had grown up whereby
people had become used to depending on the state and this had sapped their
sense of individual enterprise. They therefore sought to reduce the role of the
Welfare State in a number of ways, replacing it with private-sector provisions.
The first target was subsidised housing. Council properties were offered for
sale, at a discount, to their tenants. By the end of the 1980s many thousands
of former council tenants had become home owners. Most of the rest of the
subsidised housing system was transferred to voluntary housing associations
which are outside the control of the state. The social security system also
came under attack. Various benefits, such as unemployment support, child
benefits and the old age pension were steadily eroded. These benefits were
seen as a deterrent to work and to private insurance schemes or pension
schemes.
Though education and health systems remained largely intact, new right
Conservatives made no secret of their preference for private services and
people were encouraged to take out private health insurance and to send their
children to private schools. Private pensions, health and education all received
generous tax reliefs in a period when the public services were in decline.
Nevertheless the Conservative party could not bring itself to dismantle the
Welfare State and its principles survived the onslaught which took place
between 1979 and 1997.
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Labour
Although the Welfare State was essentially developed by Liberals, its estab-
lishment was seen as the crowning glory of the post-war Labour government.
It became a symbol of the British form of socialism and was staunchly
defended. That is not to say that Labour governments always treated the
Welfare State kindly. It was Labour which introduced and often increased
charges for prescriptions, dental care and eye checks. The principle that
welfare benefits should be free at the point of demand was thus eroded almost
immediately by the party which had introduced it.
Although the Labour party, while in opposition, defended the Welfare State
against Conservative reforms in the 1980s, it failed to maintain the real value
of pensions while in office and did not increase the proportion of National
Income spent on either health care or education.
The advent of New Labour in the 1990s under John Smith and Tony Blair
changed the party’s attitude to the Welfare State. Their new interest in individ-
ualism led them to suggest that it was indeed up to individuals to make
provision for their own welfare if they could afford to. A number of key
measures have been taken by Labour which have gone some way to eroding
welfare provision. The most striking act was to introduce tuition fees for
university students. At the same time a system of ‘stakeholder pensions’ was
introduced – a private pension scheme sponsored by the state, but left to
individuals to make their own provisions. It was clear from this that there is
an intention to erode or remove the state pension from future generations.
Labour’s loss of enthusiasm for the Welfare State should not, however, be
exaggerated. Its principles are still intact and there were substantial increases
in pensions, child benefit and family benefits in the early part of the twenty-
first century. Similarly large increases in expenditure on the National Health
Service and on schools followed, demonstrating that a strong faith in public
sector welfare provision remained in the Labour party.
THE FUTURE OF THE WELFARE STATE
None of the major parties will admit that there is a possibility of the main
aspects of the Welfare State being dismantled; but its prospects do not appear
to be rosy. A future Conservative government, especially under its new leader,
Iain Duncan Smith, may well decide to replace state health or education
provision with private-sector arrangements. They have a sense that the Welfare
State is not appropriate for a modern, pluralist society as there is sufficient
prosperity for people to be able to make private arrangements. Furthermore,
Understanding British and European political issues36
many in the party believe the private sector will provide better, more efficient,
services than the state can do.
The Liberal Democrats still support the Welfare State staunchly. However, they
are unlikely to form a government in the foreseeable future and their political
influence remains weak. The best they can hope for is to influence the
devolved governments of Scotland and Wales so that welfare remains under
state control.
Uncertainty surrounds the future attitude of the Labour party towards the
welfare State. The ordinary members of the party are unlikely to allow the
principle to die, but the parliamentary leadership is much less attached to the
idea of the Welfare State and may wish to modify, if not abolish it. As we have
seen above, pensions and education seem to be most at risk, it may be that
private health may make inroads into state welfare provision. Some form of
universal social security will always be necessary, but it is very possible that
future Labour administrations will continue to chip away at the benefits
system.
If any government were to allow individuals to ‘opt out’ of the system in the
future the Beveridge principles will have died, since universal contribution is
what defines the Welfare State.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 Assess the extent to which the neo-liberal economic reforms of the
1980s and 1990s resulted in fundamental changes in the UK
economy.
2 Assess the view that Gordon Brown is a cautious rather than a
radical Chancellor of the Exchequer.
3 How much consensus on economic policy now exists in the British political system?
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The National Health Service came into existence in 1948 after a prolonged
period of negotiation between the reforming Labour government of the day
and various sections of the medical profession. It was an idea with great
popular support, but which also created great misgivings among health profes-
sionals. Very soon, however, it became the centrepiece of British social policy.
Its main creator, Nye Bevan, was lionised for his efforts and it became an
apparently immovable institution within a few years.
Its principles were relatively simple. It was to be funded from taxation and the
National Insurance system, which had also been introduced by Atlee’s
government. All taxpayers were thus obliged to contribute, but at the same
time all citizens were entitled to free consultations and treatments, free at the
point of delivery and granted entirely according to need.
Although private medical practice was allowed to continue for those who
wished to pay separately, the vast majority of doctors, dentists, opticians,
nurses, hospitals and other health specialists were contracted to work for the
state. Their salaries would be fixed and not dependent on how many patients
they treated. As a compromise, most of these professionals were allowed to
undertake a limited amount of private work to top up their earnings.
So the great experiment began – the creation of a health service which was
entirely free and totally managed by the state. Funding was passed down
through a hierarchy of health authorities which fell under centralised control.
Up to the nineteen seventies, all seemed to go well. Economic growth kept
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pace with the increasing demands for health care. The only challenge to the
system – a shortfall in funding as the NHS was unexpectedly popular so that
visits to the doctor and demand for drugs rose alarmingly – was met by the
introduction of prescription charges in 1950.
These charges for doctors’ prescriptions were the only way in which patients
were expected to contribute. They were introduced for two reasons. Firstly to
help fund the NHS, and, secondly, as a way of deterring too many visits to
the doctor for minor ailments. The very young and the old were exempt, as
were social security claimants, so the new charges were not seen as an
excessive hardship.
THE SYSTEM COMES UNDER STRAIN
The first signs of crisis in the NHS appeared in the second half of the 1970s. To
a certain extent this was the result of events which were in no way under British
control. Two huge increases in the world price of oil – in 1973–74 and in
1978–79 – created serious reductions in world trade and an economic downturn
in the western world. Britain, under Jim Callaghan’s Labour government
suffered as badly as the rest. As a result, tax revenues were falling and
unemployment rose which put pressure on government finances. The National
Health Service almost inevitably lost out in these times of economic hardship.
Ironically, the health service was also becoming a victim of its own successes.
During the 1960s and 1970s a wide range of new treatments were becoming
available. Typical examples were transplants – mainly kidneys and hearts,
heart bypass operations, hip replacements, new forms of cancer treatment and
cures for ulcers. These developments were both popular and expensive. To add
to the problems, Britain’s ageing population was placing even more strain on
health care. So the NHS was suffering from pressure from two directions –
falling levels of expenditure and rising expectations of how much it could
deliver. Some of the strain was taken up by growth in the private health sector,
but the vast majority of people still expected free health care and could not
afford the alternative.
The signs of trouble could be seen in growing waiting lists, longer waiting
times, declining general practitioner services and disquiet among the medical
professions. The worst problems were to be found in what are known as acute
services, such as accident and emergency and intensive care.
These were some of the problems which Margaret Thatcher inherited when
she took office in 1979. To make matters worse the economic recession
deepened. All public services came under scrutiny to see if expenditure cuts
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could be made. Thatcher was also committed to avoiding large tax increases.
This was both a philosophical motion, based on the idea that high taxes are a
disincentive to enterprise, and a necessity as the economy needed greater
stimulation. It was to take three years before the new government could take
stock and decide what to do.
HEALTH UNDER THE CONSERVATIVES, 1979–97
Funding
The most obvious reaction to the growing crisis was to examine the whole basis
upon which the NHS was being funded. There were a number of alternatives:
● Go to the American model. This would require people to make their own
health insurance arrangements. Those who were unable or unwilling to do so
would be provided only with emergency services or, for the poor, a very basic
set of general services. This would have entailed a number of problems.
Health insurance in the USA was, and still is, notoriously expensive. Services
for the poor are usually inadequate, creating ghettoes of chronically poor
health mainly in the big cities. Children often go without essential optical or
dental care and those who have no insurance are sometimes relentlessly
pursued for contributions to the cost of emergency care. Above all, however,
the US model would have been unacceptable to public opinion.
● Adopt the French system. There is a subsidised insurance scheme combined
with a national service which does provide a wide range of services free. In
other words, it is a hybrid system, part state funded, part privately funded but
with incentives to keep the cost of health care down to a minimum. This was
clearly an attractive option, but it was rejected, partly because it would have
been opposed by health practitioners and partly because the French
experience is that services are patchy, with excellent services available where
private insurance provides the funding, and poor state run services. Thus,
France has a good record of treatment of major problems such as cancer and
heart disease, but it primary care services do not match up to those available
in the UK.
● Pressure could have been taken off the National Health Service by encour-
aging as many people as possible to take up private health insurance. This
could have been done by offering substantial tax incentives to those taking up
such schemes. Tax breaks could also have helped the companies providing
private health. This promising idea was rejected as it would have been seen as
a measure designed purely to help the wealthier middle classes. Working class
public opinion would have been disenchanted. 
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● Leave NHS funding essentially as it is, but introduce a wider range of
charges to ‘top-up’ tax revenues. This was an attractive proposition as it
could be claimed that the principles of the NHS were not being attacked.
Like the other options, however, it was rejected by the Health Minister,
Norman Fowler. At a time when the government was seeking to keep tax
levels down, more NHS charges would have been seen as a form of hidden
taxation. 
Fowler decided in 1982 to leave NHS funding as it was. An election was due
and the Conservatives were unwilling to fight it with accusations surrounding
them that they were attacking the NHS. Despite its problems, public support
for the principle of a fully funded state system was unshakable. Instead he
decided, with Thatcher’s enthusiastic backing, to look for ways of ensuring
that the existing funding was used more efficiently and that forms of saving
should be found. Attention therefore switched to management. Before leaving
the issue of funding, however, it should be emphasised that, in the early years
of the twenty-first century, the same options are available and have to be
considered in view of the enduring problems of the NHS.
Management of the NHS
When Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1997, she did so with a determi-
nation to improve the performance of public services. She saw most state run
activities as inefficient, wasteful, poorly managed, overstaffed and lacking in
innovation. The Civil Service came in for her closest attention and Lord Rayner
was hired from Marks & Spencer to introduce radical reforms. The NHS, being
the country’s largest employer was another obvious candidate for reform.
Roy Griffiths, managing director of Sainsbury’s was engaged to carry out a
review of the management structure of the NHS. He reported in 1983. The
Griffiths report was highly critical of the way the service was being run.
Among his criticisms were:
 The NHS was extremely inefficiently run.
 There was a lack of decisive management.
 Too many spending decisions were made on an ad hoc basis and took little
account of how to provide value for money and how to deal with the needs
of patients on a rational basis.
 He told doctors that they had to play a bigger role in management. In
return for the freedom they enjoyed in clinical decision making, they were
required to look at the broader management needs of the system.
 He recommended a comprehensive management structure to be put in
place in all levels of the NHS. The new managers would be charged with
the job of making savings through greater efficiency and of ensuring that
expenditure should be focused more effectively on patient care.
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 Management was to be conducted by a combination of executives
recruited from outside and of doctors who made themselves available for
this role.
The management bureaucracy which Griffiths created might have solved most
of the NHS’s problems, just as the Rayner reforms had transformed the Civil
Service. Unfortunately for him and for the government, another funding crisis
hit the service in the mid-1980s so it became difficult to establish whether the
new system was working. More certainly, the introduction of a professional
management hierarchy has been controversial ever since. Doctors, nurses and
other health workers have always criticised the interference of managers in
their medical decision making. The managers themselves have also been
accused of eating up large proportions of NHS funding. Ironically, in other
words, the very management system which was designed to save money and
improve efficiency, itself became the cause of wastage.
The internal market
By 1987, not long after the Griffiths structure had been introduced, a major
funding crisis struck the NHS. As we have seen above this was the result of a
squeeze on the service whereby the government was reluctant to raise
spending as this would put pressure on taxpayers, while demand for health
care was growing alarmingly. More radical measures were needed.
Better prevention of illnesses was the first method which was suggested to
take the financial pressure off the NHS. In 1987 general practitioners (GPs)
were given budgets for more inoculations against serious disease, for regular
check-ups on older patients and on disease early screening systems. But the
effects of these schemes would not be felt for some years to come. The crisis
was a short-term problem for the government.
The fundamental problem for the NHS, as with many public services, was that
it was never likely to be as efficient as private enterprise because it was not
subject to the kind of competition which breeds such efficiency. Despite this,
Conservative governments of the 1980s tended to judge the performance of
public services against the private sector. So the question was: how was it
possible to subject a public service to the disciplines of the market without
actually privatising it? 
A White Paper, published in 1989, entitled ‘Working for Patients’ seemed to
have the answer. This was a complicated set of proposals, but its principle was
relatively simple. The NHS was to split into two halves. One half would be
known as purchasers, and the other half as providers. This division would
imitate a normal market situation where there are buyers and sellers. As long
as the purchasers had a choice of providers, it could be expected that they
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would look for the best value for money. Any savings made by purchasers could
be used as an incentive, so that they would pursue even more savings.
The two halves of the system were: providers – NHS trusts, special health
authorities, non-fundholding GPs – and purchasers – Health authorities, GP
fundholders.
The providers were of three types:
1 NHS trusts were groups of hospitals, clinics and other services run by a non-
profit-making trust. They provided treatments at a price which was to be
paid by purchasers. The trusts were run by professional managers and other
representatives from the local community and from the medical profession.
As they were in competition with others, they would have the discipline of
the market to contend with. The penalty for not competing successfully
would be contraction in size, less funding and even closure. The rewards for
doing well and selling their services successfully would be increased funds
and the possibilities of expansion. 
2 Special health authorities are a variety of specialised organisations such as
blood services and teaching hospitals. They provide some of the services
not available through the trusts.
3 Non fundholding GPs. These were family doctors who chose to stay outside
the system. They were given separate contracts to deal with patients on the
basis of a fixed annual payment and a ‘capitation’ allowance which
depended on how many patients they had on their books. About 60 per cent
of their income depended on how many patients they had.
There were two kinds of purchasers:
1 Health authorities receive their funding from the government. They
purchase services from hospitals, clinics etc. to provide health programmes
within their districts, including accident and emergency and long-term
treatments. In order to maximise the use of their funding they would search
for the best deal from providers.
2 GP fundholders applied for, and were given annual budgets with which they
were to run their surgeries, received a salary and could purchase hospital
and other treatment services from providers. Like health authorities they
would look for the best value for money. As an incentive their incomes
could be increased by using their budgets more effectively. The more
patients for whom they could find treatment and the better the financial
deal they could get, the more healthy their income.
The system was duly set up by the NHS and Community Care Act of 1990,
under the control of Health Minister of the day, Kenneth Clarke. The medical
profession was uneasy about the changes and it was difficult to persuade doctors
to become fundholders and hospitals to form themselves into trusts. Gradually
over the next few years, however, the internal market was introduced.
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Two other measures were introduced at this time. Firstly, charges were intro-
duced for most eye tests and for dental checks. This effectively meant that eye
and dental services were mainly privatised, but that the poor, children and the
elderly would have their treatments paid for by the state.
Secondly, a number of community health services were transferred to the
responsibility of local authorities. At first sight this may have been nothing
more than a transfer of responsibility and funding. However, at the same time
that the transfer was taking place, increasing pressure was being placed on
local authority finances. This meant that community health services had to
be reduced.
The most notorious example was the so-called care in the community
scheme. This policy closed down many of the mental hospitals which were
dealing with patients who had long-term, low-level mental health problems.
They were transferred into community hostels or even into private accommo-
dation. This much cheaper solution saved money and, it was claimed,
provided better conditions for the mentally ill. However, many mental health
interest groups did not agree and many residents complained that they were
being plagued by homeless vagrants, often with drug problems. 
A review of Conservative policies, 1979–97
Nobody could accuse Conservative administrations under Thatcher and Major
of not trying to reform the NHS while they were in power. They were, of
course, constrained by the fact that a fundamental change in the way in which
the NHS is funded was politically unacceptable. It was therefore the case that
the performance of the health service was always going to be at the mercy of
economic forces. As long as health is funded from general taxation, it will be
affected by the broader economic policies of the government.
Some have argues that the system of the internal market was actually a first
step to privatisation. In other words, had the Conservatives remained in power
after 1997, it is suggested that this would have been the next step. Indeed on
the day before the 1997 election, the Labour party produced the slogan 24
Hours to Save the NHS. It proved to be one of the keys to their election victory.
Naturally, the Conservative party has always denied this, but there can be no
disguising their frustrations at being unable to find new sources of funding.
To replace extra financial support the Conservatives tried these measures: 
1 new management techniques;
2 a new management structure;
3 the internal market; 
4 the transfer of some community health services to local authorities.
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Yet despite these innovations, health care was seen as a service in crisis. New
Labour was elected in 1997 partly in the hope that it could get to grips with
the problems. Many of these hopes, however, were soon to be dashed.
NEW LABOUR AND HEALTH
Basic principles
1 The first assertion to make about the experience of Labour governments since
1997 is that it remains committed to the basic principles of the National
Health Service. The party leadership could never carry the membership with
it if it looked to change the method of funding. Nor could it persuade public
opinion to accept it. Opinion polls consistently show that people place the
principles of the NHS high on their list of priorities. In spite of the many criti-
cisms which have emerged since the early 1980s, few people wish to replace
it with something else.
2 If the NHS is to continue to be funded out of general taxation it will always be
the subject of difficult choices which government has to make between
competing demands placed on taxpayers’ money. Unless its funding could be
separated from the general government budget, this will always be true.
3 The Labour government’s 1997 commitment to stick to existing Conservative
spending plans meant that the NHS would continue to be modestly funded.
Any significant improvements to the service were, therefore, inevitably put ‘on
hold’ for the first three years of the new government.
4 The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, is fundamentally committed
to the maintenance and improvement of health care in Britain. This is not
merely a preference on his part, it is a part of his basic philosophy. It is
therefore inevitable that, as long as Brown remains Chancellor, he will attempt
to protect the NHS from fluctuations in the economy.
5 By 2001 all main political parties joined a consensus that the NHS is seriously
under-funded and that taxpayers will ultimately have to accept that they must
expect to pay for large increases in expenditure. 
So, in many ways, New Labour was subject to a similar array of constraints to
those experienced by the Conservatives in the 1980s and 1990s.
Early changes
The first task of the Labour government in 1997 was to abolish the internal
market. However, they did not dismantle the whole system. There were still to
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be purchasers and providers. However, the new system was designed to reduce
the amount of competition which was taking place. Reducing the competitive
system had several aims:
1 It was felt that the internal market created a large amount of paperwork
and bureaucracy. This was expensive and time consuming, diverting
attention away from patient care.
2 Competition did not necessarily provide the best system of care. For
example, the trusts had been expected to provide and compete for business
in all services. This prevented them from specialising in the types of care at
which they were best.
3 The Fundholding GPs were also engaged in a competitive system which did
not recognise the general patterns of health care needed in their commu-
nities. For example in some areas care of the elderly is a priority, in others
it is children, in some localities there is a young, transient population.
Therefore the whole system became more flexible. This is especially true of
primary care – mainly the work of GPs. A new kind of organisation is coming
into existence, known as primary care trusts. These are groups of GPs
covering about 200,000 patients each. These trusts will provide primary
health care, including minor operations and nursing services. They will also
purchase. It is hoped and believed that these large primary care groups will
come to understand better the needs of patients and will therefore direct the
work of the higher tier of care – hospitals, acute units, accident and emergency
etc. more effectively.
The trusts which continue to be the providers of treatments, are required to co-
operate rather than compete with one another. They must still earn their
funding by selling services to GPs and to health authorities and so are in a kind
of ‘market’ situation, but they are less reliant on their ability to generate large
volumes of business.
Funding
As we have seen, large increases in health service funding were not forth-
coming in 1997–2000. Whatever his inclinations, Chancellor Brown’s deter-
mination to control spending and to pay back public debt took precedence.
After 2000, however, he found himself free to spend some of the large
amounts of expenditure he had available to him. The British economy was
healthy, tax revenues were rising as a result of economic growth and the calls
on expenditure from unemployment and social security were falling. Brown
was therefore able to announce the beginning of a long-term programme of
expenditure increases. In general there is a five-year plan to raise spending on
the NHS by at least three times the rate of inflation.
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Tony Blair in 2001 made an ambitious pledge to bring health spending, as a
proportion of the country’s total income, up to typical European standards.
Economic forecasters immediately cast doubt on this commitment. Long-term
underspending has taken its toll. It is also unlikely that Britain will be able to
compete with systems like the French, which is topped up by extensive
charging and private insurance schemes. Using the example of Scandinavian
countries, where the state does fully fund the health service, British taxes
would have to rise alarmingly. The taxpayers of countries like Sweden and
Norway are used to paying for first-class public services with very high income
tax rates. Their British counterparts are unlikely to accept such a regime.
Nevertheless, a long-term spending plan is in place and there is a strong
commitment to maintain it. Indeed, to deal with the frustrations of waiting
for increased spending to ‘kick in’, as it takes so long to train additional
health professionals, the NHs has been allowed to recruit doctors and nurses
from abroad.
Blair and Brown have staked the future electoral prospects of their party on
improved health services. The future funding of the NHS does, therefore,
appear to be ‘ring fenced’ until 2006.
Further reforms
The Labour party, with the reformer Alan Milburn as Health Secretary, has
tried to be as innovative as the Thatcher governments of the 1980s. Apart from
the changes to the internal market and the increased funding commitment,
they have introduced the following developments:
 The private sector should be used to provide investment in the health
service. Private companies will be offered the opportunity to invest in and
manage NHS properties in return for management fees. The existing policy
of offering some non-medical services to private-sector firms in compe-
tition with the NHS will continue and be extended.
 Where there are acute waiting lists for standard treatments, NHS author-
ities are allowed to use private health sector facilities, paying for them out
of their own funds. In some cases they have also been allowed to send
patients abroad for treatment.
 Following a number of problems emerging in the care offered by particular
hospitals and individual doctors, consultants and surgeons, performance
tables for both hospitals and individual doctors are to be introduced. The
Kennedy Report into events in the heart surgery services at Bristol Royal
Infirmary, led to the introduction of performance statistics concerning
individual surgeons to be published.
 Hospitals are to be given star ratings so that patients can judge which are
high performing and which are failing.
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 Where Health Service trusts are seen to be failing, they may be taken over
by other bodies including charities and private companies.
 The more successful trusts will be given the opportunity to become more
independent from government, allowing them to develop new services and
involve the private sector
New institutions
Two particular bodies were set up soon after Labour was elected in 1997 and
are expected to make an impact in health care in the long run:
 The Commission for Health Improvement (CHI). This is a permanent body
which is dedicated to finding ways of improving care for patients. It can
investigate the work of hospitals and trusts. Suggesting ways in which they
can improve. It also advises the government on any new innovations which
might improve health care in general.
 The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE). NICE was a response to
the problem of expensive new drugs becoming available, but hard-pressed
health authorities being unable or unwilling to buy them for their patients.
This problem, sometimes known as the postcode lottery, meant that treat-
ments were available in some parts of the country but not others. The new
regime means that, if NICE decides that a new drug is effective and
provides value for money, it should become available to all.
These and a number of other new agencies are designed to try to make
rational decisions about health care, rather than allowing health authorities to
make decisions on an individual, ad hoc basis.
The principles of Labour policies
Amid all the many innovations and initiatives which New Labour has
produced since 1997 it is possible to discern a number of principles which
inform their policy making. Among them are the following:
 All those involved in the Health Service – doctors, other health workers,
hospitals, clinics etc. – are to be more accountable both for the standard of
service they give and the way they spend money. Workers in the Health
Service must accept that, in return for greater staff recruitment and more
expenditure, they must be more responsible for what they do.
 There is no reason why the private sector cannot be used if it does not
interfere with two principles: that services are provided free according to
need, and that it improves services to the patient.
 The country has to accept that it must spend a significantly higher
proportion of its national income and public expenditure on health care.
 Primary health care is critical to performance. GP services must, therefore,
be improved and be made more sensitive to needs.
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 Health Care is a government priority. If it fails to deliver significant improve-
ments in terms of more treatments, shorter waiting lists and reduced waiting
times for treatment, it will have to accept the electoral consequences.
Some criticisms
Despite the political consensus which has developed over health, a number
of important criticisms have been levied against Labour’s policies. Among
them are:
 It waited too long to increase funding significantly.
 Having begun the process of increasing expenditure, it is still not devoting
enough funds to make a significant difference.
 Constant reforms, and the drive to make health workers and hospitals
more accountable has sapped morale in health professions.
 The government has failed to tackle fundamental problems in the career
structure of doctors. Nurses have been given a better structure with the
development of senior nurse practitioners and consultants, but doctors
have been left behind.
 The government has failed to address problems in management, including
excessive bureaucracy, inefficiency and wastefulness.
These are familiar themes. Some can be detected in the 1970s and 1980s. It is
clear that problems in the provision of health care are likely to be with us for
some time.
CONCLUSION: THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS
Having reviewed the course of health policy since the 1970s we can now
identify the major problems which have dogged all governments over the
issue. There are, in other words, fundamental elements of health policy which
make it an especially difficult aspect of governance. The evidence suggests the
following features.
1 As long as health care is paid for out of general taxation it has to compete with
other demands on government, such as social security, local government
services, defence, transport etc. Health care, of course, is always likely to be a
high priority, but it is inevitably a target when public spending is reviewed.
Reducing health expenditure levels does not show up immediately in the way
that social security benefit cuts, for example, do. Furthermore, if the minister
responsible is relatively weak and fails to battle effectively for a fair share of
the government’s budget, the service will suffer.
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2 For the same reason, health expenditure depends on the economic state of the
country. In a recession tax revenues fall but social security payments and
industrial support payments rise. It is a brave Chancellor or Health Minister
who is able to maintain or increase real levels of spending on health in a time
of recession.
3 It is almost inevitable that public expectations of what the health service can
deliver will continue to rise. Furthermore, this rise in expectations has also
tended to outstrip the NHS’s ability to deliver. As prosperity increases, health
care is one of the benefits which people expect.
4 As new treatments come on line for such illnesses as cancer, heart disease,
strokes and arthritis, the calls on health expenditure are bound to increase.
Keeping people alive longer is an important objective for the health service, of
course, but it does mean that individuals are tending to consume more
medical care over their lifetime. Many of the new treatments are also very
expensive and so create a need to review priorities. The case of Interferon is a
typical example. This drug which can help with nervous diseases such as
multiple sclerosis, is exceptionally expensive but can benefit a small number
of people a great deal. Health care professionals and politicians find it
extremely difficult to decide whether this is a good use of scarce resources.
There will always be a temptation to buy cheaper treatments which will bring
down waiting lists and so make the newspaper headlines. It is also attractive
to develop treatments which will benefit the many rather than the few.
5 Health is a policy area which is inhabited by a large number of powerful and
vociferous pressure groups. There are the medical groups such as the British
Medical Association (BMA), the Royal College of Nursing (RCN) and the Royal
College of Surgeons (RCS), unions representing other health service workers,
mainly UNISON and there is a veritable army of interest groups representing
sufferers from every major disease and condition. From a democratic, repre-
sentative point of view this is a very healthy state of affairs. However, for
policy makers it presents special problems. Virtually every decision, especially
those about the allocation of funds, will please some and anger others. Only
by spending more across the board – an unlikely option – can everybody be
kept happy.
6 As we have remarked before, the British population is ageing. An increasingly
greater proportion of the population is old (see table 3.1). Older people
naturally place a heavier burden on medical services. Furthermore, they also
contribute less to tax revenues: their incomes fall as they become pensioners.
So the dependency ratio is worsening: fewer and fewer people are having to
support the health care of more and more. Table 3.2 illustrates the growth in
NHS provision.
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So it seems that future governments will face the same problems in this field
as their predecessors. It may be that the battle to preserve the basic principles
of a free service funded out of taxation will eventually be lost and individuals
will be forced to make additional contributions in addition to public funding.
Table 3.1 Britain’s ageing population: proportion of the UK population
aged 65 and above, as % of total
Year % 65 and above % 75 and above
1901 10 3
1931 15 4
1961 23 8
1991 31 14
2000 31 14
2011 (estimate) 33 15
2025 (estimate) 41 20
Source: Office of National Statistics.
Table 3.2 Increases in health provision: employment of NHS staff (000s)
Year Hospital and community staff GPs Dentists
1981 601 27 15
1991 639 31 18
2000 676 37 21
Source: Department of Health.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 Why has the provision of health care proved to be a problematic
area for policy making since 1979?
2 To what extent have the basic principles of the National Health
Service been eroded since 1979?
3 In what ways has the Labour government since 1997 attempted to
make health a higher priority?
4 To what extent has there been a consensus on health policy since 1979?
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Until World War II the involvement of the state in British education has been
variable and, at times, has even seemed reluctant. Being fundamentally a
liberal culture, there has been a fear that state intervention might jeopardise
the free and independent nature of much of what went on in education at all
levels. Independent schools were, as their name suggested, largely free of
external interference, Church schools, meanwhile retained their own form of
autonomy. Catholic schools drew authority from their own Church, while the
Church of England sought to retain its independence from influence by the
secular state. Schools which were secular (i.e. non-religious) were also
substantially free from at least central state control. Instead they were
overseen by local boards and authorities, which were subject to local
democracy. At university level, too, institutions fiercely retained their right to
set their own educational agendas.
Since 1944, however, the history of education in Britain has been one of
increasing centralised state control and interference. This was the result of
two factors. Firstly, there was a growing understanding that education could
be used as a tool of social and economic policy. There was a growing need to
ensure that each new generation should have a wide range of knowledge
and skills in an ever more complex economy. At the same time, the social
pressures on individuals were becoming more significant as society as a whole
was growing more complex. Secondly, the steady decline in religious obser-
vance and in the integrity of family life threatened to create a vacuum in the
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transmission of values and morality from one generation to the next.
Education was increasingly viewed as a way of filling this vacuum.
In summary, therefore, we can say that the second half of the twentieth
century has seen a whole new set of responsibilities placed on the education
system at all levels. These can be described as follows.
 Schools are now seen as a key vehicle for the transmission of morality and
cultural values. As family life has begun to break down and Church membership
has slipped away, there was a need for schools to take up the reins. Recent initia-
tives in PSHE (Personal, Social and Health Education) and in citizenship are
important examples of this process. 
 Industry and commerce are becoming increasingly demanding. Globalisation
is a part of this development. Education at all levels has had to respond to
these new pressures. The 16–18 age group (tertiary) and post-18 education
(higher and degree level) have been particularly important in this area.
 Growing levels of crime and public disorder since the 1970s have resulted in
a new interest in the role of schooling. Whatever the causes of increased
criminal behaviour, especially among the young, it is believed that education
can play a key role in reversing the trend. This is particularly true of pre-school
and primary education, which take place when children are developing their
social characteristics.
 Education has been seen since the middle of the nineteenth century as an
important vehicle for the principle of equality of opportunity. A good
education is considered a gateway for all to seek success and prosperity. After
World War II the pressure for true equality of opportunity (it had always been
limited up to that time) grew. It was part of the broader philosophy of the
Welfare State, as described in the 1942 Beveridge Report. The post-war
consensus included the principle that a modern society must give all its
citizens the chance of a decent standard of living. 
THE TRIPARTITE SYSTEM
The system
The logical place to begin a review of modern education in Britain has to be the
passage of the 1944 Education Act. This should be seen as part of the process of
re-building post-war Britain, a task which was the subject of much agreement
between the political parties. It was sponsored by R.A. Butler (and is sometimes
known as the ‘Butler Act’), the Conservative Education minister in the all-party
coalition of the day. The principles and intentions of the Act were as follows:
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1 The ‘Board of Education’ (of which Butler had been ‘president’) was dissolved
and replaced by a Ministry of Education. This administrative device symbolised
the desire, described in the introduction above, to bring education much more
firmly under state control. It also raised the profile of education policy. 
2 A firm dividing line was established between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’
education. This had varied in the past, but it was now to be regarded as 11
years of age. All school children who were outside the independent sector,
were to be tested in an examination known as the ‘11-plus’. 
3 Free primary and secondary education was to be available for all between the
ages of 5 and 15 (raised to 16 in 1973). Parents could still opt to send their
children to fee-paying, independent schools, but there was no compulsion to
pay in any state school. The actual ‘type’ of education offered at post-11 level,
was to be determined by ability, not income. 
4 Three types of secondary school were to be established. This is the origin of
the term ‘tripartite system’. Grammar schools were to take off the top 25 per
cent (approximately) of the range. This was the group which came in the top
levels of the 11-plus exam, based on literacy, numeracy and general intelli-
gence (known as IQ: Intelligence Quotient). It was assumed that this group
would go on to fill the professions, managerial posts, government service and
other ‘middle-class’ occupations. Most of the rest would attend ‘secondary
modern’ schools. These would be given a solid, but basic education in literacy
and numeracy, but would also develop technical, manual skills. They would
also not expect to take any examinations at the end of their school career.
These pupils would probably go into manual occupations at various skill
levels, or into lower levels of ‘office work’. Girls at that time were, of course,
largely prepared for parenthood and home-making at secondary moderns. A
small number of technical schools were also set up. These were for children
displaying special abilities in manual skills. It was hoped they would provide
early training for more skilled workers. In the event very few technical schools
were established. Much of the requirements for such skills training were left to
post-16 colleges and on-the-job apprenticeships. 
The importance of the tripartite system
Remnants of the system which was set up in 1944 still remain in British
education. The split at 11 years old still endures, though there are also some
‘middle schools’ which span this age. Education remains substantially free. A
few secondary schools have introduced ‘voluntary’ contributions from
parents, but this is rare and no state school makes a compulsory charge for
normal tuition. There are also some grammar schools still in existence. These
select their pupils at 11, though there is no national examination. Grammar
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schools have their own selection procedures. Such schools are most common
in Kent, Essex, the north west and parts of central southern England. 
On the whole, however, the tripartite system has now been dismantled. It is,
to some extent, symbolic of a class system which is fast disappearing. The
grammar schools were filled almost exclusively with middle-class pupils and
secondary moderns with the children of the traditional working class. Had it
remained in place, it is possible that the more rigid class system which
prevailed before the 1960s would have endured longer. Most economists and
sociologists are agreed that this would probably have been an undesirable
effect. Britain might have failed (even more than it did) to respond to the
needs of an ever-more complex economy.
Nevertheless, the experience of the system has had a lasting impression upon
British education. Some of its successes have endured even when most secondary
schools had become comprehensive by 1980. These include:
 A legacy of excellence in education, especially at post-16 level, which had
been established by the grammar schools.
 Many of the grammar schools formed the basis of comprehensive schools
through a change in function or amalgamation with secondary modern
schools.
 The system of selection at 11-plus provided the basis for the development
of the debate about the effects of dividing children on the basis of ability.
 Several generations of working-class children were given the possibility of
obtaining a highly academic education through the grammar schools.
Though relatively few working-class children passed the 11-plus exam,
those who did demonstrated the potential for an education system not
based upon social class. 
Yet the successes of the tripartite system proved to be insufficient to save it,
when demands for much greater equality in education grew to a far higher
level in the 1960s. The faults in the system were widely seen as follows:
 Although it was designed to provide genuine equality of opportunity, based
purely on ability, it failed to do so. Most of the children passing the 11-plus
were middle class. This was partly because these children had advantages
based on their upbringing rather than their ability and partly because
primary schools in working-class areas proved to be inferior to those in
wealthier districts. So, rather than breaking down class barriers to equality
of opportunity, the system tended to reinforce them.
 The system imposed an artificial threshold – the age of 11 – at which the
ability of children was to be judged. Educationalists know, however, that
children develop at various speeds. So-called ‘late developers’, for
example, were being rejected simply because they were not ready for the
exam at 11. There was a ‘safety net’ which allowed some children to
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transfer to grammar schools at age 13, but by this age most such children
had fallen too far behind their counterparts at the grammars to be able to
transfer successfully.
 The secondary modern schools were often seen as schools for ‘rejects’.
Thus the quality of education in them varied greatly and aspirations
tended to be low. At the same time the resources devoted to secondary
moderns tended to be of lower quality than those enjoyed by grammars.
Academic ‘failure’ tended therefore to be reinforced.
 Too few technical schools were established, so that children with the
potential for developing higher skill levels were denied the opportunity to
realise their full potential.
COMPREHENSIVE EDUCATION
The Labour governments of 1945–51 presided over the implementation of the
1944 Butler Act. They believed it did represent progress towards a more egali-
tarian society and so were content to see how well it would work. While out
of office between 1951 and 1964, however, the party watched as the system,
in their eyes at least, appeared to fail to achieve its stated aims.
Concerns about the effectiveness of tripartism were in other quarters too. The
Conservative Minister of Education, David Eccles, was concerned about the
lack of progress in standards. He presided over significant increases in
education expenditure and introduced an examination – the Certificate of
Secondary Education (CSE) – but neither proved to be effective. Meanwhile
two investigative reports pointed out the deficiencies of selection at age 11.
These were the Crowther Report of 1959 and the Newsom Report of 1963.
Eccles was replaced in 1962 by Edward Boyle who set in motion the plans for
the fundamental reform of education 
The Labour party was also planning a revolution in secondary education. The
idea was to introduce an entirely new kind of school – the comprehensive.
There had already been some pilot schemes to investigate the idea of compre-
hensivisation and the early indications were positive. The principles of this
were as follows:
 There would be no selection at age 11. 
 All children in the state-run system would have the right to attend a school
which was organised to cater for all abilities.
 Comprehensive schools would provide a wider range of educational
experience than any of the schools in the tripartite system. The experience
would include academic, cultural, technical, sporting and moral or
religious content.
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 They would create circumstances where children from different social
backgrounds would mix together. This was believed to enrich the
experience of all secondary pupils.
 The mixing of children with different ability levels would ‘pull up’ the
attainment of the weakest without jeopardising the potential of the more
able.
 It was assumed that comprehensive schools would usually be larger than
existing institutions. Larger schools would provide a much wider range of
experience and would benefit from ‘economies of scale’, thus making them
better value for money.
 Above all they would provide genuine equality of opportunity for all.
When Labour won the 1964 election, the new Education Minister, Anthony
Crosland, set about the task of abolishing the system of selection. To do so he
had to persuade local authorities of the virtues of the new system. It should be
pointed out at this stage that, in the 1960s, local government enjoyed consid-
erably more independence than it does today. It was not expected that central
government could dictate policy on education, and it was out of the question
that legislation should be used to force them into action. Crosland, therefore,
could only hope that they would respond to persuasion. He issued a circular
(the traditional method of issuing a firm request to a local authority) known
as 10/65, the month and year represented in the circular’s title. This urged all
local education authorities to produce plans for the replacement of selective
education as soon as possible.
The circular was largely successful and by 1970 about one-third of all secondary
pupils were in comprehensive schools. This represented rapid progress. It was
also the result of a growing consensus around the principle of comprehensive
education. It was not only Labour councils who were responding. Cajoled by a
groundswell of public opinion in favour of reform, even Conservative councils
were forced to abolish the grammar school system. Even when Margaret
Thatcher became Education Minister (still not a cabinet post) in 1970 the
process continued. She withdrew circular 10/65 but could not stem the tide. By
1974, when Labour returned to power, the proportion of children in compre-
hensives had risen to 60 per cent. A further five years of Labour administration
saw only eight local authorities holding out against reform. They accounted for
most of a remaining 150 grammar schools in existence. The year 1979,
therefore, represents the high point of the comprehensive era.
We should not leave the comprehensive issue without reference to the Inner
London Education Authority (ILEA). The ILEA was created in 1965 as a great
experiment in the power of education to compensate social disadvantage.
Comprehensive education was designed to create equal opportunity for all
children. However, it was recognised that even this could not compensate for a
Education 57
child’s deprived background. The ILEA was a single education authority
comprising the twelve inner London boroughs, where deprivation was at its
most severe. It was granted higher than normal levels of funding by central
government to provide for smaller classes, additional resources and facilities for
children with special educational needs. By doing this, it was hoped that a lavish
educational provision would compensate children for poor home backgrounds
including poverty, bad housing, broken families and low aspirations. In effect,
it was comprehensive education plus. It was an attempt to provide positive
discrimination in favour of the deprived and not just equal opportunity. 
The ILEA experiment was never seen through to fruition. Its opponents
reqarded it as a product of left-wing education policies, while its supporters
always felt it was not fully funded. Under the Conservatives in the 1980s it
certainly lost its privileged status and it was finally dissolved in 1990 as one
of the last acts in the consistent Conservative attack on local government
independence.
Comprehensive schooling has remained the backbone of the British education
system. In the 1990s a number of local authorities began to re-introduce
selective education, although the number of grammar schools remained
modest. Nevertheless, as standards in education continued to be criticised
there were increased calls for the return of selection at age 11. The Labour
party, preparing itself for government in the mid-1990s, declared through its
spokesman, David Blunkett, that the party would never introduce selection.
By 1997, however, Blunkett had to concede that public opinion in some areas
was running strongly in favour of more grammar schools. The 1988 Education
Reform Act, which is described more fully below, had allowed some schools to
opt out of local authority control and become independent with funding direct
from central government. This also allowed them to introduce a limited
degree of selection. The new Labour government was forced to compromise
on the issue. Blunkett allowed referendums among the parents of prospective
pupils to determine whether selective grammar schools should be established.
This quietened the demands for more selection, but had little effect. Most
referendums failed to approve selective systems. The comprehensive principle,
therefore, remained pre-eminent. 
RAISING STANDARDS IN THE 1990s
The problem of falling standards
In 1997 a White Paper was issued by the new Labour government entitled,
Excellence in Schools. The document declared that, Standards matter more than
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structures. This marked the end of the main debate about the structure of
education. It confirmed an idea that had been growing steadily since the late
1960s. This was that educational standards were a more complex problem
than had been appreciated before. Changing the nature of schools was not
enough. A fresh outlook on the whole philosophy of how education was
delivered was needed.
The opening shots had been fired in 1968 with the publication of a series of
reports written by right-wing academics known as the ‘Black Papers’. At first
they were treated with scepticism. The Black Papers blamed left-wing ideas
and so-called ‘progressive’ teaching methods which had taken root in the new
comprehensives for declining standards. But they were seen as reactionary
documents, out of touch with modern thinking. Yet these concerns would not
go away. A report for the Conservatives, known as the ‘Yellow Book’ appeared
in 1976. It reiterated many of the concerns of the Black Papers. The Yellow
Book proposed a return to traditional methods of teaching and a return to
increased discipline in schools. The Conservative party rejected its findings
publicly, but their influence took root in the party. 
When the Conservatives returned to power in 1979 the problems in education
were perceived as follows:
 As the Yellow Book had suggested progressive teaching methods were
blamed for poor levels of basic literacy and numeracy.
 Education had been run for many years by teachers and other academics.
It was seen as preferable that some ‘outsiders’ should be brought in to bring
a clearer perspective on the problems. 
 There was too much interference in schools by local authorities, many of
which were under left-wing control. These politicians were seen as more
motivated by politics than by educational concerns.
 There was a great deal of variation in standards of education in different
parts of the country and localities.
For much of the 1980s the debate on educational standards centred on the
possibility of introducing competition among schools. The idea that compe-
tition creates the incentive to raise efficiency and equality was the preferred
policy for other public services such as the nationalised industries (which were
mostly being privatised), local government operations, health care and public
transport. The question was, could the same principle be applied in the field
of education?
In order to do so it would almost certainly be necessary to privatise schools in
some way, but this would destroy the principle of free education for all
children. The proposed answer was the so-called voucher system. Each parent
would be given a voucher for the education of each child. This would be
enough to pay for a standard form of schooling. However, parents with spare
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income would be able to ‘top up’ the voucher and send their children to a more
expensive school. Since parents would have an entirely free choice of schools
there would be competition for pupils. In this way the requirements of both
free education for all and competition would be satisfied.
In the event the Conservative party rejected the voucher scheme. Even for a
government fully committed to free market solutions, the voucher scheme was
seen as too divisive and would not have enjoyed enough public support.
Something different was therefore needed. This emerged with the Education
Reform Act of 1988. This was probably the most important piece of educational
legislation since the 1944 Act.
The Education Reform Act 1988
The Act was not just about standards, but its chief thrust was directed at the
problem. Its main provisions were as follows.
● There was to be a National Curriculum (NC) established. This would apply
to all state schools (independent schools were exempt) for children aged from
5 to 16. The NC prescribed a number of subjects to be taught to all to a specific
standard. At certain key stages a number of educational objectives were to be
achieved. These ages were:
 Key stage 1: 7 years
 Key stage 2: 11 years
 Key stage 3: 14 years
 Key stage 4: 16 years
● The traditional subjects of English, Maths, Sciences, Physical Education,
Geography, Religious Education, Art and History were emphasised and only a
small amount of time was made available for schools to choose their own
variations. This was very much inspired by systems which are common in the
rest of Europe.
● All secondary and primary schools would be taken out of the direct financial
control of local authorities. Instead the budgets (and therefore effectively the
management as a whole) would be handled by the head teacher and
governors. This process, known as Local Management of Schools (LMS),
was designed to address the problem of schools being used by local politicians
to further their own aims. 
● All secondary and some large primary schools were given the opportunity to
opt out of local authority control altogether. Instead they could be given grant
maintained status. This would mean that they would receive funding direct
from central government. In addition, they would be allowed to adopt some of
their own practices such as a limited degree of selection at age 11.
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THE EFFECTS OF THE REFORMS
The 1988 Act and the policies which flowed from it have had a profound effect
on schooling in Britain. It has done what was intended, in that there is now
genuine competition between schools. It has also created standards by which
the performance of local authorities, schools, teachers and pupils can be
judged. It has also wrested most control out of the hands of local authorities.
At the same time schools are much more closely controlled by parents,
governors and headteachers. This independence was seen as essential if
schools were to pursue targets.
On the other hand the reforms also had unwanted effects. Some of these have
been: 
1 The teaching profession has been placed under enormous strain. Teachers
complain about constant change in the way schools and the curriculum are
organised and of greater workloads in recording test results and National
Curriculum progress. The introduction of the Office for Standards in
Education (OFSTED) has also been stressful on teachers and heads.
2 The variety of school curriculums has been reduced. Cultural, artistic and
sporting activities have tended to be pushed out by traditional subjects and
teaching methods.
3 While league tables and testing have allowed parents to judge between
schools, the system has been divisive. Low-performing schools have been
starved of better pupils and so find it difficult to improve.
4 Regular testing has placed increasing stresses on the children. It has been
said that testing has introduced ‘selection by stealth’.
NEW LABOUR: EDUCATION, EDUCATION,
EDUCATION
On his election in 1997, Tony Blair declared that education was to be the
flagship policy of New Labour. By talking about the three priorities,
‘Education, education and education’, he meant a number of things.
Firstly, he insisted that Britain needed a well educated workforce if it was to
compete in an increasingly globalised world, where high levels of skill,
knowledge and flexibility will be at a premium. Secondly, he felt that good
education was the key to eliminating such problems as youth crime, long-term
unemployment and poverty. Thirdly he argued that education was the key to
equality of opportunity. In a just society, he asserted, everybody should be
given the chance to make a good life for themselves.
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Unfortunately, the tight economic stance which Gordon Brown adopted
between 1997 and 2000 meant that progress on education was slow. However,
by concentrating on primary and pre-school education, a start could be made.
The measures which were introduced under Secretary of State for Education,
David Blunkett were:
 Specific targets for schools to achieve. These involved bringing children up
to minimum levels in standard tests for literacy, numeracy and science.
 Increased spending on information technology – seen as a key factor in
improved education.
 The introduction of a ‘literacy hour’ and ‘numeracy hour’ in primary
schools, ensuring that a minimum amount of time was devoted to English
and Maths.
 Incentives for schools to improve their performance by introducing
‘beacon’ status. Beacon status schools may be rewarded with higher
salaries and increased staff. 
 Sanctions against failing schools and local authorities, including the
ultimate threat of closure or transfer of management to state inspectors or
even private management companies.
 Greater parental choice of schools to introduce an element of competition.
 A limited form of payment by results was introduced for teachers. Teachers
with a good record could apply for substantial increases in salary.
 A guaranteed income, of at least £6,000 per year, was introduced for
trainee teachers. This had the effect of increasing recruitment.
 There were general rises in pay.
Despite continuing problems with recruitment and retention and despite the
continuing low morale of the teaching profession, improvements in the
performance of most primary schools did follow. There were continuing
concerns over truancy, behaviour of young pupils and racial difficulties, but the
government could point to higher educational standards in 7 to 11-year olds.
EARLY YEARS EDUCATION
The idea of providing pre-school education for all children has long been a
cherished goal of the Labour party. Blunkett was able to deliver this. Indeed,
not only did all 4-year olds have a place in school by 2001, but progress had
been made in supplying places in nurseries for 3-year olds.
A programme known as ‘head start’ became a key element in social exclusion
policy. By taking children from deprived backgrounds, and starting their
educational programme as early as possible – ideally at three – it was hoped
to counteract the adverse effects of such an upbringing. It was hoped that this
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would have effects on youth crime levels as well as educational attainment. Its
effects are yet to be assessed. In addition, summer schools were introduced so
that those who were lagging behind would be able to catch up.
Early years education remains controversial. It is expensive and its effec-
tiveness has yet to be proved. Indeed there are some who believe that early
schooling can be positively harmful to some children. Nevertheless, the
Labour government has placed much store by it.
HIGHER EDUCATION
It has been in the field of higher education, that Labour governments after 1997
ran into perhaps the greatest difficulty. A number of problems soon emerged:
 The new government in 1997 set itself a target of seeing 40–50 per cent of
18-year olds going on to degree or equivalent level courses. This may have
been laudable, but the implications for expenditure on higher education
were enormous.
 The costs of higher education were rising, irrespective of the numbers
entering. Research and teaching facilities are becoming more and more
expensive.
 The universities themselves were experiencing difficulty in recruiting
suitable staff.
 The hope that universities would find alternative forms of income to
tuition fees was proving to be unrealistic.
As a result of the financial crisis in higher education, the government made a
momentous decision soon after coming to power in 1997. This was to
introduce a fee of £1,000 per year for most students in order to make up the
funding shortfall. Only the poorest families would be exempt. This proved to
be exceptionally controversial.
Tuition fees broke a basic principle of the welfare state – that services should
be granted free to all. It was also feared that many children from less well-off
families would be discouraged from entering higher education. In the event
total numbers continued to rise, but the fee burden was proving to be divisive.
So hostile has been the reaction to tuition fees, combined with the inevitable
abolition of student grants, having been replaced by subsidised loans, that the
whole future of the higher education policy was placed in doubt. By 2002
Scotland had abolished tuition fees and the government was considering
restoring a form of student loans. Universities have been forced to find ways of
providing better value for money, but there is no doubt that higher education
is likely to be a growing financial burden on the Treasury.
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CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS
Education, despite the considerable progress which has been made, is riddled
with seemingly intractable problems. The Labour government in 2002 was
forced to commit growing levels of expenditure to all sectors of education.
But money is not the only solution. We can summarise the continuing
problems as follows: 
 Teacher recruitment is proving very difficult. The numbers in training are
growing, but not quickly enough.
 Morale in the teaching profession is stubbornly low. Even large pay
increases have not helped. Teachers are concerned by the high general
workload, excessive bureaucracy and paperwork, poor behaviour of both
pupils and parents, the stress of competition among schools and the
pressure to meet targets.
 Although performance of pupils in secondary schools is improving
gradually, there are still insufficient numbers staying on at school beyond
16 or going into higher education beyond 18. 
 There are major problems of poor behaviour in schools, including
widespread truancy in some areas.
 There are wide variations in the standard of schools in different localities.
 The issue of how to fund the fast-growing higher education sector has yet
to be solved.
On a more fundamental level, some key issues have yet to be resolved:
1 The issue of whether to allow some selection at 11 or older has not been
cleared up. The Labour party has long been opposed to selective education,
but is under increasing pressure from parents to allow it.
2 The major problems within the teaching profession, including low pay and
status, poor recruitment and retention and career development have not yet
been tackled successfully. 
3 The Labour party and government (indeed all parties find this difficult)
have not come to a firm conclusion on whether more single-faith schools
are to be encouraged. In 2002 official policy was to encourage such forms
of education and Tony Blair has given it his blessing. However, there are still
disagreements between and within parties as to whether Britain should not
be pursuing fully integrated education to improve the state of race relations
in the country. 
Despite the problems, it has to be said that there is a wide degree of political
consensus on education. To summarise, we can identify the remaining points
of general agreement and those which divide the parties: see table 4.1.
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Table 4.1 Education: conflict and consensus
Consensus issues Issues of conflict
Educational standards need Whether to introduce more 
to be raised selective schools
Pre-school education is to be How to fund higher education 
encouraged and provide funds for students
More 16-year olds need to be Whether to encourage or 
encouraged to stay in education discourage single faith schools
Parents should be able to exercise Whether to encourage the 
a good deal of control over schools growth of private education
Schools should be given a high How much private sector 
degree of independence funding should be introduced
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 To what extent has education been the subject of consensus
politics?
2 What have been the main effects of the introduction of the
National Curriculum and testing?
3 To what extent has the Labour government since 1997 lived up to
Tony Blair’s call for ‘education, education, education’?
4 What have been the main problems in raising educational standards since 1988?
5 Why, and in what ways, has selection been a major educational issue?
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BEVERIDGE: FROM THE CRADLE TO THE GRAVE
The Beveridge Report of 1942 which heralded in
the post-war Welfare State proposed a compre-
hensive National Insurance system which would
look after people throughout their lives. Benefits
were to be supplied by the state for all those who
found themselves in need and who had no
apparent means of helping themselves. Contribu-
tions, through National Insurance, were to be
paid by all those in work, whether employed or self-employed. In addition,
employers were given a duty to make a contribution for all those whom they
employed. National Insurance payments were based on income, although
there was an upper total limit on contributions.
The Beveridge plan was not a completely novel
idea. There was already a form of Welfare State
which had come into existence over twenty years
before, introduced by Lloyd George. However, the
Beveridge plan was far more comprehensive and
introduced the idea that membership was to be
compulsory.
Once World War II was over, the Beveridge plan
could be implemented. The system was indeed
comprehensive and offered the following benefits:
5Social security
 The principles of social security in the Welfare State
 Review of how social security developed up to 1979
 Description and analysis of the reforms and new attitude to social security
under the Conservatives after 1979
 Analysis of New Labour’s attitude to social security after 1997
National Insurance
A form of taxation levied on
those in work and employers.
Based on ability to pay, it has a
ceiling so that nobody pays
above a certain level. It is
designed to pay for welfare
benefits.
Beveridge plan
Named after Lord Beveridge
who reported on a future
Welfare State in 1942. It
proposed a comprehensive
state system where all would
contribute to services and
benefits which would be
available to everyone according
to need. Benefits would be
available to all critical stages of
life.
 maternity grants upon the birth of a child;
 family allowances – a weekly payment to be made for each child in a
family;
 unemployment benefit;
 widow’s benefit;
 pensions for men over 65 and women over 60;
 death grant for the family of the deceased.
This was indeed a comprehensive system, far more than had been seen before
in Britain. As time went by, it was added to by all governments. In principle
what happened between 1945 and 1979 was 
that the system ceased to become merely a safety
net and began, instead, to re-distribute real
income from the wealthy, who contributed 
most, to the poor who contributed least but
claimed more. 
Additions and reforms of the system came thick and fast and are too numerous
to be detailed here. A general review of the landmarks is therefore offered.
The developing social security system, 1945–79
• 1945 Family Allowances Act. Benefits were to be paid for each child in a family,
other than the first.
• 1946 National Insurance Act. Introduced the basic system. Included pensions for
all, sickness benefit for those prevented from working by illness, widow’s pension,
death grant and unemployment benefit.
• 1956 Family Allowance and National Insurance Act. Provided for a compre-
hensive system of tax allowances for dependent children up to age 18.
• 1959 National Insurance Act. Introduced a graduated system of pensions where
both the contributions and payments could be made dependent on a person’s income.
• 1966 National Insurance Act. Introduced a system of unemployment benefit based
on a person’s earnings at the time they became unemployed. It also made sickness
benefit dependent on a person’s normal earnings.
• 1966 Ministry of Social Security Act. Established a new Ministry of Social Security.
It also introduced a comprehensive system of supplementary benefits for poor
families.
• 1970 Family Income Supplement Act. Gave a larger entitlement to benefit for poor
families.
• 1975 Child Benefit Act. Replaced tax allowances for families with children with a child
benefit to be paid in cash direct to parents.
This extensive list of developments demonstrates the extent to which social
security provision was changed and added to by both Labour and Conservative
governments. As one would expect, most of the changes were made by
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safety net
The concept that the state will
be there for those who find
themselves in need, providing
benefits and services.
Labour, but the Conservatives played their part, with a key development being
the introduction of the graduated, earnings-related pension.
Undoubtedly the most significant changes were made by Labour. The intro-
duction of family income supplements, earnings related sickness and
unemployment benefit and extensive child benefits were designed to alleviate
poverty and re-distribute real income. They were not dramatic measures, but
they demonstrated Labour’s wish to use the Welfare State as a means of
reducing inequality in society.
SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE CONSERVATIVES
AFTER 1979
A new attitude to social security
When the Conservative party won power in 1979 the social security part of
their expenditure commitments came under immediate scrutiny. There were
five main reasons why this was so.
1 The new government wished to make inroads into the total level of public
expenditure. Firstly, it placed a great burden on taxpayers – and they wished
to reduce taxes. Secondly, it was seen as a deterrent to private investment as
high government borrowing was thought to ‘crowd out’ funds which could be
used by industry and commerce. The social security bill was the biggest single
item in the public finances so it was an inevitable target.
2 Margaret Thatcher had pledged to ‘roll back the frontiers of the state’ when
she took office. It was, therefore, natural that a number of social security
commitments should be scrutinised with a view to allowing the state to
withdraw its support.
3 Many Conservatives believed that a ‘dependency
culture’ had grown up in Britain. It was suspected
that, as people grew to be reliant upon state
benefits and learned to expect all kinds of financial
support, they would cease to try to fend for
themselves. In other words, excessive levels of
social security benefit had become a deterrent to
enterprise and hard work.
4 An important part of the Conservatives’ economic policy was the creation of a
more flexible labour market. This meant encouraging more people to seek work,
if necessary at relatively low wages. High levels of benefit, it was thought,
deterred many people from entering the labour market. As things stood in 1979,
it was felt that benefits prevented people from taking low paid jobs.
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dependency culture
A Conservative belief that if the
state provides too many
benefits, people will come to
depend on them. This will stifle
self-reliance, enterprise and
hard work. It also keeps people
out of the workforce.
5 The dependency ratio in Britain was inevitably worsening. This meant that an
increasingly large number of people were depending on a shrinking number
to contribute to benefits. To some extent this was caused by the ageing
population, but it was also caused by high unemployment levels and
increasing numbers of poor families. By reducing benefits, the effects of the
high dependency ratio would be reduced. 
New measures
During the 1980s there was a steady and prolonged attack on dependency
culture. Many of the reforms which Labour governments had introduced were
dismantled. The main measures were as follows.
The Social Security Acts 1980
There were two pieces of legislation in the new government’s first full year of
office. The rules for supplementary benefits for poor families were tightened
up considerably. It also broke the link between a person’s earnings and their
level of sickness or unemployment benefit. In other words they reverted to a
flat rate. Perhaps most startlingly, the first Act broke the link between the level
of the old age pension and the average rise in the level of earnings. Instead,
pensions would only be guaranteed to rise by the level of inflation. Since
inflation rates are invariably lower than the rise in earnings, this was a major
erosion in the level of pensions.
Social Security Act 1982
This required employers to pay a minimum level of sick pay to employees. In
effect this eroded the state’s responsibility to pay sickness benefit and trans-
ferred much of the responsibility to all but the smallest firms.
Social Security Act 1986
This restricted the payments of housing benefit, an important income
supplement for poor families who found it difficult to pay rents, by reducing
the numbers entitled and by effectively introducing a ceiling on payments. The
Act also reduced unemployment benefits to those under the age of 25.
Social Security Act 1988
This took away the young unemployed’s entitlement to income support.
Instead, they were required to join youth training schemes in order to receive
full benefit. This was the beginning of an attack on those young people, who,
it was suspected, did not seek work enthusiastically enough.
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Social Security Act 1989
This built on the previous year’s Act. Entitlement was withdrawn from anybody
who was unemployed but could be shown was not making themselves available
for work. At the same time, anyone who was unemployed for three months was
no longer entitled to turn down any job, no matter how poorly paid. This was
the principal measure designed to free up labour markets at the lower end of
the wage scale.
Statutory Sick Pay Act 1991
The employer’s contributions to sick pay were increased and the contributions
made by the state were reduced.
Job Seekers’ Allowance 1993
This established the principle that unemployment benefit would only be paid
to those who were genuinely looking for work and were willing to prove to
civil servants that they were actually unemployed. Its effect was to make
unemployment benefit more difficult to claim.
The legislation does not tell the full story. Through the 1980s and early 1990s
the real value of many benefits was gradually eroded. We have seen that the
old age pension was linked to inflation rather than earnings, but other benefits
also fell in terms of their real value. Unemployment benefit, sickness and child
benefits were all eroded. At the same time some of the benefits which had been
paid largely by the state had become the responsibility of employers. For the
disabled, too, the welfare regime became tougher. Important tests were intro-
duced to ensure that only those who could prove to medical experts that they
were unable to work owing ta a long term disability could claim benefit.
Nevertheless, the story was not all in one direction. Some additions were
made to the welfare system. Cold winter payments were introduced for old
age pensioners to help with fuel bills, family credits were introduced to allow
people to borrow money to buy essential goods and the new income support
system for the poor did improve benefits for some families.
ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSERVATIVE REFORMS
Opponents of these, and many other changes to the system of social security
have argued that they fundamentally changed the distribution of wealth and
income in Britain. The gap between rich and poor was widened and people
spoke once again of ‘two nations’ being created. For some, the changes were
Understanding British and European political issues70
seen as little more than an attempt to pay for tax cuts for the middle classes.
For the left of the political system it was tantamount to class warfare.
The Labour party, which moved steadily to the left during the first half of the
1980s fought a bitter rearguard action against what they saw as the erosion of
the Welfare State. But after their heavy defeat in the general election of 1983,
they were powerless to stop the tide. A new pressure group – the Child
Poverty Action Group (CPAG) came into existence to bolster opposition to
the reforms, but they too fought a losing battle.
One of the objectives of governments of the 1980s and 1990s had been to
reduce the Social Security Bill and so stabilise the public finances. This aspect
of the policy, however, failed. The Social Security Bill rose during most of the
1980s. High unemployment in the first part of the 1980s and 1990s was the
main culprit. The pensions commitment rose inexorably, even though the real
value of the old age pension was falling. A higher and higher proportion of the
population was falling into poverty and so needed support. Thus opponents
argued that, while things might be improving for the majority, they were getting
worse for a substantial minority and the state was having to foot the bill.
Supporters of the rolling back of the Welfare State and the toughening of the
regime could, on the other hand, point to several improvements. The labour
market was indeed made more flexible (aided by the successful attacks on
trade union power) and unemployment receded during the 1980s. It was also
argued that the dependency culture had been broken, that a new set of values
was beginning to affect Britain. The ‘work ethic’ was strengthening and the
performance of the economy, especially the so-called ‘enterprise culture’
had improved.
There was also a strong body of opinion that welfare benefits had become too
easy to obtain. Therefore, by toughening the rules and forcing claimants to
justify their dependence, a new kind of social justice had arisen.
NEW LABOUR AND SOCIAL SECURITY
There is no doubt that a key element in New Labour’s philosophy was to attack
poverty in the UK, especially child poverty. Gordon Brown, who was always
slightly to the left of most of New Labour’s leadership, held this belief
especially strongly. Indeed one of the first measures introduced after 1997 was
the national minimum wage. This device was to have a double effect. Firstly,
it would obviously raise the earnings of a substantial number of workers. But
secondly it was also expected to affect the social security budget. Fewer
families, it was hoped, would have to claim extra support if they could earn a
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decent wage. Since its introduction, furthermore, the level of the minimum
wage has risen faster than inflation – in other words its real value has
increased. Having done this, Brown and the cabinet turned to the social
security system.
Welfare to work
This idea was to change public and governmental attitudes to the use of
welfare – social security, in particular, completely. The previous Conservative
administrations had tried to reduce many benefits on the assumption that this
would force more people into the workforce and so make them less dependent
on the state. The New Labour plan was to use new welfare policies as an
incentive instead of low levels of benefit as a sanction. There would still be a
harder regime for those who refused to take up the system of incentives
(perhaps even harder than the Conservatives had envisaged).
The change in policy direction came to be known as ‘welfare to work’
suggesting that the welfare system would help people back into the workforce
rather than force them. It was, in other words, to be a carrot rather than a stick 
The poverty trap
One of the main problems causing both poverty and unemployment in the UK
has been the so-called poverty trap. This phenomenon occurs under a
particular set of circumstances. Where nobody in a family is working and they
rely on state benefits to live, there may be no incentive for anyone to find
employment. If somebody did and began to earn money, the value of the
earnings would be instantly eroded by taxation.
At the same time the family would begin to lose
many benefits which are means-tested. With
some income coming in, such benefits as housing
benefit, school uniform and meals allowances,
income support and the like would be lost. The
net effect of all this was often that a family was
actually worse off by working than by not
working. They were, therefore, in a poverty trap. It was a disincentive to work
and, for those who nevertheless chose to find employment, it actually
increased poverty.
There are essentially three ways to attack the poverty trap:
1 Raise earnings at the lower end of the wage scale. This was partly achieved
by introducing the minimum wage.
2 Reduce or eliminate taxation at low earnings levels. To achieve this Brown
introduced a new 10 per cent tax band to replace levels of 20 per cent or 22
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poverty trap
A situation where families find
there is no incentive to find
work. The double effect of
paying tax and losing benefits
when they start work may
result in a reduction in net
earnings.
per cent for low earners.
3 The most difficult measure concerns social security benefits. It was here that
the most radical proposals were made by the new Labour government.
Though many benefits would continue to be means tested, and therefore lost
when a family raised its earnings, a system of tax credits could be used.
Effectively this meant compensating such families for the loss of benefits and
ensuring instead that their effective income level would be increased. This
was designed, in the end, to ensure that
anyone would gain by seeking and finding
employment. It is discussed in more detail
below.
The attack on poverty: selective
universality
This apparently odd phrase (selective universality) has been used to describe
the overall social security policies of the post-1997
Labour governments. It suggests a system which is
designed to be of general benefit, but which
targets action upon poor families, and especially
those with children.
The main measures which are designed to
achieve this targeting are as follows:
 The working family tax credit is a system of
subsidising families where one or more of
their members is earning. It compensates for
the loss of benefits as earnings rise. It is designed to achieve an effective
minimum level of income for such families. By 2002 this reached £214 per
week. The family will actually receive money from the inland revenue,
rather than simply paying to them.
 A child tax credit is also becoming available, again to ensure that working
families are rewarded with extra income, rather than punished by the tax
system.
 A new stakeholder pension scheme was introduced, specially for those
unable to take part in private pension schemes. These are discussed below.
A number of other measures to help pensioners are also described in the
next section.
 Help became available to subsidise the cost of child care for working
parents. Again this is described below.
 Higher levels of income support in general became available for families
with children.
We can therefore see that benefits have tended to be aimed mainly at poor
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tax credits
A system where the tax
authorities actually pay back
taxes to poor families. This
improves their financial status
and can reduce poverty.
selective universality
A name applied to New
Labour’s Social Security
policies after 1997. It refers to
the idea that, although all
benefits have been reformed,
there is a focus on those
groups who are especially in
need through no fault of their
own.
families, pensioners and those who have dependent children – traditionally
the groups in society who are the poorest. We can now look at some of the
measures in a little more detail.
Pensions
Gordon Brown decided at the outset to retain the link between the state
pension and the rate of inflation. He resisted calls from his own party and
pressure groups such as Age Concern and Help the Aged to restore the link
between pensions and average earnings. This led to perhaps his greatest
political error. In 2000, when inflation was at a particularly low level, the
index-linked pension rise came to only 75p per week. It had been correctly
calculated and Brown claimed that it was fair. But the psychological effect of
such a tiny increase was devastating. At one point, indeed, it seemed to
threaten the government’s re-election prospects.
What had been lost in the political controversy which raged around the
increase was the fact that Brown was attempting to target benefits on poor
pensioners only. The state old age pension was not means tested and paid on
an equal basis to all – from dukes to dustmen – as had been said. By raising
means tested minimum income support for pensioners, he claimed to be
helping those who needed the support, rather than everybody. So, even if the
real value of the pension was falling, poor pensioners would be protected. By
2003 it is intended to raise the minimum income for a single pensioner to
£100 per week, and £154 for a married couple. In addition benefits are
available for those with disabilities and chronic illnesses.
But the Brown plan – another example of selective universality – did not
convince the doubters. So in 2001 he was forced to give above-inflation
pension increases. He also substantially increased the cold weather bonus (now
available whatever the weather), the pensioners’ Christmas bonus and a free
TV licence for those over 75. These measures were
successful in heading off opposition and the
pensions issues did not affect the general election
result.
Labour’s other plan for the elderly has been the
introduction of the stakeholder pension. For those
who do not enjoy occupational pension schemes
or cannot afford to have their private pensions,
the state is now providing its own system. This 
is designed to ‘top up’ the state pension, which, 
as we have seen, is likely to continue to fall 
back below typical living standards. All large
employers must organise a stakeholder pension
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stakeholder pensions
A new system of old age
pensions. People may start
their own pension plan and will
enjoy tax relief on
contributions. Every large
employer must offer such a
scheme to their employees,
though they do not have to
contribute. It is needed
because the value of the state
pension is being eroded and
the state cannot afford to meet
the increasing demands of an
ageing population.
scheme for their workers, though they do not have to contribute. The contri-
butions to the stakeholder pension are tax free, though there is a ceiling as to
how much can be put into the scheme. 
Stakeholder pensions are not designed to replace private schemes – indeed the
government encourages them. However, there is a recognition that the state
cannot sustain the growing expenditure on the old age pension. Individuals
will be forced to make their own additional contributions. 
Child poverty
As we have seen, Gordon Brown’s main priority has been child poverty. A signif-
icant number of measures have been introduced to try to alleviate the problem:
 The real value of child benefit has been increased substantially after over
a decade of erosion.
 The state offers up to 70 per cent of the cost of child care to any poor parent
who wishes to work.
 Child tax credits are available for poor families.
 Working families with children are now offered substantial income support
 The working families tax credit system, as shown above, is designed to
have a major impact on children’s welfare.
 Perhaps less directly, but nevertheless creating an impact on poorer
families with children, especially lone parents, a place for all 4-year olds is
not guaranteed at nursery school. In 2002 it was announced that the
government also intended for places for every 3-year old to be available for
all parents who needed it. The existence of such places for children is
designed to help more parents with child-care responsibilities to seek
employment.
Despite the measures and Brown’s claim that he
has taken hundreds of thousands of children out
of poverty, his aim to eradicate the problem
altogether is still very far off. Low wages and
areas of high unemployment stubbornly refuse to
go away and these may have to be the subject of
future policies.
Social exclusion
The term social exclusion, a key element of New Labour’s philosophy, refers to
those groups in society who have been seriously disadvantaged by a variety of
circumstances. Some of Labour’s Social Security policies have been directed at
this problem. Four particular aspects of social exclusion can be used as
examples of how welfare policy has been used to try to attack it.
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social exclusion
Part of New Labour philosophy.
It refers to those who are
deprived and have a variety of
social problems with a variety
of causes. Reforms to the
social security system are a
part of an overall strategy of
reducing social exclusion.
1 Youth unemployment has been perhaps the most severe problem. It has given
rise to high crime rates, drug use and poverty. To attack it, a new deal was
introduced for the young unemployed. It basically gave young people four
choices at age 16. They could stay on in education, in which case, if they were
from a poor family, benefits would be maintained as an incentive. They could
go onto recognised training schemes in which case, again, they would receive
benefits. Thirdly, they could seek employment and would receive an allowance
while doing so provided they attended training for job seeking and attended
designated interviews. Finally they could do none of the above, in which case
benefits would be withdrawn. 
2 Lone parents created problems, both in terms of long-term dependency and the
quality of care given to children. They were offered a new deal, like the young
unemployed. Those who chose to look after their children would be rewarded
with increased benefit. If they opted to seek work, the state would pay for up to
70 per cent of child-care costs so there would be no ‘poverty trap’ for them.
3 Child poverty is a further form of social exclusion. Not only is it seen as an
evil per se, it also leads to other problems such as low educational attainment,
truancy, crime and drug abuse. By eliminating child poverty it is assumed that
many of these problems will dissolve.
4 General unemployment has been tackled by attempts to reduce the poverty
trap as shown above. It is a cause of family poverty, of child poverty and of
many other social problems. Clearly, the enduring health of the economy has
helped ease unemployment since 1995, but the effects of ‘welfare to work’
policies may also have been a benefit.
NEW LABOUR: AN ASSESSMENT
In Labour’s first term, and after their election victory in 2001, attention has
tended to centre upon policies towards public services such as health,
transport, education and crime. The failure of the party in these areas has put
their future electoral prospects in doubt. This has tended to overshadow the
progress they have made in the field of social security. There is no doubt that
they have made some progress in reducing inequality and in dealing with
poverty. The claims are grand ones and the party has very far to go. It may well
be that Gordon Brown has overstated the achievements.
However, there remains some concern that the Labour government’s refusal to
use the tax system to re-distribute income from rich to poor will mean that
progress will be limited. The role of welfare in bringing more people into the
workforce and in reducing poverty can only go so far unless Brown is prepared
to raise taxes at the top end. There is no immediate prospect of this happening. 
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Making fundamental social changes is a long-term project. The effects of
ending child poverty and social exclusion will only be seen after a new gener-
ation has grown up. It is too short a time period to make a final judgement on
New labour’s performance.
AN OVERVIEW OF WELFARE AND SOCIAL
SECURITY
We can usefully divide the post-war period into the folowing four main phases
where welfare.
1 1940s to 1960s. In this period social security was largely seen as a safety net
protecting those who were deprived through no fault of their own. It was also
there to provide support for people at times when need is greatest – when
children are young, when a person is unemployed, when there is sickness and
when people are old.
2 1960s to 1970s. When Labour was in power in this period they attempted to
use the Welfare State, in combination with direct taxation, as a means of re-
distributing income and reducing inequality.
3 1980s to early 1990s. This saw the Conservative attack on the dependency
culture and their attempt to create a more flexible labour market. Welfare
benefits were reduced, partly to prevent too many people relying on the state
and partly to prevent cash benefits being used to keep people out of the
workforce.
4 1997 to the present. This period has seen New Labour’s programme of welfare
to work and its attack on poverty. Social security was to be used as an
incentive for enterprise and for people to seek work, rather than as a safety
net or a means by which people could continue to be dependent on the state.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 To what extent have the principles of the Welfare State been
eroded by social security changes since 1946?
2 How did the Conservatives seek to end the dependency culture
after 1979?
3 How has New Labour attempted to attack poverty after 1997?
4 In what ways has the Labour government after 1997 sought to reduce child poverty?
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Before examining the political issue of law and order as it has unfolded since
1979, we need to define the scope of the subject. The following elements may
be included under the general heading ‘law and order’.
● The system of criminal law. How can it be kept up to date and used to
combat law through conviction and deterrence.
● Crime and punishment. What are the most effective ways in which the
sentencing of convicted criminals can be used to deter crime, to satisfy the
victims of crime and to prevent re-offending.
● The law courts. How can they be organised to deal efficiently and effectively
with crime.
● The prison and probation system. This needs to keep up with demand,
ensure security from criminals for the community and to take measures to
rehabilitate prisoners and try to avoid re-offending.
● Policing. How much should be spent on the service, how many officers should
be employed, what equipment should be invested in and how should police
forces be managed and deployed to combat crime.
● How to deal with potential breaches of public order. This concerns both
the laws on public order and also how police are used. It also concerns the
circumstances in which public meetings and demonstrations should be
banned or curtailed.
● How to deal with the social and moral causes of crime.
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 Review of the problem of crime in recent decades
 Descriptions of the various attempts which have been made to reduce crime
since 1979
 Analysis of different governments’ attitudes to crime
 Descriptions of legislation passed to deal with law and order issues
 Analysis of theories concerning the causes of crime
 Speculation as to how law and order issues may be dealt with in the future
From time to time all these matters come to the attention of policy makers.
Some may be stressed more than others at times, but they are all facets of the
same problem.
Although the maintenance of law and order is one of the oldest and most basic
functions of government, it has not been one of the main subjects of partisan
conflict for most of the modern era in Britain. Crime and public disorder are
the concern of all, but usually stand in the background of party politics. This
has been for two main reasons:
1 There was a perception that politicians do not have it in their power to
control crime levels. Crime was seen as a social problem which is inevitable
and whose causes are complex.
2 Until the 1970s, crime levels, or at least known and reported levels of crime
did not rise seriously. Nor was fear of crime seen as a major problem. It was
rare enough for people to be affected by crime or public disorder so that
other issues, such as the economic well-being of the country, foreign policy
and welfare policy, were uppermost in their minds when making political
judgements.
This led to a circumstance where there was a general consensus on law and
order issues. The causes of growing crime rates were social and moral, more
the concern of the churches, the schools and the courts than of politicians. The
way in which crime could best be combated, all major parties agreed, was to
remove the social causes of crime. Prosperity, educational opportunity, high
employment and better housing were all seen as the best way of dealing with
crime. Breakdowns in public order were, meanwhile, rare events. There had
been some race rioting in the 1950s, youth violence in the 1960s, political
demonstrations in the late 1960s and some violence during large-scale strikes,
but most people were unaffected. The police, too, seemed capable of handling
the outbreaks. No special legislation was seen as necessary.
During the 1970s this situation began to change. Crime levels were rising
inexorably, especially crimes against property and cars, and violent and sexual
offences. This also meant that the fear of crime was growing. Public disorders
also grew with large industrial strikes becoming more violent and football
hooliganism growing.
An increasingly alarmed public turned to the politicians for solutions. Under
this pressure the political consensus on law and order collapsed. The Labour
party remained committed to policies which were designed to deal with the
social causes of crime. The Conservative party, however, moved steadily
towards a harder-line approach. For them the laws needed to be reviewed,
police and law courts to be given greater powers’ and public disorders
controlled. The Liberals (later Liberal Democrats) shared a social view of
crime with the Labour party, but also emphasised the threat to human rights
of the Conservatives’ increasingly severe policies.
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The election campaign of 1979 marks a clear end to the consensus. The
Labour party was still arguing that economic prosperity and reduced
unemployment would solve many of the problems of crime. Restoration of
communities, better housing and social services were also seen as basic
answers. This was rejected by the Conservatives who actually blamed many of
the policies of the Labour government of 1974–79 for the rising crime rate.
Labour’s ‘soft’ approach to trade unions led to public disorders. An extremely
liberal approach to young offenders – largely replacing custodial sentencing
with community work, probation supervision and the involvement of social
services with young criminals – was criticised as failing to deal with delin-
quency. The electorate agreed. Conservative law and order policies were
certainly one of the factors which brought them to power.
THE CONSERVATIVES IN POWER, 1979–97
The first seven years of the administration of Margaret Thatcher saw one of
the greatest onslaughts on crime and disorder ever seen in Britain. The issue
was attacked on all levels. The main developments were as follows:
 There was a steady increase in the size of the police force. Police pay was
raised by 16 per cent to raise morale and boost recruitment. Between 1979
and 1984 expenditure on policing more than doubled. From 1979 to 1983
police numbers rose from 110,000 to 120,000 in the UK.
 To meet the demand for greater custodial sentences, eight new prisons and
four youth detention centres were built between 1979–84.
 The Criminal Justice Act of 1982 gave magistrates much greater powers to
imprison offenders and to lengthen sentences. More importantly a system of
youth custody for very young offenders was introduced. This policy was
known as the short sharp shock and was based on a belief that if a young
criminal was given a short but strict period of custody it would nip their
criminal tendency in the bud. The policy was highly controversial. Many
sociologists were convinced it would not work and that the detention
centres (sometimes known as ‘boot camps’) would only be breeding grounds
were young offenders would learn crime from older inmates.
 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) of 1984 marked a consid-
erable increase in police powers. The ability to stop and search those
suspected of committing or even contemplating crime was extended. It
also became possible to question suspects for extended periods of time
with the permission of a magistrate. The compulsory recording of inter-
views of suspects went some way to balance out the greater questioning
powers, but the overall effect of PACE was to change the balance of power
markedly in the direction of the police.
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 In 1986 the Public Order Act was passed. This was a response to the inner
city disturbances which had occurred in London, Liverpool, Bristol and
other cities, and to the conduct of the miners’ strike of 1984 when there
was extensive violence around the pits and severe challenges to police
peace lines. The Act gave the police extensive powers to prevent marches
and demonstrations if they believed that breaches of the peace might
result. Rioting itself became a special crime and curbs were introduced on
the activities of trade union pickets who may try to prevent non-union
workers entering factories and mines.
 New training was introduced for the police, enabling them to become
almost a paramilitary force when facing serious public disorder.
These measures, and the general climate of policy makers being hard-line on
crime issues, proved to be popular. However, the figures suggest they were
unsuccessful. Crime levels continued to grow inexorably (see tables 6.1, 6.2
and 6.3). This led to a re-examination of policies after 1987.
Table 6.1 Crimes reported in the British Crime Survey (millions)
Year Total crimes Violent crimes
1981 11.0 2.2
1983 11.9 2.1
1987 13.3 2.3
1991 15.1 2.7
1993 18.6 3.6
1995 19.2 4.1
1997 16.4 3.4
1999 14.7 3.2
2000 12.9 2.6
Source: British Crime Survey.
Table 6.2 Total drugs seizures, 1981–99
Year Cannabis Heroin Ecstasy Cocaine Crack
1981 17,227 819 n/a 503 n/a
1991 59,420 2,640 1,735 1,401 583
1995 91,325 6,468 5,513 2,210 1,444
1998 114,667 15,188 4,849 5,207 2,488
1999 97,356 15,108 6,438 5,619 2,436
Source: Home Office.
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Table 6.3 Offences per 10,000 people, by age range
Age range Male Female
10–15 221 85
16–24 597 123
25–34 250 57
35 + 47 11
Source: Home Office.
1987–93: retreat from the hard line
By 1987 it was apparent that law and order policies, especially those designed
to contain the crime rate, were failing. Furthermore there was a complete
reappraisal of the hard line approach by policy makers. Attention switched
once again to the social causes of crime and to the belief that severe custodial
sentences, especially for the young, were ineffective. At the same time a new
initiative was developed. This was a community-based approach to crime
reduction. The changes which occurred in the period can be summarised
as follows:
 Local authorities were given greater responsibility for crime reduction.
Improvements in the condition of communities, neighbourhood watch
schemes and the idea of community policing
were all to be undertaken at local government
level. Community policing was thought to be
particularly important. The policy was that
local police forces should become integral
parts of their communities, with close links
between officers and local agencies, schools,
youth groups, tenants organisations etc. By so
doing it was hoped that the police would be
seen, not as outsiders, but as part of the fabric of local society. It was also
expected that local authorities would create schemes for young
unemployed and offenders which would provide employment or other
projects to divert them from crime.
 Tough sentencing policies were relaxed. The courts and probation service
were encouraged to find alternatives to prison and detention centres. The
main device was to be community service and probation orders which were
to be more active in attempting to rehabilitate offenders. This policy was
legislated in the Criminal Justice Act 1991. Judges and magistrates were
required to justify prison sentences and only give them in the case of
serious crimes.
 There was a steady rise in the number of police officers and probation
officers employed.
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community policing
An idea that the police should
see themselves as part of the
community, not separate from
it. Officers should get to know
the community and so be able
to protect people, gain their
trust and obtain information
about law breaking.
The course of policy and law and order was hampered considerably by a lack
of consensus about how best to stem the alarming rise in crime statistics and
by the fact that there was little continuity in policy. There were four different
Home Secretaries in the period – Douglas Hurd (1985–89), David Waddington
(1989–90), Kenneth Baker (1990–92) and Kenneth Clarke (1992–93) –
reflecting the relatively low profile of the issue in the government’s political
programme. To make matters worse, an economic recession struck the country
in 1990. Rising unemployment, which resulted, led to a further leap forward
in the crime statistics.
So, by 1993 Conservative policy on law and order appeared to be in disarray.
Both the hard line and the community-based approaches seemed to have
failed. The party, which normally led Labour comfortably on this issue, began
to lose public confidence. It was time for a radical initiative. This was provided
by the appointment of Michael Howard as Home Secretary in that year.
The 27-point plan for law and order
When Michael Howard took over as Home Secretary he signalled a complete
reversal of Conservative law and order policy. Cynics have argued that this was
a response to the unpopularity of the government as it struggled to overcome
the effects of a major economic recession. A more objective explanation is that
it was the result of continued rises in crime rates and clear public demands for
a tougher stance. Youth crime represented a main concern and Howard went
a long way to addressing this particular aspect of the problem.
At the Conservative party conference in the autumn of 1993 Howard declared
that ‘prison works’, and criticised his predecessors’ policies as being too soft on
crime. As the title ‘27-point plan’ suggests his policy was broad and compre-
hensive. Its main features were contained in the Criminal Justice and Public
Order Act of 1994 and were as follows:
 To tackle juvenile crime Michael Howard announced the introduction of
secure detention centres for 12- to 14-year olds. This group had previously
been placed into local authority hands for education and rehabilitation. At
the same time magistrates were given powers to give longer custodial
sentences to 15- to 16-year olds.
 It had long been a complaint of the police and the courts that the law was
weighted in favour of accused persons. The main culprit was the ancient
‘right to silence’ which allowed suspects and defendants to remain silent
without this being allowed to be used against them in court. So, a suspect
who refused to answer police questions and/or who refused to testify in
court was protected from suspicion on the grounds of silence. The absolute
right was, therefore, removed. This marked a change in the criminal law
which overturned a centuries-old principle allowing a person to refuse to
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answer questions which may incriminate him or her (this is the famous
fifth amendment of the United States Constitution). Accused persons who
choose to remain silent may have the fact referred to in court and magis-
trates or juries may take the silence into account when judging guilt.
 The police were given increased powers to limit demonstrations and public
meetings. Open-air ‘rave’ parties were effectively banned, squatting was
made a criminal offence, as was trespass on private land. These measures
extended police powers greatly and, most controversially, particularly
affected young people. They were designed to control the activities of
groups of homeless or travelling people who were often seen as a public
nuisance and seedbeds of crime.
 The rules on bail were tightened so that it became very difficult for those
who commit violent crime or are persistent offenders to be given bail. This
resulted in a sudden increase in the numbers of people held on remand in
custody. The police had asked for this measure on the grounds that accused
people on bail very often committed repeat offences.
The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 was an extremely contro-
versial piece of legislation which received widespread condemnation as an
infringement on human rights and a step backwards in the treatment of
juvenile crime. But its author, Michael Howard, was unrepentant and
continued his crusade to prove that a harsher regime would eventually make
an impact on crime figures.
Also in 1994 the Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act was passed. This made
changes in the management of the police. It involved much greater central
control over police policy, in the hands of the Home Office. By reducing the
influence of local authorities, Howard hoped that policing could become more
effective. It effectively marked the end of the experiment with community
policing. More significantly, the Act introduced performance targets for police
authorities. It was hoped that a system of targets for clearing up crime would
concentrate minds and result in better detection rates.
Finally the Crime Sentences Act of 1996 allowed for much higher minimum
sentences, especially for repeat offenders, and those convicted of violent,
drugs or sexual offences. For those already in prison the parole and early
release system was severely reduced. More prisoners would now serve their
full term. For younger offenders a system of curfews was allowed, permitting
the police to impose movement restrictions of juvenile offenders.
The result of these measures was to increase the prison population from
47,000 in 1993 to 60,000 in 1997.On the positive side there were signs in
1997 that the rise in crime was slowing down and, in the case of some
offences, was falling. Clear-up rates by the police also began to improve.
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The post-1997 policies of the Conservative administration also have to be seen
in the context of a marked shift in the party’s moral outlook. Prime Minister
John Major had announced in the early 1990s a new moral initiative which he
titled ‘back to basics’. The policy was designed to restore a stronger sense of
moral responsibility and to try to re-establish Christian and family values.
Criminals were seen as responsible for their own actions and the liberal notion
that the causes of crime are predominantly social, was rejected. The term ‘New
Right’, which has been applied to the more authoritarian policies of the
Conservatives in the 1980s and 1990s, could be applied most directly to the
law and order policies of Michael Howard.
They can also be viewed as a direct attack on many civil liberties which had
been closely guarded in the United Kingdom for many years, even centuries.
When added to the more draconian measures of the 1980s, they also mark a
significant increase in the powers of the police. Citizens can be prevented from
demonstrating in public or from forming any large gatherings which caused
the police to believe there might be breaches of the peace. Individuals can
routinely be stopped and searched by police officers. Accused persons may be
held in custody for up to three days (longer still if suspected of terrorism). If
they choose to remain silent, it may be held against them in court. Young
people are much more likely to be given custodial sentences and these
sentences may be for substantial periods. It is more difficult to obtain bail and
prisoners are often denied the opportunity for parole or early release if they
show signs of rehabilitation. Finally, judges and magistrates have had much of
their power over sentencing reduced. There are now statutory minimum
sentences for a range of crimes. This marks a significant shift in responsibility
for the treatment of convicted criminals from the judiciary to politicians.
The Labour party, whose law and order policies were largely formulated by
Tony Blair, the shadow Home Secretary until 1994, and his successor Jack
Straw, opposed many of these policies. They, along with the resurgent Liberal
Democrats, criticised the attack on civil liberties and the neglect of the social
causes of crime. But it was clear that a new Labour government would not
abandon all the Howard policies. Indeed, aware that a tough stance on law
and order was a vote winner, Blair promised to be as hard on criminals as the
Conservatives had been. But the traditional Labour view that crime has mainly
social causes, meant that Blair had to promise that these too would receive the
party’s attention.
Tony Blair’s 1993 assertion that Labour would be ‘tough on crime and tough
on the causes of crime’ reflected this dual approach. However, when the party
unveiled its programme of action on crime in 1995, the measures looked to be
as severe as Michael Howard’s had been. As the 1997 election loomed, the two
main parties seemed to be engaged in a contest to see which of them could be
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seen as harsher line on crime in the eyes of the electorate. Thus, in many ways,
a new consensus on law and order had emerged even though the two main
parties claimed to have distinctive policies in the 1997 campaign.
TOUGH ON CRIME AND TOUGH ON THE CAUSES
OF CRIME – NEW LABOUR’S RESPONSE
As Labour’s policies on law and order began to unfold in its early years of
office, it became clear that there was a great deal of continuity between the
Conservative policies of Michael Howard and those of Jack Straw. There were,
however, different emphases and it is certainly true that the Labour
programme was more extensive than its predecessors.
Much of the programme was inspired by the
experience of Mayor Giuliani of New York and his
conspicuous success in reducing crime. His policy
was commonly described as ‘zero tolerance’,
though it was much more than a drive against
minor offences. The New York scheme suggested
that ‘low-level’ crimes such as begging, minor
drug dealing, drunkenness and general disor-
derly behaviour, if left unchecked, would soon
grow into more general criminal behaviour. They
exacerbated the fear of crime and socialised vulnerable younger people into a
life of more serious offending. The effects on the crime statistics, especially
violent crime, in New York were dramatic, with crimes falling by 15 per cent
in 1995 alone. Murders fell from just over 2,200 to 990 between 1990
and 1996.
Jack Straw, who became Home Secretary in 1997, set about introducing a
broad-based version of the New York experience. Youth offending was to be a
priority as research indicated that most offences were committed by boys and
men aged 15–25. The fact that government in Britain is able to make more
social interventions than in the United States meant that a programme of
attacks on the basic social causes of crime could be undertaken in a way which
was less feasible in New York or America in general.
If we are to describe and assess policies since 1997, a summary of the policies
is best divided into two sections, as suggested by Tony Blair’s 1993 decla-
ration, ‘tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime’.
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zero tolerance
An idea developed in New York.
The police refuse to tolerate
small crimes such as begging,
graffiti and vagrancy. By doing
so it is believed to discourage
people from drifting into more
serious crime. It also helps to
reduce the fear of crime. In
New York it has been
dramatically successful.
TOUGH ON CRIME
The Labour programme appears to be the most extensive set of proposals to
appear in modern times. Of course, some of the plan is little more than a set
of objectives, targets and pledges. But there is also a good deal of legislation
and concrete action.
YOUTH CRIME
In 1999 a major experiment was introduced. Anti-Social Behaviour Orders
could be made against youths who were suspected of causing widespread
crime and disorder within a particular community. The youths were ordered to
cease their activities and, if they failed to do so, would be liable to prosecution
for ignoring the order. This represented a completely new kind of offence,
based on generalised behaviour rather than specific crimes.
The central piece of legislation was the Crime and Disorder Act of 2000. This
was aimed very much at young, repeat offenders who are responsible for the
majority of crime. A Youth Justice Board was set up in order to co-ordinate
the government’s efforts and to advise on new legislation. However,
immediate action was taken to speed up the legal process of bringing
offenders to trial. The system of giving young offenders repeated warnings
was ended. A ‘final warning’ system was devised after which young criminals
were to receive a full-scale trial and sentence. Curfews were introduced for
child offenders and restrictions placed on offenders, preventing them from
entering certain districts where they were known trouble-makers.
The youth crime policies were further beefed up in the Criminal Justice and
Police Act of 2001. The scope of curfews was extended and more youth
detention centres were announced. The main thrust of this Act, however, was
an attack on what Jack Straw described as Britain’s ‘yob culture’. The main
innovation was a system of fixed ‘on-the-spot’ fines which could be levied by
police against ‘disorderly behaviour’. Eight relevant offences were identified
including such actions as public drunkenness, threatening behaviour and
general violence. The purpose of this development was twofold – to provide
summary justice and to allow the police to deal with general street disorders
more effectively.
General crime
Although there was little evidence that serious crime among the older age
groups was on the increase, there were also measures which were designed to
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deal with criminals of all ages. Minimum sentences were increased for a range
of crimes of violence as well as sexual and drugs-related offences. Mandatory
drugs testing for all suspects was introduced in the Crime and Public
Protection Act of 2001.
The Act also forced sex offenders to submit themselves to police orders on
their movements after release from prison. A sex offenders register had
already been set up, but the new regulations gave greater discretion to the
police in informing communities of the presence of such individuals. In
extreme cases sex offenders could be forced to re-locate. The laws preventing
them working with children were also toughened.
For some prisoners ‘tagging’ was sanctioned, an electronic system for tracing
the movement of offenders on early-release schemes. Such prisoners were also
subjected to stricter probation conditions, while those given community
service orders were subjected to greater controls over their work.
But adult crime was no longer seen as a key problem and the Labour
government was less active in this area than the Conservatives had been.
Instead, it was intended that more effective policing, higher detection rates and
better social conditions would automatically reduce the overall levels of crime.
Football hooliganism
The main drive against this widespread range of offences was spurred by the
behaviour of England football supporters in the 1998 World Cup and the
European Championships of 2000. The two main devices introduced were
International and Domestic Banning Orders.
The orders were applied not only to known, convicted offenders, but also to
those who were merely suspected of being likely to commit crimes. The
subjects of the orders could be banned from travelling to specific football
matches, be required to report to police stations while matches were taking
place and, most controversially, could be forced to surrender their passports
when matches abroad were taking place.
The orders were largely at the discretion of the police and did not require
sanctions by the courts. Thus some level of guilt was being presumed and the
basic right of freedom of movement could be denied to individuals who had
broken no laws, or at least had never been convicted of doing so.
Policing
Labour’s attitude to policing was three-pronged. These concerned numbers,
equipment and improving standards. Labour inherited a service which was
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suffering declining strength, low morale and a constant barrage of media
criticism. The seemingly unstoppable rise in the levels of crime had sapped
their confidence and, just as the crime statistics began to fall in the early
1990s, cuts in public expenditure began to bite.
While the new government wished to see an increase in police numbers after
a decline during the 1990s, it was constrained by financial limits. Having
committed itself to Conservative spending plans, the Home Office was forced
to endure further reductions in police strength. It was not until 2000
that Gordon Brown was able to announce significant increases in spending.
A plan to increase the service by 9,000 officers over three years was
announced. By 2001 police numbers at last began to rise slowly. However, the
increase was slow, being hampered by relatively low levels of pay and, in
London especially, a reluctance among young recruits to locate in London or
other expensive areas.
The second initiative promised to be more effective. The Home Office began
to approve larger and larger numbers of closed circuit TV (CCTV) schemes,
especially in inner cities and other crime ‘hot spots’. The extensive use of speed
cameras released officers from traffic duty and, as we have seen above, the
force was given more powers to prevent public disorder I town centres. Disor-
derly behaviour in clubs or pubs could result in speedy closure on police
recommendation and fixed penalties could be levied for offences of public
disorder. In 2001 further measures were proposed to give the police a greater
ability to secure convictions. The measures were promised a rough ride
through parliament and widespread opposition among civil rights group, but
David Blunkett, who took over as Home Secretary in 2001, seemed deter-
mined to push them through.
The right to trial by jury was to be removed for many ‘medium level’ offences
under the Mode of Trial Bill. Apart from reducing the expense of the criminal
justice system, it was also believed that juries were less likely to convict than
magistrates. At the same time there were proposals to introduce ‘double
jeopardy’, which would enable to courts to try a person more than once for the
same offence provided new evidence was found. Like trial by jury, the double
jeopardy rule was an ancient right, but was nevertheless to be dispensed with.
A proposal which was to have similar effects was to allow courts to be told an
accused person’s past record before the verdict. Finally Blunkett decided that
he would allow police forces to retain DNA records, not just on convicted
criminals, bit also on anyone who had been a crime suspect, whether or not
convicted. The overall effect of these proposals was, it was hoped, to tilt the
balance of power decisively towards the police and away from accused
persons. The Conservative Michael Howard’s 1995 plea to ‘take the handcuffs
off the police’ was being answered by a Labour administration!
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The police were to pay a price for their increased powers. The Crime and
Public Protection Act established the power of the Home Office to set
performance targets for police authorities. League tables of performance
based on crime reduction and conviction rates were to be published. Forces
were also required to contribute to Local Crime and Disorder Reduction Task
Forces, encompassing the probation and local authority social services as well
as the police. In other words, the police were to improve their performance
both in reducing crime and in tackling some of the basic causes of crime and
disorder (see box).
Law and order legislation and increases in police powers
• 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act. Increased police powers of stop and
search. Extended allowed period of questioning without charge to 72 hours.
• 1986 Public Order Act. Increased the power of the police to prevent demonstrations
which might lead to criminal activity.
• 1991 Criminal Justice Act. The courts were forced to justify custodial sentences,
making it more difficult to imprison minor offenders.
• 1994 Criminal Justice Act. Took away people’s right to remain silent and not have
their silence held against them. Created a new offence of criminal trespass. Increased
police powers to prevent demonstrations and rave parties. Violent criminals were not
allowed bail while awaiting trial.
• 1996 Crime and Disorder Act. Forced courts to give longer sentences for serious
offences.
• 2000 Crime and Disorder Act. Required the police to bring more young offenders
to trial. Introduced a new offence of racially aggravated crime.
• 2001 Criminal Justice and Police Act. Introduced curfews for young offenders and
instant justice for public disorder offences.
• 2001 Crime and Public Protection Act. Allowed police to keep a register of sex
offenders and to restrict their movements after release from prison.
• 2002 Terrorism Act. Gave wide police powers to detect international terrorists,
including inspecting bank accounts, mobile phone records and to search premises.
THE CAUSES OF CRIME
Principles
The Labour government subscribed to the view of Liberals and many sociolo-
gists that much crime has its roots in the very young. The seeds of criminal
behaviour, they believed, were sown very young. They also accepted that the
causes of crime were multi-faceted. Attempts to attack these causes, therefore,
would also have to be pluralist. Strengthening the powers of the police and the
courts could do so much, but it was not enough.
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Three basic New Labour principles were applied to the crime problem. The first
concerned social exclusion. This phenomenon was identified as the tendency
for some deprived portions of the population to become excluded from the
normal benefits of the welfare state and so
become alienated and disaffected. The sources of
social exclusion included poor parenting, bad
housing or homelessness, family unemployment,
low educational attainment and truanting, drug
misuse, general lack of opportunity, teenage
pregnancy and chronic poor health. Clearly, many
of those suffering from such exclusion are likely to
turn to criminal activity.
The second idea is joined-up government. Here, it is seen that, if social
problems have many and varied causes, the solutions must also be pluralist.
In practice this implies that a number of agencies, rather than just one, should
be involved in solving the problems, Crime, especially among the young,
should therefore not just involve the police and the courts. Social services
departments, probation offices, schools, education welfare departments,
community groups and youth organisations were also to be involved.
Finally, we should refer to the communitarian and active citizenship philoso-
phies which are an important element of the New Labour programme. These
approaches to all social policies are designed to promote the belief that
individuals should feel responsible for what occurs within their own commu-
nities. ‘Communitarianism’ as a principle stresses
that communities are largely responsible for their
own welfare. While this includes such features as
the physical environment, education, care of the
elderly or needy and cultural life, the central
element concerns law and order issues. Thus the
existing neighbourhood watch schemes have
received additional funding and publicity, while
residents are encouraged to report possible law-breaking (especially drugs
offences) to the police and to become actively involved in preventing juveniles
becoming involved in crime. Active citizenship, too, implies that we are not only
responsible for ourselves and our families, but also have a social duty to involve
ourselves in social action to make our communities better and safer to live in.
MEASURES
The most dramatic of the measures has been the Surestart programme with a
budget of £540 million for three years. This identifies children, mostly below
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social exclusion
A New Labour expression. It
refers to those people, often
young, who are excluded from
mainstream society because of
a variety of problems including
low educational standards,
unemployment, drug use,
homelessness, petty crime,
bad housing.
active citizenship
Another New Labour idea. This
suggests that people should
take responsibility for their own
communities. This includes
helping to control criminal
behaviour.
the age of 4, who are at ‘multiple risk’. The agencies, working together as
described above, are to intervene to try to prevent later trouble. Parents of
such children are encouraged to take up parenting classes. Special nursery
education is provided to try to ensure that children can integrate successfully
into mainstream education. Children with special needs are to be subject to
remedial action by all the agencies described above. As a corollary to this,
negligent parents may be subject to criminal prosecution, especially for failing
to ensure the children attend school.
On a broader front than Surestart, the New Deal for Communities was
granted £800 million to be spent regenerating some of the most deprived
communities in Britain, in which crime has been prone to ferment. Schemes
for improved environments, housing, schools and remedial education schemes
for habitual truants were introduced in selected districts.
Truancy, indeed, has been identified as a key factor in youth crime. Schools
have been given targets for the reduction in truancy and league tables, similar
to those for examination results, are being published. As we have seen above,
parents are liable for prosecution if their children miss too much school. At the
same time persistent offenders may be provided with special schooling
designed to make education more relevant.
These and other schemes are supervised by Youth Offending Teams, staffed
by multiple local agencies. These teams are charged not only with the task of
improving the detection of criminals, but also with reversing criminal
behaviour among individuals. This latter objectives involves a more active
approach to punishment. Ways are to be found to force offenders to face up to
their crimes and their victims. Thus, community service orders, special
education and counselling may be used as well as custodial sentences.
SOME THEMES
Civil liberties
There is no doubt that, since 1979, all governments have been engaged in a
consistent drive to halt the seemingly inexorable rise in crime and, hopefully,
to start bringing the figures down. It is also clear that this drive has meant that
a number of civil liberties, some of them very ancient, have either disappeared
or come under serious threat. Indeed, in an interview with the author in the
1988, the then Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, admitted that a major part of
his role as a minister was to balance the community’s desire for security from
criminals and public disorder with individuals’ right to civil liberty. He also
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accepted that this role was almost impossible, though it had to be undertaken.
A review of these threats includes the following features:
 The position of those accused of crimes has been significantly altered.
Above all the right to remain silent without this incriminating them has
been removed by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994. The
police may question suspects for longer, in the case of suspected terrorists
for seven days. DNA and fingerprint samples are routinely taken and are
now retained, whether or not the suspect is convicted. Rape victims cannot
be forced to confront their accused attackers directly in court and children
are heavily protected in sensitive cases, being able to give evidence
by video.
 On our streets, the police have also gained considerable powers. There is
now an almost unrestricted right for the police to stop and search suspects.
Summary justice may be meted out to those who are committing public
order offences, with fixed-rate fines applying. Young offenders may have
orders placed against them, preventing them from entering specific
districts where they have committed crimes in the past. Many city streets
are now scanned by closed circuit TV (CCTV) systems and many more such
schemes were announced in August 2001.
 It is now more difficult to hold public demonstrations as the police have
increased powers to prevent such events if they believe breaches of the
peace may result. The right to hold open air parties and to gather on
common land has also been curtailed.
 Motorists are regularly photographed or video’d if they are speeding and
may be fined on the basis of this evidence alone. There are now proposals
to extend video and photographic evidence to illegal parking. These
measures are seen by civil rights groups as important infringements on the
right to privacy.
 Severe restrictions may now be applied to individuals who are merely
suspected of habitual criminal behaviour. Both convicted and suspected
football hooligans may be prevented from travelling both at home and
abroad and may have their passports confiscated. Known youth offenders
may be excluded from certain districts even after they have been punished
for their crimes.
 Convicted prisoners are now more likely to have to serve their full terms
and have had their right to parole and early release curtailed. Released
prisoners may be tagged or curfewed to restrict their movements. Children
up to the age of 15 may also now have to observe a curfew, again in
addition to any other punishment.
These, and many other less severe measures represent both a large extension
in police powers and a loss of personal liberty. If, on the other hand, we test
these developments against public opinion, there is little doubt that they have
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received the backing of the majority of the public as well as the law
enforcement community.
Are measures working?
One of the problems of making an assessment of the Labour government’s
two-pronged attack on both crime and its causes is that it is difficult to
establish how far success has been achieved.
The significant reductions in crime levels which began in the mid-1990s
coincided with Michael Howard’s tougher approach. It is therefore tempting to
suggest that the approach works. On the other hand, the same period saw the
onset of rising prosperity and falling unemployment, both of which might
have a similar result. To further muddy the waters of this debate, police
numbers were falling at this time while police powers were being extended.
Under Labour administrations the same dilemma exists. Most crime statistics
continued to fall after 1997, but whether this was due to the even stricter
policies of Jack Straw or whether more sympathetic social policies are having
an effect may never be known, certainly not in the short run. If we are to assess
whether New Labour has indeed been ‘tough on crime and tough on the
causes of crime’ we may take a straightforward approach. In terms of the
depth and variety of measures adopted, Labour’s programme certainly looks
more extensive then anything seen before. On the other hand we must also
point once again to the better economic health of the country. This alone could
be solely responsible for the lower crime statistics. It must also be noted that
crimes of violence, which contribute so greatly to the public fear of crime, have
continued to rise.
It is clear that both the main parties place a huge significance upon the law
and order issue. It is also true that Labour has stressed the social aspects of the
problem more than the Conservatives, but they have extended police powers
as much as their predecessors. Labour places great store by police numbers
and closer monitoring of police performance as a means of bearing down more
forcibly on crime and disorder. Thus, Labour policies have certainly repre-
sented toughness on known criminals and an attempt to reduce the numbers
of new ones by attacking the causes of crime. The extent to which tough talk
is converted into success remains unclear.
Terrorism
During 2001 the attention of the Home Office was drawn to the problem of
terrorism. Two pieces of legislation emerged. The first was the Terrorism Act
of February 2001. This had two main effects. Firstly, it broadened the
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definition of a ‘terrorist’. It could now include anyone, who in the opinion of
the law enforcement authorities was planning any damage to the state. Civil
Rights campaigners suggested it could be used against anyone who was
planning any form of demonstration which might lead to damage to property.
In other words, all pressure groups planning direct action might be under
suspicion. Secondly, it allowed the police to hold for questioning a terrorist
suspect for up to seven days with the permission of a minister. In other words,
the government could create its own definition of a terrorist.
After the 11 September attack on the USA, stiffer measures were proposed.
Future proposals
Terrorism
The terrorist attacks on the USA in September 2001 and the anti-terrorist
movement which followed them has given rise to a number of new possibil-
ities. The most important suggestion has been the introduction of identity
cards. On a broader front, there have been calls to increase police powers of
property search or seizure, surveillance, internment of suspects and depor-
tation. It seems likely too that police will be given even greater freedom to
question terrorist suspects before bringing them to trial.
Double jeopardy
The Stephen Lawrence murder trial, when the police case collapsed for
technical reasons gave rise to proposals to allow suspects to be tried twice for
the same crime. In the Lawrence case further evidence emerged after the case
had been heard, but could not be used because of the ancient double jeopardy
rule. The police and Crown prosecution Service believe that more criminals
would be brought to justice if the rule were to be removed.
Trial by jury
It is Labour government policy to reduce, though certainly not abolish, the
right to be tried by a jury in medium-level offences (minor offences are already
tried by magistrates only). This will, it is believed, speed up the process of law,
reduce expense and ensure the conviction of more guilty offenders. It has been
successfully fought off by civil rights campaigners, especially in the House of
Lords, but government seems determined to change the law.
Previous offences in trials
Until now, an accused person’s previous offences are not revealed in the course
of a criminal case until the jury have delivered a verdict. The Home Office,
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with strong police backing, is considering changing this rule, again in order to
secure more convictions.
Sentencing
The Labour administration would like to extend Michael Howard’s programme
of introducing longer mandatory sentences for serious offences. This would
further erode the judiciary’s control over punishment, placing it instead in
the hands of political ministers. Though the Labour party stresses the causes
of crime, they also accept in part Howard assertion that, in many cases,
‘prison works’.
Whichever, if any, of these measures are introduced it seems likely that the
process of extending police powers, reducing the rights of accused individuals
and coming down harder on serious offenders will continue for the
foreseeable future. It is also inevitable that civil rights campaigners will
continue to resist such policies.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 ‘Tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime.’ What did Tony
Blair mean by this 1994 assertion? In what ways have his
governments since 1997 attempted to meet this commitment?
2 What special measures have been taken to combat youth crime
since 1979?
3 How have police powers increased since 1979?
4 To what extent have the increases in police power since 1979 eroded human rights?
5 Describe and analyse the different approaches to crime adopted by Labour and
Conservative governments.
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BACKGROUND
Women’s emancipation
Although the cause of improvement in the status of women can be traced back
into the nineteenth century, the effective story must begin with the time when
women achieved the right to vote after a sustained campaign of civil disobe-
dience and parliamentary campaigning. Women over 30 years old were allowed
to vote in 1918 and 21-year olds (the age of male suffrage) followed in 1928.
But women’s suffrage was not the breakthrough which it might at first appear.
It had been hoped, and even assumed, that once women were given a political
voice many other benefits would automatically follow. With politicians now
accountable to women and seeking their votes, surely they would begin to
listen to demands for further concessions. Furthermore, the movement had
been almost exclusively middle class in character. There was little interest in
the plight of women in working-class families such as lack of education, poor
career prospects and the common burden of large families in poor circum-
stances of health and housing.
The truth was that, in the first half of the twentieth century, the problems of
women, their rights and status, were too deeply rooted to be solved merely by
access to the political system. The political parties did not, as had been
expected, place women’s issues on their political agenda, there was no
avalanche of women entering the House of Commons and the extra-parlia-
mentary movement seemed to wither after it achieved its primary goal.
Sandwiched between the two stages in the enfranchisement of women came
an Act which had almost as much potential significance. This was the Sex
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Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919. This legislation opened up both the
universities and the professions to women. There had previously been a range
of prohibitions on women’s ability to pursue advanced careers. In the event,
relatively few women entered politics for many years to come, but the opening
up of higher education and the professions had a more immediate impact.
Nevertheless, progress in the early part of the twentieth century remained
slow. Between 1928 and the 1960s, therefore, the women’s movement
retreated into the background of British politics. When it re-emerged in the
1960s, the impetus came from the USA.
Radical feminism and the New Left
A crucial event in the development of the modern women’s movement was the
publication of an American book – The Feminine Mystique – written by Betty
Friedan in 1963. Friedan’s work was a devastating criticism on a culture which
had come to be completely dominated by men. She demonstrated that ‘patri-
archy’ was in fact a complete system of oppression of women. Women suffered
not only discrimination in fields such as employment, education and the arts,
they were also being denied opportunities to realise their full potential. From the
moment of birth, she complained, gender stereotypes are encouraged which
suggest that men are superior. This went much further than the women’s
movement had ever gone before, representing a radical analysis of a male-
dominated society and implying similarly radical measures to combat patriarchy.
In the early 1960s the infant women’s movement was part of a broader
phenomenon which came to be known as the ‘New Left’. This essentially left-
wing political philosophy saw society as polarising into two large groups. The
first contained those who were enjoying all the benefits of the prosperous
consumer society. They were in the mainstream of a mass culture which was
the result of fully developed capitalism. The other was a collection of groups
who had become alienated from the mass culture. They were denied many of
its benefits and made to feel outsiders. The principal examples of alienated
cultures were ethnic minorities, the poor, disaffected youth, gays and, of
course, women. In each case radical, often revolutionary, movements grew up
in the 1960s.
The women’s movement, inspired by Friedan’s work spread into Europe. Its
key figures were Kate Millet and Shulamith Firestone in the USA, Germaine
Greer in Britain and Simone de Beauvoir in France. In varying degrees these
campaigners recommended militant measures to liberate women from the
control of the men. They suggested women should separate themselves
entirely by forming their own communes or should engage in subversive activ-
ities to undermine patriarchy very much as the suffragettes had done fifty
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years before. These radical feminists, as they came to be known, argued that
legislation to grant women equal opportunities and higher status would not
be adequate. The problem of women’s status would require a radical transfor-
mation of society.
During the 1970s the radical feminist movement began to weaken and
become dissipated. This was, to some extent, part of a general decline in the
strength of the new left. However, it was also overtaken by the fact that a wide
range of concessions were appearing. These were designed to meet some of
the clearer demands of the women’s movement, but also had the effect of
splitting the women’s movement. In the 1970s it was a new liberal kind of
feminism which was gaining the ascendancy.
Liberal feminism
Liberal, as opposed to radical, feminists were not revolutionaries. They wished
to see reform, but did not challenge the fundamental order. In other words
they believed it would be possible to achieve equal status and liberation for
women through changes within the existing social order. Three important
developments in Britain (all of which were also supported by the militant
feminists) occurred in the 1960s and 1970 to give a boost to the liberal
movement and set it on the way to further successes.
The birth control pill became widely available after 1967. This heralded in a
period of sexual liberation for women, which became the centrepiece of a
more general youth liberation movement (the so-called ‘hippy’ or ‘flower
power’ era). It resulted in two developments. The first was that married
women were able to take control themselves of family planning and so rely less
on men. This meant that women were able better to control the size of their
family and/or delay childbirth to a later age, thus enabling them to pursue a
career. The second was that unmarried women were more sexually liberated
as they could protect themselves easily from fear of pregnancy. Of course, for
many this was an undesirable result, but it was welcomed wholeheartedly by
all feminists.
Also in 1967 the Abortion Act was passed. For the first time abortion became
legal in Britain (England and Wales only at first). This had an immediate
effect on the illegal abortion industry which resulted in many health
problems and even deaths for young women. More importantly here,
however, abortion became the flagship issue for women. In practical terms it
stood alongside the birth control pill as a liberating force. But it was much
more than that. Abortion became symbolic of women taking control of their
own bodies and health. Feminists saw the prohibition on abortion as a feature
of a male-dominated society. Put simply, it was men deciding what was best
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for women on their behalf. So the legality of abortion became a vital gesture
of liberation.
The Divorce Law Reform Act of 1970 made it much easier for women
(incidentally as well as men) to obtain a divorce. It established that there was
only one ground for divorce which was the irretrievable breakdown of the
marriage. The Act established that a two-year separation (five years if the
divorce was contested) constituted a breakdown. Not only did this liberate
many women who were trapped in unhappy and unfulfilling marriages, it also
helped to take away the social stigma which used to surround divorced
women. Like the other two reforms described above, easier divorce had its
opponents who saw it as a retrograde step in terms of morality and social
stability. But also like the other two feminists welcomed the liberalisation of
the divorce laws as a key step forward for women.
In the same year the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act gave courts
the power to grant property to divorcing women and to force husbands to
make financial provision for ex-wives and their children. So, not only was it
easier for women to obtain a divorce, but the financial consequences would
also be less severe.
The scene was now set for even more important battles to be fought by the
feminist movement. These were the issues of equal pay and the outlawing of
sex discrimination in a wide variety of fields.
EQUAL PAY
By 1970 there had developed a crescendo of women’s protests against unequal
treatment of women in the workplace. There were significant differences in
the pay of women compared with men. The Equal Pay Act of 1970 attempted
to correct this situation. At first sight it seemed to have solved the problem,
but it turned out to be a flawed measure.
The Act stated that women should be paid the same wage as men if they were
doing the same job. However employers were able to avoid the legislation
simply by giving women different job titles or by slightly altering the nature of
their work. In this way it could be claimed that men and women were not
doing the same job in the strict sense of the word. Two more Acts were needed
to tidy up the equal pay legislation.
The Sex Discrimination Act of 1975, which is described more fully below,
established that if a woman’s work was effectively the same as that done
by a man then she was entitled to equal pay. In 1984 the Equal Pay
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(Amendment) Act was a final attempt to close up all the loopholes. It was
passed to bring Britain into line with European Union legislation (which was
to be binding in the UK). This introduced a new test for equal pay. Provided
work is of equal value, even if it is different in nature, women should be paid
the same as men (and vice versa, of course). The 1984 Act was the most
radical of all the measures on pay as it was an attempt to establish total
equality for women in the workplace
But equal pay was only one of the issues concerning the status of women. It
was seen as a symbol of wider discrimination which was taking place, but on
its own it was inadequate. A broader, all-embracing measure was needed. This
arrived in 1975.
THE SEX DISCRIMINATION ACT 1975
The new Labour government which came to power in 1974 was determined
to complete the radical reforms concerning equal opportunities which had
been started in the 1960s. It therefore passed the landmark Sex Discrimination
Act as a priority. The Act contained two main elements as shown in the box.
Sex Discrimination Act 1975
1 Outlawed discrimination on the grounds of sex (i.e. for either men or women, but not
including homosexuals) in a wide variety of activities.
2 Established the Equal Opportunities Commission whose role was both to administer the
existing legislation and to further the issue of sexual equality into the future.
Since 1975 many cases have been brought by individuals and by the Equal Opportu-
nities Commission which have ‘filled out’ the basic laws. This body of ‘case law’ has
established some of the following principles:
 Even when an employer is not discriminating directly against women, he may be
accused of engaging in practices which have the effect of discriminating. For
example if an employer will not employ people who are lone parents, this will have
the effect of tending to discriminate against women. It is also not permitted to
refuse to employ a woman on the grounds that she is likely to become pregnant and
so take too much time off work.
 If a woman can prove that she has equal qualifications to men and yet is continually
passed over for promotion, a case may be made that the employer is discriminating.
 If women are doing the same work as men, but have a different job title, they must
not be discriminated against in terms of pay.
 In the provision of services such as insurance, bank loans, mortgages and rental
agreements, women must be treated on an equal basis to men.
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These cases are a sample of the way in which the sex discrimination laws
work. They are also reinforced by the European Court of Justice and the
European Court of Rights which ensures that women are given equal
treatment at work, in terms of working conditions and in welfare benefits. The
passage of the Human Rights Act in 1999 made it easier for women to claim
discrimination under the European Convention on Human Rights. They may,
since then, bring a case in the British courts. This saves both time and money.
REMAINING ISSUES
The battles for equal treatment for women in most aspects of life have been
won. However, there remain a number of areas, often which are less clear,
where women do not feel they have achieved equality or justice. The main
examples are described below:
Sexism
The term ‘sexism’ refers to a cultural attitude towards women which implies
that they are inferior or that they have a limited role to play in modern society.
Sexist attitudes are, claim campaigners, carried in such institutions as schools,
TV and radio, the press, sport and entertainment. It is further argued that, as
long as sexist attitudes persist, real, concrete examples of discrimination will
follow. Furthermore, the more extreme examples of sexism may lead to the
degradation of women.
Pornography, hard and soft, and the gratuitous display of women in sexual
poses to advertise goods are seen as particularly undesirable examples of
sexism. Led by Cabinet Minister Clare Short, women’s groups have sought
stricter laws against pornography and so-called ‘page three girls’.
The problem with sexism is that it is difficult to tackle it with legislation. All
that can be done is that women’s groups, including the Equal Opportunities
Commission, to raise awareness of the problem and seek to combat it through
education and public campaigning. Moreover, the anti-sexism movement has
had to face accusations of ‘political correctness’ by Conservatives and liberals
who see it as a form of cultural coercion.
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Until the 1970s the existence of widespread violence by men against their
female partners was scarcely recognised. It was almost impossible for women
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to persuade the police to prosecute in such cases. Furthermore, it was recog-
nised that many women were suffering systematic violence but were trapped
by circumstances – usually poverty and responsibility for children – and so
could not escape.
These problems were attacked on two fronts. The first was to force the police
to accept that domestic violence is a serious crime and to begin prosecutions.
This campaign has yielded results and all police forces now have special
domestic violence units. The second problem – women being trapped in a
cycle of violence – was tackled by the opening of a network of refuges. In these
‘safe’ houses women and their children were able to escape from violent
partners, their location being kept secret. Social and voluntary workers who
are attached to these refuges are also able to attempt to find long-term
solutions for the women.
RAPE
Legislative action is not required to strengthen protection against rape. The
problem has been that too few cases have reached successful prosecution. The
reasons for this are that:
 Women are constrained from reporting rape because they have feared they
will not be treated sympathetically by the police.
 It is difficult to prove a charge of rape, especially when the defence is that
the woman consented.
 Also in cases where consent is the main issue, women may find cross-
examination in a trial a gruelling experience.
 In cases where the alleged rapist is a close friend, perhaps boyfriend (so-
called ‘date rape’) it is especially difficult to secure a conviction.
 Wives have long claimed that it is possible to be raped by one’s own
husband. Until recently courts did not accept this.
Considerable progress has been made. Many police forces now have special rape
units and officers trained to deal with women. In court women receive some
protection by judges when giving evidence, especially when they may be cross-
examined by the alleged rapist. The importance of date rape has now been
recognised and it has become possible for husbands to be convicted of rape.
Nevertheless, women’s campaigners continue to argue that rape is not taken
as seriously as other crimes by either the police or the courts. This involves a
change in attitudes, rather than any change in the law. In particular, it is
argued that the past life of a woman should not be taken into consideration
when she has accused a man of rape.
Issues concerning women 103
POSITIVE DISCRIMINATION
Women are still considered to be suffering from discrimination. This occurs
especially in employment. The law says that discrimination must not occur,
but it is happening in subtle ways which avoid prosecution. The main concern
is the so-called glass ceiling which is said to exist in many occupations,
mainly the professions. The glass ceiling theory says that there is a level of
promotion above which women find it very difficult to rise. The main culprits
are said to be law, medicine, teaching, business and government.
The more extreme campaigners suggest that the answer to the glass ceiling is
positive discrimination. Such a scheme requires that quotas should be estab-
lished, so that a minimum proportion of women should be promoted to higher
levels. This is, of course, a highly controversial proposal as it is suggested that
some ‘inferior’ women may be promoted simply to fulfil a quota. Supporters,
on the other hand, claim that positive discrimination will change the ‘culture’
in many organisations. With better opportunities, more able women will enter
such professions so that the quotas will be filled by able people.
POLITICS AND PARLIAMENT
Just as it was assumed by the suffragettes that obtaining votes for women
would lead to further examples of emancipation, modern campaigners see
increased participation of women in politics as vital for the movement. The
election of Margaret Thatcher as Conservative leader in 1975, and then as
Prime Minister in 1979, may have been a key development. However, women’s
groups tended to disown her, partly because she was extremely unpopular in
some sections of the community and partly because she refused to champion
any women’s causes.
Attention since has centred on having more women elected to parliament.
Aided by a Labour party policy of insisting on more women candidates in
winnable seats, a breakthrough seemed to have been made in 1997. A total
of 120 women were elected, 101 of them from the Labour party. More
women were also seen in the cabinet and by 2001 there were 7 and many
more in junior ministerial posts. In 2001 fewer women were elected, but
the number remains high. Women do play a key role in politics – far more
than previously.
There remain some issues in politics. In particular the rules and procedures of
parliament are considered unsympathetic to women MPs. Long hours, a lack of
childcare facilities and the sheer nature of the job which involves much
Understanding British and European political issues104
travelling, does not lend itself to motherhood. It is hoped that proposed reforms
to the House of Commons in 2002 will address some of these concerns.
There is also lack of a specific cabinet post which deals with women’s issues.
There is a junior minister in charge of policy for women, but the fact that it is
a junior post indicates how low it is on the political agenda.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 Why has it proved so difficult in modern times to advance the
cause of women’s rights?
2 What are the main legislative and non-legislative initiatives since the
1960s which have been designed to raise the status of women?
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IMMIGRATION
Although Britain has, throughout its history, assimilated large numbers of
different ethnic groups from abroad, the issue of race was not a particularly
significant element in politics until the 1950s. There were two reasons for this:
Firstly, the incoming groups were small and tended to lose their own cultural
identity quickly, becoming, within two or three generations, effectively British.
Apart from the small Jewish community, many of whom do retain a strong
separate identity, most immigrant groups until the 1950s were thoroughly
absorbed. Secondly, skin colour had not been a factor until that time. There
were small communities of Afro-Caribbean descent, a few residents from the
Indian sub-continent and groups of Chinese immigrants, but they had been
insignificant in size or impact. Then everything began to change in the second
half of the 1950s.
The first significant wave of non-white immigration occurred in the 1950s.
This was a time of full employment and there were significant shortages of
labour in such fields as the health service and public transport. To meet the
shortages, the government introduced a system of subsidised immigration,
most from the West Indies. With expenses paid, the new immigrants were
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promised good wages, decent housing and guaranteed employment. Many
thousands took up the offer. Immigration from the West Indies has continued
ever since, though strict quotas have been set and the cash incentives no
longer exist.
The second wave of immigrants arrived in the 1960s and 1970s. These were
of Asian descent, either from India and Pakistan (later also Bangladesh),
former members of the British empire and therefore British passport holders.
In addition to these economic migrants seeking a better life, there were
refugees from East Africa, mostly Uganda and Kenya. These groups, also origi-
nally from the sub-continent, but largely running businesses in Africa, suffered
persecution at the hands of newly independent regimes. Forced out of their
adopted countries, and often having their businesses confiscated, these Asians
found a natural home in the UK.
Since then immigration has become more diffuse. The numbers are less than
in the 1950s to 1970s, but the origins of immigrants have widened. The
immigration ‘mix’ now includes Africans, West Indians, Sub-continent Asians,
Hong Kong Chinese and refugees and asylum seekers from all over the world.
In the 1990s and early twenty-first century, there has been a large inflow from
the Balkans, East Africa, Eastern Europe and even Afghanistan.
IMMIGRATION CONTROL
In the 1950s there was no thought of the need to control immigration. Indeed,
as we have seen, most of the immigrants had actually been invited to settle in
the UK. However, as unemployment began to rise in the 1960s and the flow of
immigration showed little sign of abating, demands grew for some controls on
the numbers entering. In 1958 race riots in London, Nottingham and
Liverpool broke out, demonstrating the fears that were beginning to emerge,
especially among white members of the working class in cities, where jobs
were under threat.
The response of governments of both the main parties was to introduce
numerical controls to stem the flow. Commonwealth Immigration Acts in 1962
and 1968 introduced quotas. The Immigration Act of 1971 broadened the
controls to non-Commonwealth countries. However it was the 1981 British
Nationality Act which represented the most stringent measure to date. This Act
remains the basis of immigration policy to the present day. The Act stated that
possession of a British passport no longer entitled the holder to residence in the
UK. At a stroke many millions of people all over the Commonwealth – i.e.
former British colonial possessions – who believed themselves to be partly
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British, were no longer allowed to come to the UK. Residence in the UK would
only be allowed to those who could show that they, a parent or a grandparent
were born in the UK. The only other way to obtain full nationality and residency
rights was to apply for naturalisation after seven years living in the country.
The Nationality Acts of 1962 and 1968 were highly controversial and were the
first pieces of legislation which were thought to be ‘racist’ in their effect
(though governments argued they were not racist by intention). The reason
was that their effect mostly fell upon Afro-Caribbean and Asian peoples – i.e.
so-called ‘coloureds’. Would-be white skinned immigrants from Australia, New
Zealand, Canada or South Africa could usually find at least a British born
grandparent to give them residency rights. This was more rarely the case with
black and Asian immigrants.
THE RACIAL QUESTION
In the 1950s and 1960s racial tensions in Britain grew, very much in
proportion to the quantity of immigrants entering the country. Immigrant
groups were openly attacked in the race riots of 1958, especially in the Notting
Hill district of London. Discrimination against black immigrants was
becoming a major cause for concern. Thus was most common in employment,
housing, education and social life. But matters reached a head in 1968.
In that year immigration of Asians from East Africa was reaching a peak. The
government was proposing more controls on the numbers. A leading Conser-
vative, Enoch Powell, during the debate on the new Immigration Bill, gave a
speech in Birmingham (where many of the new immigrants were settling)
which was to echo throughout Britain. With a dramatic piece of imagery he
claimed, ‘like a Roman I seem to see the river Tiber foaming with much blood’.
The reason for his vision, he said, was the result of excessive immigration
leading to racial violence. The speech, which has come to be known as the
‘rivers of blood speech’, created a furious response.
On the one hand, Powell claimed to receive 100,000 letters of support for his
views. The right-wing press seized on the statement in their campaign to see
strict limits on immigration. The Conservative party (led at the time by Ted
Heath), where Powell did have a certain degree of support, was forced to sack
him from the shadow cabinet. In parliament, where the second Race Relations
Act was being debated, MPs on both sides of the divide were galvanised into
a major conflict over immigration policy. The speech contributed to the
effective end of Powell’s political ambitions, but he had set the scene for
debates on race for many years to come.
Understanding British and European political issues108
The Conservatives remained split on the issue, but official policy remained
that while immigration quotas should remain, there was to be no repatriation
of immigrants. Repatriation was a policy of both the right wingers in the
Conservative party and extremists such as the National Front, but it was
never seriously considered by political parties. Labour and the Liberals,
meanwhile, were committed to improving the state of race relations in the
country.
Immigration attitudes
• Liberal Conservatives and Labour. Support the idea of a multi-racial society with
tolerant attitude to racial minorities and accepting racial diversity. Tolerant attitude to
asylum seekers. Immigration to be continued, but controlled to reduce over-population
and to import people who can reduce skill shortages.
• Centre Conservatives. Support controls on immigration, but allowing some to enter
under strict quotas. Insist that racial minorities should learn to integrate.
• Right-wing Conservatives. They have opposed immigration and supported repatri-
ation of immigrant groups. Suspicious of the idea of a multi-racial society, they take a
hard line on asylum seekers.
• Liberal Democrats. Strongly believe in a tolerant, multi-racial society. They have an
open policy towards asylum seekers and economic refugees. They favour stronger
race discrimination laws.
LEGISLATION ON RACE
The Labour party which came to power in 1965 was committed to improving
race relations in Britain. It therefore passed two pieces of legislation.
The Race Relations Act 1965
This set up the Race Relations Board. The board
was to perform two main tasks. Firstly, it was to
investigate ways of improving race relations in
the country. Secondly, it received complaints from
individuals and organisations concerning racial
discrimination. It could investigate the claims and
recommend measures to overturn the discrimi-
nation (positive discrimination).
The board lacked legal powers to enforce its
recommendations. However, it did place race
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racial discrimination
The systematic practice of
disadvantaging members of an
ethnic group in such fields as
employment, social life, supply
of service, housing.
positive discrimination
A system which actually
favours members of ethnic
groups. For example some jobs
or housing will be reserved for
such groups. Known as
affirmative action in the USA.
relations on the political agenda and did highlight
the worst examples of racism or discrimination.
Race Relations Act 1968
This Act gave the Race Relations Board some
enforcement powers, in particular it could bring to
an end any systematic examples of discrimination.
A Community Relations Commission was also
established. This commission was to look at the
broader picture of race relations. It made recom-
mendations concerning education, employment
and housing to try to ensure that members of
ethnic minorities received fair treatment.
The two Race Relations Acts were certainly progressive on the issue of race.
However, in both cases they lacked teeth and failed to make serious inroads
into public attitudes. Labour had lost power by 1970 so further progress was
put on hold. The Conservatives were not so concerned with racial issues and
so relied on the board and the commission to try to keep the lid on race
relations. When Labour returned to power in 1974, race appeared high on the
agenda again. A third piece of legislation was therefore introduced.
Race Relations Act 1976
The Commission for Racial Equality
Firstly, this tidied up the confusion over the existence of two bodies concerned
with racial issues. The Board and Commission were replaced by the
Commission for Racial Equality (CRE).
Role of the CRE
• To advise and assist people and organisations, including the media, on racial issues.
• Investigate discrimination policies by companies, the media and other organisations,
requiring them to change as necessary.
• To take legal action against specific discrimination incidents.
• To sponsor judicial reviews by individuals and groups where they feel they have suffered
discriminatory practices by a public body.
• To advise the government on possible future legislation and race policy.
• To liaise with local Racial Equality Councils, which have been set up to foster good
community race relations.
The Commission has 15 members and a staff of over 200. It has regional
offices and is headed by a chairperson.
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racialism
Scientific or quasi-scientific
theories about race. Most
theories suggest that some
races are superior to others.
The German Nazis and South
African white supremacists
were examples.
racism
A generalised attitude which
views some racial groups as
inferior. It leads to
discrimination and sometimes
race hatred.
The Act and racial discrimination
For the first time the Act was specific in making certain discriminatory
practices illegal. Any action which is considered to be discriminatory (either
directly or in its indirect effect) on the basis of race, colour, nationality or
ethnic and national origin, is deemed to be illegal. The CRE may prosecute any
individual or organisation which contravenes this provision.
Certain areas of activity were specified as applying to the law. These were:
 Employment: in pay, recruitment, promotion or training practices.
 Housing: applying to the allocation of housing by local authorities and
housing associations. This also applied to private landlords or estate agents
and solicitors involved in sale and purchase.
 Education: schools could not refuse entry on the grounds of race etc. Nor
could any racial group be excluded from specific subjects or activities.
 Provision of goods and services: discriminatory practices when selling goods
or providing services.
Summary of the Act
The 1976 Act was undoubtedly the most important development in race
relations since World War II. It was important for the following reasons:
1 It established discrimination as a crime.
2 It established the Commission for Racial Equality as a key part of the British
political establishment.
3 It widened the areas in which racial discrimination was to be outlawed.
4 It created a powerful pressure group which could campaign for better race
relations in the UK.
But the Act had its weaknesses. A number of institutions were exempt, most
notably the police. It also could not enforce the law with regard to private
organisations such as sports or social clubs. Perhaps most significantly, the Act
could only really deal with very specific examples of discrimination. It could
not deal effectively with attitudes to race. Nor was it concerned with some of
the social causes of racial conflict. Thus, when serious inner city disorders
broke out in London, Liverpool, Leeds and Bristol in 1981, the racial under-
tones were left largely untouched.
Legal measures undoubtedly help to lead public opinion towards a more
tolerant society. However, they are insufficient on their own. It was not until
the 1976 Act was amended in 2000 that the broader aspects of the race
problems were tackled by legislative action.
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ARTICLE 13 OF THE AMSTERDAM TREATY
This was agreed in 2000 by all EU members. It asserts a minimum standard of
legal protection for all ethnic minorities. When the Article became compulsory
in 2003 ethnic minorities throughout the European Union were offered the
same protection.
The British government take the view that the law in the UK already conforms
to Article 13 in most respects, but there may have to be some toughening up
of the regulations on policing and the conduct of trials where race is an issue.
The additional measures are due to be announced later in 2002.
THE RACE RELATIONS (AMENDMENT) ACT 2000
This Act came into force in April 2001. It was in part an updating and
extension of the 1976 Act, but was also a response to growing concerns about
the state of race relations in Britain at the end of the twentieth century. In
particular it had to deal with the conclusions of the Macpherson Inquiry into
the Stephen Lawrence murder case. The incident and inquiry are described in
more detail below. Macpherson uncovered deep problems in race relations in
Britain. It had six main measures.
1 It established a code of practice which the CRE tries to promote in public
bodies. It applies mainly to the criminal justice system, the police, education,
the health service, housing, local government, politics and sport. Best practice
is not a statutory (i.e. legally compulsory) requirement, but the CRE is charged
with the task of trying to implement it.
The kind of measures included are the education and training of staff on racial
equality, eliminating practices which might cause racial discrimination,
directly or indirectly, the reporting of racial incidents and future prevention.
There was also an implication that ethnic minorities should be given fair repre-
sentation in recruitment and promotion. However, the last measure was to be
beefed up when the Act was amended in 2000.
2 There was a statutory duty imposed upon all public bodies to promote equality
of opportunity and race relations. Government, education, the police and local
authorities were the principal examples.
3 Where crimes were considered to have a racial element (such as an assault
based on racial conflict) they would be considered to be more serious and the
sentences would reflect this.
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4 Incitement to racial hatred (whether or not leading to violence) was made a
serious offence. This was particularly aimed at publicity produced by such
extreme groups as the British National Party.
5 Police officers were made vicariously liable for racial offences committed by
the police. In other words more senior officers can now be held legally respon-
sible for the actions of their subordinates, whether or not they are directly
involved.
6 A race legislation unit within government was set up to oversee the imple-
mentation of the Act
The 2000 Act did, therefore, attempt to fill in some of the gaps left by the 1976
legislation. It extended the provisions, outlawed more general examples of
racial conflict and introduced statutory duties on organisations to improve
their race relations record. Its main effect will be felt by the police. This is
because the Act had to respond to the Macpherson Report (see below). Never-
theless it has created a climate in which all public bodies now feel they have
a responsibility to improve race relations and racial equality.
Above all, however, the 2000 Act has shifted the whole emphasis on race
relations. In the past the stress has been placed on dealing with racism by
making discriminatory activities unlawful. Following the Macpherson Report
and the 2000 Act there is a statutory duty upon many organisations to advance
good race relations in a positive way. As we shall see below too, non-legislative
measures have tended to concentrate on positive measures and not just
negative prevention.
THE STEPHEN LAWRENCE INQUIRY
(MACPHERSON)
At first sight the Stephen Lawrence case and inquiry represented a tragic
incident which had little impact outside south London. In fact, the case proved
to be something of a turning point in race relations in Britain.
On 22 April 1993 Stephen Lawrence, a black teenager, was murdered in south
London by a group of white youths. The murder seemed to have no motive,
but it was later established to be racially motivated. Though the guilty men
were widely known in the area, the police failed to secure a prosecution. It was
claimed that the police had made insufficient efforts to secure a conviction,
had failed to offer sufficient protection to witnesses and had failed to under-
stand the racial nature of the crime. The Lawrence family, encouraged by the
CRE and other race relations campaigners, called for an inquiry into the case
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and the government acceded to the request by convening a commission under
Sir William Macpherson to investigate.
His report in February 1999 had an extraordinary impact. Its effects can be
seen on two levels:
The police and institutional racism
Macpherson declared that the Metropolitan Police, who had investigated the
case, were characterised by what he called institutional racism. Thus a
new phrase entered the vocabulary of race relations. The definition in the
report was as follows:
institutional racism
‘[Institutional Racism] consists of the collective failure of an organisation to provide an
appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic
origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amounts to
discrimination, through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racial stereo-
typing which disadvantages minority ethnic people.’
There had long been strong suspicions that the police contained racist
elements, but Macpherson went further. He suggested that racist attitudes
were deeply ingrained in the force and in its institutions. In other words it was
part of the culture of the institution. The implications for race relations were,
of course, very serious. The CRE had already pointed to lack of trust between
ethnic minority communities and the police. Macpherson confirmed this and
demonstrated how deeply established the problem was. Indeed Macpherson
suggested that, as the police were part of the problem, they also had to be part
of the solution.
There was also an implication that other institutions might also suffer from
institutional racism. He therefore made a general statement with them in mind:
It is incumbent upon every institution to examine their policies and the outcome
of their policies and practices to guard against disadvantaging any section of the
community.
The Race Relations (Amendment) Act of 2000 responded to this conclusion.
The police service was required to introduce a number of measures, known as
the Police Action Plan. They included:
 Education for police officers to prevent racially motivated actions.
Awareness of possible racial problems in policing to be raised.
 Efforts were to be made to ensure that recruitment, retention and
promotion policies are non-discriminatory.
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 The recording of all racial incidents.
 Logging of all ‘stop and search’ incidents to ensure that there was no
systematic discrimination against ethnic minorities.
 Strict disciplinary procedures were introduced against officers guilty of
racial prejudice.
Community race relations
The Lawrence murder had once again drawn attention to the sorry state of
race relations in poorer districts of big cities. To some extent, Macpherson
asserted, this was due to lack of trust between the community and the police.
His recommendations were designed to reduce such suspicions. However, the
report went further.
Macpherson recommended that racially motivated crimes should be singled
out for special attention. Where there was a racial element, sentencing was to
be more severe. Furthermore all racial incidents, whether or not they resulted
in a crime, were to be recorded by the police. A racist incident was defined by
Macpherson as: ‘any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or
any other person’.
The police were not the only body to be singled out as playing a crucial role in
community relations. Macpherson also stressed the need for a multi-agency
approach to improving race relations at local level. Local councils, schools,
social services, community leaders and the police were urged to work together
to build trust among different ethnic groups.
On a national level the government’s Race Equality Unit of the Home Office
responded to Macpherson by producing ‘public service agreements’ with a
variety of institutions. The central plan was to see progress towards ‘represen-
tative’ workforces (i.e. containing appropriate proportions from members of
ethnic minorities). The institutions concerned included the police, fire,
probation and prison services. These bodies stand at the forefront of race
relations so that their race policies are crucial.
As we have seen, the impact of Macpherson was far-reaching. As the twenty-
first century dawned, therefore, there were renewed hopes for race relations
in Britain. Sadly these hopes were dashed in the summer of 2001 by racial
conflict in a number of northern cities.
THE 2001 RIOTS AND THE OUSELEY REPORT
In July 2001 serious rioting broke out in a number of cities including Burnley,
Oldham and Bradford. The problem was largely confined to white and Muslim
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youths who engaged in organised fighting and damage to property. The
former Chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality, Sir Herman Ouseley,
was immediately asked to make an inquiry and he reported rapidly on the
incidents. His report was entitled, ‘ Community Pride, Not Prejudice’.
Community pride, not prejudice
Ouseley was addressing an issue which had become central to race in Britain at the
beginning of the twenty-first century. This was a twofold problem:
1 Assuming that a multi-racial society is desirable, how should we define the term
‘multicultural’?
2 Having established the nature of a multicultural society, how should we go about
achieving it?
The answer to the first question was that a multicultural society is one where
all ethnic groups feel integrated and included. In other words, although
cultural differences should be tolerated and protected, it is desirable for all
groups to integrate into mainstream British culture. This image is very much
how traditional Jewish communities in Britain have dealt with the problem.
Ouseley was also suggesting that the reason why youths from ethnic
minorities (mainly Muslim in the case of the 2001 riots) were so disaffected
was that they felt alienated from British society. It was not so much that they
experienced direct discrimination, but that they felt excluded.
The second question is clearly more complex. However, in general terms
Ouseley was proposing that each community had a responsibility to promote
full integration and to prevent any group feeling excluded. In practical terms
this would mean finding ways of bringing ethnic communities together, but
more importantly, it required a widening of opportunity for those members of
ethnic minorities who experience the alienation. If these objectives could be
achieved, all members could share in ‘community pride’.
An alternative view
An alternative view of what a multi-cultural society is, which can be broadly
described as ‘liberal’ in nature, is rather different. This view suggests that, in
a truly multicultural society, cultural differences should be preserved and
celebrated. Within such a scenario, each ethnic group should tolerate the
different cultures which flourish, but should not seek full integration.
This vision sees diversity as a positive force, increasing the richness of society
and actually encourages tolerance. In practice, it implies the creation of more
single-faith schools which preserve different cultures and the strong protection
of minority rights against discrimination and antagonism.
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Members of so-called ‘ethnic minorities’ should still be required to be good
citizens, with all the responsibilities which that carries. However, as far as
possible, cultural differences should be protected by the law (notably the
European Convention on Human Rights) and positively encouraged.
THE RACE EQUALITY UNIT
This is a government body which was set up to implement Labour’s race
relations policy. Its view of a multicultural society is very much along the lines of
the second vision described above – that ethnic differences should be allowed
to flourish, but that each group should have an
equal stake in society and should be free from
discrimination. The ‘mission statement’ of the race
equality unit very much epitomises the Labour
government’s view of good race relations. It says
that Britain should be a country where:
 Every colour is a good colour.
 Every member of society is able to fulfil their potential.
 Racism is unacceptable.
 Everyone is treated equally according to needs and rights.
 Everyone recognises their responsibilities.
 Racial diversity is celebrated.
This is a clear enough statement of what is considered to be a fair and healthy
multicultural society. A particularly practical step has taken place within the
Home Office where there is an agreement to create ‘representative’ workforces
in the police, fire, probation and prison services.
NON-LEGISLATIVE RACIAL MEASURES
Most of the attempts to outlaw racism and racial discrimination in Britain have
involved legislation, either to prohibit discriminatory practices or to require
institutions to improve race relations. However, dealing with this issue is too
complex to be handled through the law alone. There have also been a number
of initiatives designed to change attitudes, consciousness and behaviour. In
other words there is a need to create a new culture of race relations. Some of
the objectives of these programmes have been:
 to create equality of opportunity for all racial and national groups;
 to eliminate racist attitudes and so reduce racial violence;
 to foster better relations between different ethnic groups;
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multiculturalism
Ideas which suggest that
society should tolerate ethnic
diversity or should encourage
full cultural integration.
 to make Britain an inclusive society in which all groups feel they have a stake;
 to create a climate of tolerance towards an ethnically diverse society.
A wide variety of measures are in place to try to achieve these objectives,
mostly under the auspices of the Commission for Racial Equality. However
many other agencies are involved. These include the football authorities who
have instituted a programme to remove racism from the game, local author-
ities, educational bodies and the Civil Service itself.
Ironically it is in the field of politics where there has been a noticeable lack of
progress. There are still very few MPs from ethnic minority backgrounds
(though the number is creeping up). The battle to have separate ‘black
sections’ within the Labour party failed. This would have ensured guaranteed
representation on party bodies for ethnic minority members. It would also
have increased the number of parliamentary candidates and therefore MPs.
The House of Lords, which is supposedly a socially representative chamber has
also lagged behind. The new Appointments Commission is, however, charged
with the task of ensuring the nomination of more peers from different ethnic
groups. The Civil Service code of practice also now demands progress towards
more racial equality in recruitment and promotion.
However, it is likely that education is the main field in which better race
relations and equality of opportunity will be achieved. The National
Curriculum recognises this and every local education authority has a duty to
improve race relations. Unfortunately, by 2002, there was still no clear policy
on whether schools should be more ethnically mixed or whether it was better
to encourage the creation of more single-faith schools. There are many who
believe that the latter will reinforce ethnic tensions, while others suggest that
such schools actually prevent them.
Table 8.1 Britain’s ethnic mix, 2001
Ethnic group Millions
White 53.0
All black groups 1.3
Indian 1.0
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 0.9
Chinese 0.1
Others 1.5
All non-white 4.8
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SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 Discuss the significance and impact of the Macpherson Report into
the Stephen Lawrence case.
2 What have been the main barriers to improving race relations since
the 1960s?
3 Differentiate between legislative and non-legislative methods of
improving race relations.
4 What have been the attitudes of the main parties in Britain towards race relations and
immigration?
5 Describe the role of law in the field of race relations.
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DEFINING THE TERM ‘ENVIRONMENT’
The term ‘environment’ is a broad one and we need first to establish which
aspects are covered here. For the purposes of this chapter, we will recognise
the following meanings.
● Matters concerning the physical environment, including air and water quality,
climate, noise, traffic congestion, health issues and the physical beauty of
landscapes etc.
● Long-term concerns about bio-diversity, preservation of endangered species,
the effects of earth changes which affect climate etc.
● Issues concerning the safety of foods etc., mainly dealing with the implications
of genetically modified foods.
● Environmental issues which affect safety, such as the use of nuclear energy or
mining.
● The question of preserving sources of energy and other resources, including
the development of alternative forms of energy and recycling schemes.
These examples may omit some environmental concerns, but they represent a
selection of the most important matters which have been considered by the
British political system.
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PRINCIPLES
Environmental policy is very different to other issues in British politics. There
are a number of reasons for this.
As a policy issue, it is very densely populated with pressure groups. Green-
peace and Friends of the Earth are well known examples, but there are many
others concerned with a wide range of specialised areas. Furthermore, some
of these groups have extremely large memberships. The National Trust and
the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) are prominent
examples. But there are many others such as the Council for the Protection
of Rural England, the Countryside Alliance and Woodland Trust. If we
consider local levels of political activities, there are still more, many of them
temporary in nature. Groups exist to promote or prevent traffic management
measures, airport building, changes in countryside use, building develop-
ments and the like.
Issues affecting the environment concern the political system at different
levels. There are, as we have seen above, many local campaigns constantly
being fought. In addition, issues may be regional or national, but, more often
than not, are European and global in nature. Most environmental problems do
not recognise political boundaries, so action by governments is rarely simple
and cannot be conducted in isolation.
The environment is not normally considered to be a subject which is a vote
winner or loser in elections. Although environmental issues remain on most
people’s list of concerns, it is not normally high and rarely influences voting
behaviour. Political parties know this, so they do not consider it a high
priority. Meanwhile, the British Green party has failed to gain a significant
toe-hold in British political life, largely as a result of the first-past-the-post
electoral system which discriminates against small parties. As we shall see
below, some progress has been made in recent years, but this is slow and
relatively modest.
THE ORIGINS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
Until the 1960s the environment scarcely appeared at all on the political
agenda. There had been concerns about the health implications of pollution in
the nineteenth and early twentieth century, but they were largely seen as
isolated examples. They tended to be dealt with by the creation of inspec-
torates, which were set up to regulate the activities of individual industries.
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Two early pieces of legislation which signalled the end of an ad hoc approach
to environmental issues were the Clean Air Acts of 1956 and 1968. This legis-
lation applied to both individual households and to industry. They were
concerned solely with air quality, but were the first signs of a national policy
emerging.
In 1974 the Control of Pollution Act marked a further step towards a more
comprehensive policy. This was both national and dealt with a wider variety
of forms of pollution, adding water quality to air. At the same time the issue
of pollution was brought onto the agenda of the European Community, with
Germany leading the way in demanding European-wide anti-pollution
standards.
These were some of the opening shots in the war against pollution and in the
battle to bring environmental concerns to a higher place on the political
agenda. During the late 1960s and 1970s a number of developments were
important:
 Part of the New Left movement of the 1960s, which was concerned with
the alienation of marginalised groups in society, became interested in
environmental issues. Left-wing opponents of free-market capitalism,
mainly among youth protest movements, saw it as exploiting the earth’s
physical environment as well as its workers and consumers. As members of
this youth movement grew older, many of them retained the environ-
mental concerns which they had developed in the 1960s.
 A larger amount of scientific evidence was emerging. Information gathered
about links between air pollution and diseases such as cancer and asthma.
Concerns about the increasing danger to many animal and plant species
were growing. Scientists began to suspect that long-term changes in
climate were taking place and were possibly the result of environmental
degradation.
 The two oil price crises of the 1970s alerted the developed world to its
over-reliance on a single source of energy. This led to a search for new
sources of energy which would be both environmentally friendly (i.e. not
fossil fuels) and renewable.
 New political groups were coming into existence in this period. The British
Ecology party appeared and soon transformed itself into the Green Party.
Friends of the Earth appeared as a world movement and soon became a
huge pressure group with extensive funds and a large organisation for
campaigning, publicity and scientific research. Greenpeace soon followed.
Meanwhile, existing organisations such as the National Trust were turning
themselves into campaign groups.
Understanding British and European political issues122
THE ENVIRONMENT BECOMES A MAJOR ISSUE
Having drifted around the margins of British and European politics in the
1960s and 1970s, the environment moved closer to centre stage in the 1980s.
The environmental concerns of the past were becoming more obviously acute
and political action was clearly needed.
In Britain the issue was brought to the forefront of the agenda by the Conser-
vative government of Margaret Thatcher. They seemed to be an unlikely
candidate as guardian of the environment. As an apparent friend of capitalism,
which was seen as the main culprit in environmental degradation, one would
not have expected radical policies in this area. Yet progress was made in the
mid-1980s.
In 1987 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP) was set up. This
was the first national organisation created to deal with environmental maters.
They had powers to deal with both industry and local authorities in
controlling air, water and waste pollution. In 1988 Thatcher herself made a
landmark speech to the Royal Society, accepting that global warming was a
serious problem for the future.
The years 1989–90 proved to be landmark ones in Britain. In 1989 the
National Rivers Authority (NRA) was set up. In 1990 the Environment
Protection Act was passed. This was the first piece of legislation to set
universal standards of pollution control. They were to be administered by the
NRA and the HMIP. Private and public bodies were bound by the targets and
sanctions were introduced against transgressors. Any organisation which felt
it could justify breaking the targets was forced to apply for special dispen-
sation. Also in 1990 the Conservative government published a document
entitled This Common Inheritance, the first comprehensive policy document
to appear concerning sustainable development.
While these initiatives were taking place, the European Community were
placing the environment onto their agenda. In 1987 the Single European Act
was implemented. This Act made environmental protection one of the respon-
sibilities of the Community, with voting on the issue in the Council of Ministers
requiring unanimity to protect national interests.
In 1993 John Gummer became Environment Secretary. This was a key event
as Gummer was an important environmental campaigner. He wished to build
on the progress made in the 1980s. Gummer introduced air pollution targets,
which began the process of reducing harmful car emissions, and instituted a
policy for farmers to create environmentally sensitive areas, with grants to
support them. Most importantly, however, he created the Environment
Agency in 1995 by amalgamating the NRA and the HMIP. This large powerful
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body was to carry forward environmental policy and had extensive powers to
enforce standards. Any developments which might have environmental conse-
quences had to submit plans to the agency for approval.
NEW LABOUR AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Part of New Labour’s ‘third way’ philosophy was to accept environmentalism
as a key political issue. Although Blair’s party is committed to supporting
business, it argues that this can only be done provided environmental
concerns are addressed. In other words, it contains a belief that industrial
development and environmental concerns can be compatible, an idea which
many campaigners see as impossible. The diversity of New Labour policies
reflects the breadth of the issue in itself.
Global involvement
Two international treaties have set the scene of global concerns. These were
the agreements at Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and the Kyoto agreement in 1997.
The former was negotiated by the Conservative government of John Major
and the latter by the Labour government, with John Prescott representing
Britain, interestingly assisted by John Gummer who had led the Conservative
environmental initiative earlier.
These two agreements aimed to make progress in cutting harmful emissions,
known as greenhouse gases. The Rio accord, known as Agenda 21 placed a
requirement on all participants to take measures to reduce emissions.
However, the targets were too imprecise. At Kyoto, however, it was agreed that
greenhouse gas emissions should be cut from 1990 levels by the following
levels:
 USA: 7 per cent
 EU: 8 per cent
 Japan: 6 per cent
There is little doubt that the British government representatives played a
leading role in these negotiations. Furthermore, the British commitment has
been in excess of the targets set. New Labour sees itself as a more interna-
tionalist government than its predecessors and has attempted to move both
the EU and the USA to a more radical position on the environment. In the
case of the USA this has not been successful and President George Bush
junior repudiated the Kyoto treaty early in 2002. His administration also
largely ignored the 2002 Johannesburg conference on poverty and the
environment.
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Traffic and car pollution
Although the Labour government since 1997 has claimed to be interested in
reducing traffic levels and congestion in cities, its policies have failed to make
significant progress. Road building programmes have not been cut back
(despite fierce opposition from a variety of local anti-roads campaign groups).
Indeed, when London Mayor Ken Livingstone announced the introduction of
congestion charges in the city centre and proposed parking taxes, the
government seemed remarkably hostile.
Labour has also dragged its feet on such issues as road tolls to reduce
motorway traffic and a taxation system designed to reduce the use of large-
engined cars which produce most pollution. Its 1998 Transport White Paper
promised more spending on public transport to get cars off the road, in combi-
nation with a variety of proposals to introduce charges on motorists to deter
car use. By 2002 little progress had been made and a new crisis in public
transport threatened to de-rail (literally!) policy.
But the government’s anti-emissions policy was most severely tested in the
autumn of 2000. At that time there was a sharp rise in oil prices, and therefore
also petrol prices. This caused a massive campaign against the high levels of
duty on fuel which the government was levying (in its defence, the
government could argue that the rise in fuel taxation had started under
previous Conservative governments).
Gordon Brown was now in a dilemma over how to deal with the crisis. Fuel
depots were being blockaded by protesters: the farmers and other rural
interests were applying huge pressure and motorists were running out of fuel
as the blockades prevented petrol getting to filling stations. Brown argued that
high petrol duties were a key part of an integrated emissions policy. Indeed,
he added, it was part of the country’s Agenda 21 commitments.
In the event Brown made concessions to the protesters. Fuel duties were
reduced and he gave a commitment to hold them down in the immediate
future. Environmentalists were dismayed by Brown’s apparent climbdown.
Motorists, however, were pleased that the crisis had passed. Most agree that the
government, Brown in particular, had failed its greatest environmental test.
Farming and the countryside
The Labour government reluctantly became mired in problems with the
countryside after it came to office. It was dealing with the aftermath of the
BSE crisis, which had devastated livestock farming when two further problems
emerged. The first was the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in 2001. It took
nearly a year before the epidemic subsided. During this period rural interests
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claimed that the crisis had been badly handled and was a sign that the
government did not understand the problems of the countryside. The second
was very much of the government’s own making. It decided to allow
parliament a free vote on whether to ban hunting with hounds (mainly
foxhunting). This was seen as an attack by urban dwellers on the countryside.
The three problems which the government faced threw into focus the whole
issue of the British countryside and rural life. John Prescott had already estab-
lished a so-called ‘right to roam’, forcing landowners to open up footpaths and
rights of way. The measure had been greeted with mixed feelings. It had also
placed the countryside and the environment together by creating a new
government department – the Department for the Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs (DEFRA). Now the whole issue of the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) had to be addressed.
Expenditure on the CAP was becoming excessive. Furthermore British
agriculture was not benefiting greatly from it, while it seemed to be of most
interest to the French, who were seen as being at the centre of the beef
industry’s problems over BSE. It was, therefore, decided in 2002 to tie
together the two issues of agricultural subsidies and environmental measures
in the countryside. Rural Affair Minister Alun Michael announced that some
subsidies would be phased out. Under a new EU directive he is free to replace
up to 20 per cent of subsidies with government grants to farmers in return for
their becoming responsible for environmental protection. Such issues as the
conservation of endangered species, river water quality, maintenance of
meadows and hedgerows are to be included in the scheme.
At the same time the new department has additional funds available for the
encouragement of organic farming. It is recognised that large-scale industrial
farming is unlikely to have a future in the UK. Farmers here cannot compete
in an increasingly free world market. Industrial farming is also seen as a
danger to the countryside environment.
The issue over which Labour has created most difficulty for itself in this field
concerns research into genetically modified (GM) foods. In 1998 the
government decided to ban its commercial use and brought in regulations
(which apply throughout the EU) to force food processors to declare whether
GM ingredients have been used. However, Tony Blair himself is committed to
the continued approval of research. This has angered campaigners, especially
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, who want an outright ban.
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NEW LABOUR: AN ASSESSMENT
Despite its rhetoric, the Labour government which came to power in 1997 has
a very mixed record on the environment. It has shown considerable global
concerns and is widely praised for its attempts to preserve the Rio and Kyoto
agreements on climate change. On the other hand its policies on transport
have been less coherent. The commitments to reduce road traffic and improve
public transport have not been maintained.
The main problems concern the government’s difficulties in reconciling
competing interests. The conflict between environmentalists and the
motorists’ lobby is a typical example. So too are those issues which create
heated debate between farmers and rural interest groups and, in some cases,
within the farming community itself. Its difficulties over what to do about GM
foods is a typical example of the latter.
It may be that it will need a further advance by the Green Party and its allies
to stimulate fresh interest. The Greens made an apparently famous ‘break-
through’ in the elections to the European Parliament in 1995 by winning 15
per cent of the popular vote. It has also won seats in the Scottish Parliament
and Welsh Assembly where proportional representation (PR) is being used.
But these advances have been small and short lived. In terms of the popular
vote the Greens have achieved little. Until they do, the government is unlikely
to renew its commitment to the environment. As things stand, environmental
campaigners are pleased by what they hear but are disappointed by what has
been achieved.
THE EUROPEAN UNION
As we have seen, environmental protection, became an EU concern in 1987.
Its jurisdiction lies in the following areas:
 The preservation of fish stocks in the seas around Europe. This is part of
the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).
 Control over sea pollution. Member states must conform to regulations
concerning sewage and other potentially harmful releases into the sea.
 There is a scheme in place to encourage clean beaches. Coastal towns which
can demonstrate minimum standards of cleanliness receive European awards.
 Under the Common Agricultural Policy, farmers must agree to certain
environmental regulations in return for subsidies.
 Emissions controls over industries, notably chemicals and metals, are set
by the EU.
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 There are European emissions control regulations on cars, lorries and all
forms of transport.
 European targets for the cleanliness of rivers have been agreed.
 There are European controls over the hunting of species which are
considered to be endangered.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 Why has environmental policy remained relatively low on the British
political agenda?
2 In what ways has membership of the European Union affected
environmental policy in Europe?
3 Assess New Labour’s claim to be a friend of the environment since
1997.
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BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM
How Northern Ireland came about
Until 1921 Ireland was a single political entity under British rule. It elected
MPs to parliament in London, but was directly ruled by the British
government. Between the 1880s and 1921 there was an ongoing campaign
among nationalist Irish politicians, British Liberals and the new Labour party.
At the more extreme end of the nationalist movement Sinn Fein, a political
party dedicated to Irish independence and the Irish Republican Army (IRA,
originally the ‘Irish Volunteers’) were formed to fight for independence.
The momentum for independence gradually built up to something of a
crescendo when there was an IRA-led uprising in 1916 – the so-called ‘Easter
Rising’. Though the revolt was easily crushed, Britain’s new prime minister,
David Lloyd George, became convinced that a settlement had to be reached.
However, there was a major obstacle to the independence process.
In the north of the island there was a concentration of Protestants who formed
a majority in the so-called ‘six counties’ which comprised most of the ancient
province of Ulster (strictly speaking, Ulster and Northern Ireland are not the
same thing. Ulster is slightly bigger than what later became Northern Ireland).
However, the Protestants were a minority in Ireland as a whole. These Protes-
tants were the descendants of people who had been settled in Ireland since the
10Northern Ireland
 The background to the Northern Ireland problem
 The build up to and the importance of the Good Friday Agreement
 The effect of the devolution process on Northern Ireland
 The workings of the Northern Ireland Assembly
 The effects of decommissioning of arms and demilitarisation
 The future of Northern Ireland
seventeenth century. They had been given large tracts of land and so, by the
twentieth century, they formed a high proportion of the middle classes in the
north. In other words they enjoyed considerable economic, political and social
power in those northern counties. Most of the Protestants were totally
opposed to Irish independence. By the end of the twentieth century, many of
their descendants were equally horrified by the prospect of a united country.
The Protestant fear and opposition of a united Ireland are complex emotions,
but two main features stand out. The first is that this group, usually known as
‘Loyalists’, consider themselves culturally British. They are loyal to the
monarchy and believe they have more in common with British people than
with the Irish. The second issue concerns religion. The religious question in
Northern Ireland requires separate consideration and is described fully below.
In short, however, the Protestant minority in the north totally opposed
absorption into a new Catholic state of Ireland.
It was therefore decided by government and parliament in London that Ireland
would have to be partitioned. Six counties in the north would remain part of
the United Kingdom, while the rest of the island was to become a separate
state. In 1922, therefore, the ‘Irish Free State’ and ‘Northern Ireland’ – a
province of Great Britain – came into existence. At first, the Irish Free State
remained part of the United Kingdom. It had its own independent parliament
and government, but accepted the authority of the British Crown. This fact
prevented excessive tension from growing in Northern Ireland. All the Irish
people owed allegiance to the Crown, so there was little to fear for the Protes-
tants. But this situation began to change after 1937.
In that year the Irish Free State broke its close links with Britain and became
‘Eire’, though there was still a weak link with the crown. More importantly,
however, a new constitution was developed under the influence of the Irish
president, Eamonn de Valera. The new constitution incorporated a number of
principles based on the Catholic religion (described below). This created a
wide cultural and religious division between Northern Ireland and Eire. In
1949 Ireland became a full republic (known since as the ‘Republic of Ireland)
with no links to Britain. (It can be noted here that the term ‘Republican’ which
is still applied to modern campaigners for a united Ireland, arises from the
movement which had always opposed continuing links with the British
Crown.) The schism between the north and the south was now complete.
Religion
The religious divide in Northern Ireland can only be understood in relation to
the events of 1688–90. It may seem strange to consider history which is over
three hundred years old when explaining a modern political problem, but that
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is part of the mystery of the province.
In 1688, the Catholic King of England, James II (of the Stuart dynasty), was
removed from the throne. He was replaced by the Protestant William III (of the
family of Orange). William knew he had to quell the Catholics of Ireland and
so sent an army to crush a revolt led by the exiled former King James. At the
Battle of the River Boyne in 1690 the Catholic army was defeated and
Protestant ascendancy in the north was established. King William’s family
title, of course, gives its name to the Protestant Orange Order which was
founded to celebrate the victory of protestantism in Ireland. When the Orange
Order marches in the north today it is a demonstration of triumphalism which
is well understood by both sides of the political divide.
So history continues to play a major role in the troubles. But it is not just an
ancient tribal feud. The Protestants in the north fear the domination of the
Catholic religion in various aspects of their lives. Education is a prime example
of this, but there is also a fear that artistic and cultural life will be suppressed
by the dominance of strict Catholic values. Until 1998, indeed, the consti-
tution of the Irish Republic contained principles of law which were effectively
religious rules. Divorce, abortion and contraception, for example, were all
outlawed in Irish law. On a stricter religious level, some Protestants also fear
the authority of the Pope which Catholics accept. This is now a more extreme
view, but is held by some such as the reverend Iain Paisley who leads the
extreme loyalist party, the Democratic Unionist party.
As religious observance has declined, it might be thought that the so-called
‘sectarian’ divide in Northern Ireland might disappear. This has not been the
case. Strict religious belief may be less significant, but religion still represents
culture and the conflict is, to a great extent, cultural in nature. There is an old
joke in Northern Ireland which illustrates the strange place of religion in the
troubles. It runs like this: A Jew was walking along a Belfast street. He was
stopped by a threatening group of youths. ‘Are you a Protestant or a Catholic?’,
they demanded. ‘Neither’, said the man, ‘I’m Jewish’. ‘Yes,’ said one of the
youths, ‘but are you a Protestant Jew or a Catholic Jew?’ The spiritual side of
religion is less important than its cultural and political significance.
To many in Northern Ireland, therefore, being Protestant is synonymous with
being ‘British’, while Catholics are seen as ‘Irish’. The religious labels have
become convenient ways in which we can identify the political and cultural
divide, even though there is nothing intrinsically Protestant about loyalism or
Catholic about republicanism.
The onset of the modern ‘troubles’
When the province of Northern Ireland was granted its own devolved
government in 1921, it was given political institutions which were, in effect, a
smaller version of the Westminster model. A small parliament (known as
‘Stormont’ after the building where it met) was elected by first past the post
after a brief flirtation with proportional representation. From the majority at
Stormont an executive government was drawn, with a prime minister and a
cabinet. It operated very much like the government in London, though its
jurisdiction was limited to domestic affairs. Foreign policy, defence and overall
economic management were set in London. There was also a full local
government system put in place.
This seems uncontroversial at first sight. However, it transpired that all the
institutions of government came to be dominated by the Protestant Unionists.
This was reinforced by the practice of ‘gerrymandering’ where political bound-
aries were manipulated to favour one political party – the Unionists. Although
the Unionists represented about two-thirds of the population of the north, they
exerted 100 per cent control over Stormont, the government and most local
government. The Catholics felt effectively ‘disenfranchised’. But the problem
ran deeper than this. It was also the case that Catholics suffered widespread,
systematic discrimination at the hands of state institutions.
This discrimination existed in education, housing provision, employment in
public service, the granting of official contracts to local firms and, perhaps most
seriously, in the law enforcement system. The Northern Ireland police – known
as the Royal Ulster Constabulary – was almost exclusively Protestant, and so
was much of the judiciary. It was therefore suspected (with varying degrees of
justification) that Catholics were also discriminated against in the criminal
justice system. As the 1960s wore on, the Catholic minority found it could less
and less rely on the forces of law and order. Indeed many actually felt directly
threatened by them. This is a key ingredient in the recipe for conflict
To add to the political and religious strife, Northern Ireland Society is also
culturally divided. Most schools, sports clubs, pubs, clubs, newspapers and
housing estates are associated exclusively with one side of the sectarian divide
or the other. The two communities, therefore, rarely mix. The opportunities
for mutual understanding and compromise are, thus, limited.
Tension within the Catholic community mounted steadily during the 1960s. A
largely middle-class civil rights movement was formed in 1968, a year when
protest movements of various kinds had emerged all over Europe and the USA.
This began to demonstrate against discrimination against Catholics. It became
ultimately allied to a working-class movement in the Catholic housing estates
whose grievances were not only economic and political. In hard economic
times in the mid-1960s it was clear that the Catholic workers suffered more
than their Protestant counterparts. The chemistry between the two
movements proved to be explosive.
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THE MODERN ‘TROUBLES’
The flashpoint for conflict occurred in 1968 when a march by the new Civil
Rights Association – a largely Catholic, Republican organisation – was
attacked by Loyalists in Londonderry. The Royal Ulster Constabulary restored
order, but at the expense of some violence, which antagonised the civil rights
campaigners. During 1968 and 1969 there were growing outbursts of conflict
between Loyalists and Republicans. Extra British troops were drafted into
Belfast to keep the peace. From then on, the British army presence in Northern
Ireland steadily grew.
The year 1971 proved to be a critical one. A bomb, planted by the Protestant
paramilitary organisation – the Ulster Volunteer Force – killed fifteen Catholics
in a Belfast bar. This was in response to what the Protestant community saw
as an increasing threat from the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The IRA had
mobilised its forces and was recruiting new members rapidly. The response of
the British government was to introduce internment.
The process of internment had last been used in World War II to remove people
of enemy nationality from society by placing them in special camps. In
Northern Ireland it was applied to anyone who was suspected of being engaged
in terrorist activity. No trial was held, though the authorities had to convince
a judge that there were grounds for suspicion. Three hundred were interned
in the summer of 1971, nearly all Catholics, who were suspected of IRA
membership. This angered the civil rights campaigners who saw it as impris-
onment without trial. More seriously, it convinced the Catholic, Republican,
community that the British government was firmly on the side of the Loyalists.
Demonstrations, sporadic rioting and bombings continued through 1971,
culminating in the most serious incident of the troubles to date. In 1972 a
relatively peaceful civil rights march in Londonderry was broken up by
members of the Parachute Regiment. Thirteen people, some merely
bystanders, were shot dead by the troops. The explanation of how this
occurred is still not resolved. However, it was seen by the Catholics and Repub-
licans as the clearest sign of British intent – that they would resist political
reform at all costs. The British embassy in Dublin was attacked and a bomb was
set off at an army barracks in Aldershot. The transfer of violence to the British
mainland was a particular shock, as it now became clear that the Northern
Ireland problem was about to involve everyone in Britain.
The reaction of the British government was to institute direct rule in Northern
Ireland. The devolved institutions in Belfast were suspended. It was clear that
the Northern Ireland government had lost its authority in the province and
could not maintain order. Furthermore the Unionist-dominated institutions
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only served to antagonise the Catholic minority. Laws were from now on to be
made by the Westminster Parliament and government was to be carried out by
the Northern Ireland Office, headed by the Northern Ireland Secretary (the
first being William Whitelaw).
DIRECT RULE
The period of direct rule from London lasted from 1972 until 1999 when
devolved government took over in the province. For 27 years Northern Ireland
suffered from violence, disruption, political initiatives bringing hope followed
by disappointments, and renewed sectarian conflict. The story of direct rule is
best divided into three themes – the course of sectarian violence, the fragmen-
tation of the party system and the various attempts to find a lasting peace.
Sectarian conflict
Violence continued to dominate life in Northern Ireland through the 1970s.
This was characterised by rioting, bombings, attacks on security forces, tit-for-
tat killings and punishment beatings. In 1974 the Prevention of Terrorism Act
was passed, giving the security wide powers to stop and search people,
property and vehicles, to ban marches and demonstrations and to detain
terrorist suspects for extended periods.
Political assassination was added to the litany of violence in 1979. Lord
Mountbatten, a member of the royal family, was killed by an IRA bomb and
Airey Neave, Conservative Opposition spokesman on Northern Ireland, was
killed in Westminster by the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). This
second death marked the arrival of a new Republican group which was even
more committed to violence than the IRA.
By the early 1980s Northern Ireland’s main prison, the Maze, was full of
terrorist prisoners. Seeking a special ‘political’ status, the republican prisoners
started a campaign to gain privileges normally accorded to such detainees in
1981. Several went on hunger strike and fasted to death. The most celebrated
of them was Bobby Sands who actually won a parliamentary by-election while
in prison and close to death. Sands entered the mythology of Republicanism
and became one of its most revered martyrs. His death brought a new wave of
rioting and general violence.
Dramatic bombings continued, the best known of which destroyed part of the
Brighton Hotel which housed many leading members of the Conservative
party who were in town for the party’s annual conference in 1984. Prime
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Minister Thatcher only just escaped, but four others were killed. Eleven people
were killed by an IRA bomb at Enniskillen, and 10 Downing Street suffered a
mortar attack in 1991.
A crescendo of violence seemed to have been reached by 1993. There were
now a number of groups operating all over Britain, each of which was capable
of wreaking havoc. On the Republican side there was the IRA and the INLA.
The Loyalist cause was served by the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and
the Ulster Volunteer Force (UDV). The politicians who spoke for these groups
were incapable of controlling them. It was at this point, however, that political
forces had gathered sufficiently to break the deadlock. An IRA ceasefire was
declared in 1994 (following the Downing Street declaration – see below) and
the Loyalist paramilitaries followed suit. Apart from the bombing of Canary
Wharf in London in 1996, the ceasefire held. Only the INLA and the ‘Real IRA’
– an extreme breakaway group – continued the campaign of violence.
Party fragmentation
Up to 1970 Northern Ireland politics was completely dominated by the Ulster
Unionist party which won most of the seats in Stormont and at Westminster.
They were opposed by Nationalist parties and Sinn Fein, but these had little or
no hope of breaking Unionist control. Everything changed, however, with the
onset of the troubles.
A moderate party was formed to represent the Nationalist community. This
was the Social Democratic Labour party. Its domestic policies were similar to
the British Labour party but it was also committed to the uniting of Ireland by
peaceful, political means. This party had no connection with terrorists and
did, indeed, shun all forms of violence. A non-sectarian, neutral party, the
Alliance also came into being in 1970. This party gained an immediate
following within the Northern Ireland middle classes and hopes were high that
it represented the future. After a brief early flurry, however, the Alliance has
failed to make a significant impact. Meanwhile, Sinn Fein, which was
considered to be the political wing of the IRA, was increasing its support,
especially among working-class Republicans.
The Unionists were also not immune from internal dissension. The unionist
Party split almost as soon as violence broke out. The main schism, then and
ever since, lies between the more moderate centre of the party and the
extremists led by the Reverend Iain Paisley. Paisley is a militant in both the
religious and political senses. His brand of Protestantism is totally opposed to
Catholicism (he describes Catholics as ‘papists’) while, as a Unionist, he is
opposed to any compromise with Nationalism. His party became known as the
Democratic Unionists (DUP) in 1971.
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Since Paisley’s defection from the Ulster Unionist party (UUP), others
have followed and there is now a varied collection of Unionist parties
including the UK Unionists, Progressive Unionists and the United Unionists
Assembly. These groups vary in their attitudes towards the peace process from
extreme to moderate. There is also a Women’s Coalition party which is
dedicated to a peaceful solution and claims to be non-sectarian. The other
non-sectarian group – the Alliance party – has survived but with very little
influence.
Party fragmentation has brought with it a number of problems. Firstly, it is
extremely difficult to reach general agreement on any new initiatives, so many
factions have to be satisfied. The pressure to ensure that all groups are repre-
sented in any political system means that complex electoral systems have to
be adopted. Some of the groups, furthermore, have their own military wings
which they only partially control. Failure to satisfy them all may result in a
continuation of violence, even from very small splinter groups. Above all,
however, the multi-party nature of Northern Ireland politics means that there
is always likely to be a lack of coherence in any of the various movements
which jockey each other for influence.
Peace initiatives
Throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s British governments produced a
series of initiatives to try to find a peace formula. The essential details of the
most important stages in this process are described below.
POWER SHARING AND THE SUNNINGDALE
AGREEMENT, 1973–74
With hindsight it may seem naive that the British government should believe
that the political problem of Northern Ireland could be solved simply by
creating a system which appeared to give representation to both the loyalist
and nationalist communities. But back in 1973 this was perceived to be the
main problem. The idea that conflict was more deep rooted was simply not
understood at the time.
So, in 1973, a new assembly was elected and an executive was drawn from it.
This 11 person government was comprised of 6 Unionists, 4 Nationalists from
the SDLP and 1 ‘neutral’ member from the Alliance party. This was a
reasonably fair reflection of the divisions in the community, but it still meant
that the Unionists held a clear majority. Furthermore, the head of the executive
– Brian Faulkner – was soon rejected by his own Unionist party. Sinn Fein, who
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now claimed to represent nationalism, was also excluded on the grounds that
it was a terrorist organisation.
Despite its problems the government continued to hope for a settlement. The
following year the Sunningdale Agreement was signed with the government
of the Irish Republic. This allowed for regular consultations between the
British and Irish governments over Northern Ireland affairs and a good deal of
cross-border co-operation, especially over security. The agreement was seen as
a ‘sell-out’ to the Irish by the Nationalists while the new executive was seen as
no more than a continuation of Unionist domination by the Nationalists.
In 1974 a general strike by Nationalist, Catholic workers was called and it was
very soon realised that this was a clear demonstration of a withdrawal of
popular consent from the new arrangements. The government of Britain
conceded defeat and dissolved the new assembly. Direct rule was re-established.
ROLLING DEVOLUTION, 1982–86
The Labour government of Harold Wilson had investigated the possibility of a
new settlement by calling a Constitutional Convention in 1975, but there
was still insufficient common ground for meaningful discussion. The
convention collapsed after less than one year. Undaunted, a renewed attempt
at settlement was begun in 1982. This was a process known as ‘rolling
devolution’ and was introduced by the Conservative Northern Ireland
secretary, James Prior.
The idea here was to elect a new assembly, but to give it little power at the
beginning. As time went by and the community got used to the idea of having
its own government, the powers of the assembly were to be gradually
increased until self-government for the province could be established. The
SDLP and Sinn Fein boycotted the assembly, so that its early signs were very
pessimistic. Some hope for its future were revived by the Anglo-Irish
Agreement of 1985. By this convention, the government of the republic of
Ireland accepted that Northern Ireland could not be united with the rest of
Ireland without the consent of its people. This agreement, it was expected,
would allay the fears of the Unionists of a Catholic takeover. But it proved to
be insufficient. Unionists wanted a complete surrender by the republic of
ireland and this was not forthcoming. The failure of the Anglo-Irish Agreement
contributed to the demise of the rolling devolution process and the assembly
was dissolved in 1986.
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THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION 
AND THE IRA CEASEFIRE, 1993–94
The so-called Downing Street declaration – the brainchild of John Major –
changed the Northern Ireland situation dramatically and marked the
beginning of the modern peace process. The declaration stated that the British
government had no ‘strategic interest’ in Northern Ireland remaining part
of the United Kingdom. What this meant – and its significance was not lost
on the Nationalist community – was that Britain became a truly neutral player
in the game of Irish politics. In the past Britain had always been seen as an
ally of the Loyalists. Now it portrayed itself as a neutral arbiter between the
two communities.
The following year the IRA called a ceasefire and most of the other paramil-
itary groups followed suit. An uneasy peace descended and serious talks
began. President Clinton of the USA threw his weight behind a settlement and
sent Senator George Mitchell as a neutral envoy to try to broker a new political
agreement. Sadly for John Major, who had put all his efforts into a permanent
peace, he was ousted from office before a new agreement could be reached. It
was left to Mo Mowlem, the new Labour Secretary of State to reach a
settlement in 1998. This was the Good Friday agreement.
Reasons for failure before 1998
Why had all these attempts to find a lasting settlement failed before the
Good Friday Agreement? This is a complex question, which must involve
considerable speculation. Some of the reasons which have been offered are as
follows:
 Political agreement could not be reached until there was some certainty
that sectarian violence was over. There was always a fear that if either side
could not achieve its aims politically it would simply resort to violence.
There was no prospect of a lasting ceasefire until after 1997.
 The British government was treated with suspicion by both sides of the
sectarian divide and could therefore never negotiate with both sides on an
equal basis.
 The government of the Irish Republic was seen as a malign influence on
Northern Ireland affairs by the Loyalists. Until it showed a determination
to allow Northern Ireland to command its own destiny its motives would
always be suspected.
 The security forces in Northern Ireland were not seen as even-handed.
Ironically, both sides of the sectarian divide believed the British army
favoured their opponents. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was also
viewed as a Protestant force by the Catholic community.
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 However sincere attempts were to achieve genuine power-sharing, there
was always a suspicion that the majority – i.e. the Protestant Loyalists –
would always be in political control.
THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT
The conditions for peace
Having established the reasons why so many previous attempts at peace-
making had failed, we can now examine the circumstances which allowed a
convincing agreement to be reached in 1998. Again these must inevitably be
speculative, but there is considerable evidence to support them:
 The British government needed to convince both sides that it was a neutral
player. The new Labour government was able to achieve this to some
extent. In addition the intervention of the United States, President Clinton
and Senator Mitchell in particular, went some way to establish trust on
both sides.
 The new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland – Mo Mowlem – enjoyed
the trust of the Republican community more than any of her predecessors.
 The Unionist Leader, David Trimble, had the necessary respect to carry
forward a more moderate Loyalist position. His willingness to negotiate –
albeit indirectly – with Sinn Fein was a huge step forward.
 Possibly, the return of some degree of economic prosperity in the second
half of the 1990s may have reduced alienation among the working classes.
 The rapid and dramatic growth in prosperity in the Republic of Ireland,
together with a distinct loosening of religious influence there, may have
allayed some of the fears of Protestants in Northern Ireland.
 The death of 27 people in Omagh (albeit after the Good Friday Agreement
was signed) confirmed the community’s desire to see an end to violence.
Sinn Fein and the IRA, neither of whom were responsible for the Omagh
bomb (it was the act of the extremist ‘Real’ IRA), repudiated violence of
this kind. The revulsion within Northern Ireland renewed determination to
make the agreement work.
The nature of the agreement
The Good Friday Agreement can be divided into five main strands. These are
as shown in the box.
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Good Friday Agreement
1 There should be a devolved government in Northern Ireland along strict proportional
lines with all elements of the community properly represented.
2 There was to be real progress towards the solving of sectarian issues such as the
decommissioning of terrorist weapons, reform of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the
gradual withdrawal of British troops and reform of the criminal justice system.
3 There was to be increased co-operation and some power-sharing between the govern-
ments of the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland and the devolved government of
Northern Ireland.
4 All sides in the agreement should renounce the use of violence once and for all.
5 The Republic of Ireland should give up its historic objective of uniting Ireland and should
amend its constitution and laws to remove specific terms which were offensive to
Protestants.
DEVOLUTION
The electoral system
The devolution process in Northern Ireland had to be very different from its
counterparts in Wales and Scotland. In particular, the electoral system to be
used had to be such that all minority groups were represented. A form of
proportional representation was used in Scotland and Wales, but this was not
a radical system and it eliminated the very small parties which might have
sought election. In Northern Ireland even very small factions had to have a
chance of winning seats in the new assembly. For this reason, the Single Trans-
ferable Vote (STV) was introduced. STV allows both small parties and
individuals to win seats as it is one of the most proportional forms of electoral
system known to politics. The results of the first assembly elections reflect the
success of STV in this regard (see table 10.1). Local government elections were
held on the same basis and the results were similar.
Table 10.1 Northern Ireland Assembly election, 1998
Party Seats won
Ulster Unionist party 28
Social Democratic and Labour party 24
Democratic Unionist Party 20
Sinn Fein 18
Alliance party 6
Northern Ireland Unionist party 3
United Unionist Assembly party 3
Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition 2
Progressive Unionist party 2
UK Unionist party 1
Independent Unionist 1
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We can see that Loyalist parties (all the Unionist factions together) won over
50 per cent of the seats, but the political system is so fragmented that no group
enjoys a dominant majority. This contrasts with the traditional political system
in the province, which was completely controlled by a large, single Unionist
party
The Assembly
The election result demonstrates that the new assembly, containing 108
members, represented a multi-party system, very much along the lines of most
European systems. In order to pass legislation, coalitions of support have to be
built. No single group can bulldoze any measure through the legislature.
Its powers are extensive. A wide range of primary legislation can be passed.
However, such areas as foreign policy, the economy, finance and, above all,
security matters, cannot be left to the assembly. Security (mainly policing) and
criminal law are the most sensitive of issues in the province (unlike Scotland
and Wales where sectarian conflict is not an issue). It also oversees the admin-
istration of such services as health, education, housing, transport and
agriculture. It is expected that these policy issues, which were formerly run on
sectarian basis, will be conducted in a neutral fashion so that no section of the
community will suffer discrimination. A strong committee system, which
scrutinises the work of the devolved government, helps to prevent such possi-
bilities from re-emerging.
The idea of cross-community agreements in the assembly was a key
innovation. It is completely different to anything known either in the British
political system, or the devolved arrangements in Wales and Northern Ireland.
Essentially, the safeguards work as follows:
 All Northern Ireland legislation must conform to the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. This ensures that no sections of the community
or individuals may suffer discrimination. Though this provision is in place
in Scotland, it does not apply to primary legislation for England and
Wales.
 The committees of the assembly, which consider both proposed legislation
and the operation of government, are formed in direct proportion to party
strengths in the whole assembly. Again, this ensures proportionality.
 Legislation must command not only an overall majority of the assembly,
but must also be approved by a majority of both communities, i.e.
Unionists and Nationalists. This unique provision is a vital element in the
arrangements. It ensures that a majority cannot govern without the
consent of both sides of the sectarian divide. This is, of course, not the case
in Westminster, nor does it apply in Scotland and Wales where the nation-
alists have been excluded from power.
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What we see here is a new model for proportional forms of government. It may
not work in the long run, but, as a constitutional innovation, it may serve as
a blueprint for the settlement of similar conflicts here or elsewhere.
The executive
This is effectively the government of Northern Ireland. Powers which have not
been devolved, such as defence, security, finance, the economy, remain in the
hands of the UK government or the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. It
is headed by a first minister. This will be the nomination of the largest party
in the assembly. Accordingly, David Trimble was the first holder of the post, the
nomination of the Ulster Unionist party. It is assumed that his deputy will be
from the biggest party on the other side of the sectarian divide. Thus Seamus
Mallon of the SDLP became Trimble’s first deputy.
An executive of ten members works with the first minister. Places on the
executive are awarded in proportion to the strengths of parties in the assembly.
The parties which qualify nominate those whom they wish to serve. Again this
ensures that all sections of the community are represented in the government.
It was, for example, a radical and dramatic development when Sinn Fein
found itself in a position to nominate two members. One of them, indeed, was
a former senior member of the IRA, Martin McGuinness, who became
education minister. We therefore saw the amazing reality of Unionist politi-
cians sitting down in government with former Republican terrorists. It was an
uneasy partnership, but it did take place. Unsurprisingly, the radical anti-Good
Friday Agreement party, the Democratic Unionists, led by Iain Paisley, did not
take part. As a safeguard, all Northern Ireland ministers must publicly
renounce the use of violence to achieve political aims.
Once again the arrangements for the executive were radically different from
those at Westminster, Cardiff or Edinburgh. The Northern Ireland executive
does not feature collective responsibility – each minister is independent and
answers directly to the assembly – and it is not controlled by a single party or
a partial coalition. Its critics point out that it has a very narrow jurisdiction so
that its existence is very much a token of power-sharing. This may be the case,
but, if so, it was an important symbol of reconciliation.
EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Northern Ireland had been seen as a British problem within the province. Any
attempts at interference from the rest of Ireland was viewed with great
suspicion. The agreement, however, accepted for the first time that the Republic
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did have legitimate interests in the province. Three new institutions were
therefore set up:
The north–south ministerial council
A regular opportunity for ministers from both sides of the border (i.e. from the
Republic and Northern Ireland) to discuss matters of mutual concern. It meets
twice a year at the most senior level but more junior ministers may discuss
specialised issues at any time. The meeting cannot make binding decisions but
is expected to make influential recommendations to member governments.
The issues it discusses regularly include security, transport, economic devel-
opment, agriculture, tourism, fisheries and European affairs.
The British–Irish council
This has also been described as the ‘council of the isles’. Representatives from
all over the British Isles meet twice a year. Thus, not only are Britain and
Ireland represented, but also all their constituent parts – Scotland, Wales, the
Isle of Man, Channel Islands and, of course, Northern Ireland. To a large extent
this is a token organisation, designed to give equal status to all parts of the
British Isles and to express some kind of common heritage and interest. Its
range of concerns is inevitably limited. Such matters as drugs enforcement,
crime and the environment are discussed in a generalised way.
The British–Irish inter-governmental conference
This involves representatives from the main British and Irish governments,
with the intention that heads of government should try to meet twice each
year. The issues it is expected to address give us clues as to its purpose. They
include, for example, cross-border policing and security, human rights and
terrorism.
To some extent in recognition of this open involvement of the Irish
government in the affairs of the province, the Republic made a key concession.
It had been placed in the Irish constitution of 1937 that an objective of the
Irish state was to unite Ireland, i.e. to take possession of the north at some time
in the future. This territorial claim was dropped (following a referendum to
amend the Irish constitution). Instead, both the British and Irish governments
agreed to respect the will of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland.
The removal of the Irish ‘threat’ to the ‘Britishness’ of the province allayed
some of the Protestant fears of a Catholic takeover.
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THE RESOLUTION OF REMAINING ISSUES
It was recognised that the creation of political institutions alone could
not result in a lasting peace. The other sources of conflict had to be addressed
too. The main issues which were reserved for additional negotiation were
as follows.
The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)
As we saw above, the RUC was regarded as a major stumbling block to security
by the Nationalist community. Most of its members were Protestant (Catholic
members were persecuted and even shot by terrorists) and it was seen by
Nationalists as a Loyalist force which was not even-handed in its dealings with
the community. Even the title ‘Royal’ suggested to them that it served the
British Crown, rather than all the people of the province. Although, by the
1990s, it had been reformed and had become a more neutral body, the Nation-
alists wished to see the creation of an entirely new police force which could
serve both communities equally.
An inquiry was set up under former Conservative minister and governor of
Hong Kong, Chris Patten. His proposals, which were presented in 2000,
suggested a change of name, completely new recruitment policies, with a
minimum quota of Catholics and a new set of safeguards to be introduced.
However, they were quickly rejected by the Loyalists, who objected especially
to the change of name to the ‘Northern Ireland Police Service’ or something
similar. They insisted on it remaining ‘Royal’. They also objected to the
enforced membership of large numbers of Catholic officers. The issue of the
RUC remains unresolved.
Prisoner releases
The existence of large numbers of terrorists in Northern Ireland prisons
remained a potential source of friction on both sides. As an act of good faith
by the British government and in recognition of the ceasefire which was
holding on both sides of the sectarian conflict, it was agreed that some long-
term prisoners should be released early. This was on the understanding that
they should renounce violence. In other words they were set free ‘on licence’.
Although both Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries benefited from the
scheme (which also applied to prisoners in the Irish Republic), many Unionists
opposed this part of the agreement, especially when some of the released men
committed crimes for which they were re-arrested. The policy was, however,
retained as it was seen as an important factor in maintaining a lasting peace.
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Demilitarisation
The hard-line Republican movement saw the presence of large numbers of
British troops, together with road blocks, watch towers and armed bases, as
an occupying army. By 1998, too, the need for such a tight security system,
had diminished. There was, therefore, added to the agreement a loose
commitment to troop reductions.
In the event, largely symbolic gestures were made towards de-militarisation.
A few army bases were closed and troops were less evident on the streets,
being confined mainly to barracks in case hostilities broke out. Three years
after the agreement was signed, little progress had been made. Indeed, by the
summer of 2001, when there was an increase in sectarian violence, the need
for the retention of a large British force remained undiminished.
Weapons decommissioning
This issue remained the central feature of the search for a lasting peace. The
Good Friday Agreement quoted the following resolution from the talks which
preceded it:
the resolution of the decommissioning issue is an indispensable part of the process
of negotiation.
In order to deal with the process a commission was set up (under General John
de Chastelaine) which would organise and verify the removal of weapons. In
addition the agreement set a deadline for decommissioning at two years after
its ratification by referendum. In the event, this date passed without a
solution, so the problem rumbled on.
One of the difficulties with decommissioning is that the agreement did not
define it precisely. In the months and years which followed, indeed, it became
increasingly apparent that the Unionists and the Nationalists defined it in
different ways. Unionists wanted to see the final destruction of all weapons
held by terrorist organisations. This was to be a clear public gesture that
violence was to be renounced for good. The Republican Nationalists, specifi-
cally Sinn Fein and the IRA, refused to accept such a tight definition. To them
decommissioning meant ‘taking weapons out of use’. They were prepared to
accept public demonstrations of this concession, but stopped short of actual
weapons destruction.
But this dispute was not just a question of words and definitions. Weapons
decommissioning had powerful symbolic significance for both sides. To the IRA
it potentially meant surrender to the Loyalists and to the British government.
Though they were prepared to hold a cease-fire and to demonstrate that weapons
were out of use, they were not ready to accept their destruction which would
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suggest capitulation and would create a permanent situation. The Unionists, on
the other hand, wanted a firm assurance that the IRA had renounced violence for
good. The mainstream Unionists added that they were not prepared to sit down
permanently in government with Sinn Fein, as long as they were backed by a
military force. They feared that, if a political conflict were to appear, the Repub-
licans could resort to violence again if the weapons were still in existence. The
hard-line Unionists, such as Paisley’s DUP went further, seeing decommissioning
as a sign of defeat, ironically, the same view as that of the IRA.
In August 2001, as the deadline for decommissioning was running out, the
IRA and the de Chastelaine commission announced an agreement to put
weapons out of use once and for all (still stopping short of full destruction).
However, in the absence of details and a timetable of action, the Unionists
rejected the plan and the decommissioning process was back almost at square
one. Sinn Fein continued to protest that they did not control the IRA and could
therefore not be blamed for slow progress on the issue. But this was not
enough for the Unionists who remained cautious and suspicious.
Standing, as it does, at the centre of Unionist concerns, decommissioning
remains the main stumbling block to final agreement. It cannot guarantee
peace as there will always be extreme splinter groups of both Loyalists and
Republicans, but a successful agreement would lead to the opportunity for a
lasting political settlement. Sinn Fein would no longer be seen as a front for
terrorists and the withdrawal of a large British military presence may become
a possibility. Peaceful politics might take centre stage at last.
WHY THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT 
WAS POSSIBLE
If we wish to answer this question we need first to consider why previous
attempts at a settlement failed. The following problems may be included.
1 They were seen as a token attempt at power sharing, but they were perceived
as little more than devices to give the Catholic community some represen-
tation, but not equal status. The power-sharing assemblies and executives
which had existed before 1998 still allowed the Unionists to dominate the
political system.
2 There was a lack of trust, mostly among Republicans, of the motives of the
British government. Most negotiations had taken place in secret so that suspi-
cions were inevitably aroused that private deals had been made by ministers
and other officials.
3 There had never been sufficient political will among Northern Ireland
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politicians to reach a long-term agreement. The cumulative effect of atrocities
played its part as the population, weary of continual grief and disruption, put
pressure on elected representatives to end the violence.
4 The motives of the government of the Irish Republic were suspected by the
Loyalist community. Interference by the Republic was always seen as an
attempt to persuade Britain to give up the province to them.
5 Perhaps above all, previous attempts at settlement had taken place within the
context of continued violence. Politicians on both sides of the divide felt that any
political progress was likely to be undermined by the terrorists. Furthermore,
whenever there was a political deadlock, the paramilitary wings of the parties
simply chose to commit acts of violence in pursuit of their aims.
The preparation for the Good Friday Agreement was designed to overcome
most of these problems. The key elements were as follows:
 The Downing Street declaration, which stated that Britain was neutral in
its attitude to Northern Ireland sovereignty, allayed the suspicions of the
Republicans.
 The ceasefire meant that negotiations could take place in good faith and
without pressure from terrorists.
 The intervention of representatives of the USA was important. The
involvement of President Clinton and Senator George Mitchell both
inspired the people of the province to search for peace and provided
genuinely neutral go-betweens who could move the peace process
forward. Senator Mitchell, indeed, was the key figure in bringing Repub-
lican and Unionist politicians together.
 The declaration that Sinn Fein was willing to renounce the use of violence
was a key development.
 The statesmanship of leading politicians, notably David Trimble for the
Unionists, John Hume for the SDLP and Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein must
receive credit. These men showed a willingness to make some concessions
and so find common ground. In the past, sectarian politicians had sought
outright victory, but Trimble, Hume and Adams understood that any final
settlement would need a consensus. Similarly, British ministers, such as
Patrick Mayhew, Mo Mowlem and Peter Mandelson, showed greater vision
than in the past in understanding the difficulties of Republican and
Unionist politicians.
HOW SUCCESSFUL HAS THE AGREEMENT BEEN?
Events in Northern Ireland move quickly. Any assessment of the Good Friday
Agreement must, therefore, be very tentative. But some assessment can be made.
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Successes
The assembly and the executive have survived for longer than any of their
predecessors since 1972. This is, in itself, an achievement. The longer political
institutions can survive, the more chance there is of a lasting peace. Apart from
sporadic outbreaks of rioting and some atrocities by extreme groups who do
not support the agreement, the ceasefire has also held.
The institutions of devolved government also seem to have worked well. It
was certainly a triumph that the foot and mouth epidemic which decimated
farming in the rest of Britain was dealt with decisively in the province. The
committees of the assembly have made a great deal of progress in making the
Civil Service more accountable and in creating more open government. There
are also signs that the health and education services are being sensitively run.
The education service, already felt to be stronger than its English counterpart,
abolished school league tables and is moving further towards independence.
In general, therefore, the ideal that devolved government should create a ‘real’
and independent sense of regional government may be succeeding.
Public support for the institutions is also high. Opinion polls show a good deal
of confidence being expressed on a non-sectarian basis. The fact that Unionists
and Republican politicians, once implacable enemies, have been able to sit
together in the assembly and the executive does inspire confidence and may
help to reduce tension.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, devolved government is providing
lasting protection of human rights and the maintenance of equality. The
agreement itself built into Northern Irish politics safeguards which ensured
that executive action could never be seen to be sectarian in nature. The
assembly cannot pass sectarian legislation and the cross-party committees
keep a careful watch over institutions to ensure that they do not fall into the
pre-1968 situation when they were unionist dominated.
Problems
The agreement has certainly not removed the threat of sectarian violence.
There have been regular outbreaks of rioting, the worst example of which
were the attacks on young Catholic children being taken to school in the
Ardoyne district of Belfast. There have also been punishment beatings by
paramilitaries, a few sectarian assassinations and attacks on security forces.
By the autumn of 2001 the problem of decommissioning had still not been
solved. Clearly the IRA did not have sufficient faith in the long-term success of
the political process to give up weapons permanently. Until the issue of armed
terrorism is solved it seems unlikely that the Good Friday Agreement, or any
other such settlement, will succeed in the long run.
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Though the agreement has seen politicians from across the sectarian divide
finally meeting openly, its real test is whether it can start to bring the commu-
nities together and prevent the polarisation of politics which has occurred in
recent decades. By 2001 there was little sign of this. As we have seen, a
constant level of violence remains. The Orange Order marches in the summer
also continue to cause tension. More worryingly, however, the 2001 general
election saw advances made by the two main extremist parties, the Democ-
ratic Unionists (who are still refusing to take part in the Northern Ireland
executive) and Sinn Fein. They won more votes and seats at Westminster than
in 1997, an indication that voters were losing faith in the moderate, pro-
agreement parties such as the UUP and the SDLP. Hopes that progress could
be made in such areas as reform of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and
reduction of troop levels have been dashed and look remote with the two
communities seeming to move further apart.
SUMMARY – THE FUTURE 
FOR NORTHERN IRELAND
At the end of 2002, as this book is written, the future remains uncertain as it
has done for over thirty years. It is impossible to predict what will happen over
the course of the next few years. A number of possible scenarios do, however,
present themselves.
1 The most optimistic view is that the people of the province will become weary
of the conflict and pressure will build up on all sides to make the Good Friday
Agreement and devolved government work. This must, it seems, depend on a
resolution of some kind of compromise on weapons decommissioning and on
a reduction in sectarian tensions. In the very long term this must involve
reconciliation between the two communities and an effective programme of
education so that future generations will not inherit the entrenched views of
their parents and grandparents.
2 More realistically it may be that devolved government will survive, but that
sectarian tension and violence will continue to affect the province. In such
circumstances it seems unlikely that Northern Ireland government will be
effective. Devolution may become something of a symbolic gesture. In such
circumstances there may also be periodic suspensions of the assembly and the
executive. There had already been two suspensions by 2001 and direct rule
may certainly have to be imposed again.
3 The most pessimistic scenario is that the remaining problems will not be
resolved in time to save devolved government. Direct rule may be imposed
and tight security regulations maintained. In such a case violence will
Northern Ireland 149
continue. In the long run it seems likely that continued conflict will result in
economic decline and large-scale emigration from the province (to Ireland or
mainland Britain).
4 Finally we can consider a longer-term vision. This concerns the development
of closer integration in Europe. The issue of sovereignty has always been one
of Northern Ireland’s main problems. Republicans challenge British sover-
eignty, while Loyalists will not accept any diluting of British political authority.
As long as the majority of the people wish to be considered British, there will
always be some conflict (either violent or political) with the Catholic minority.
A more closely integrated European Union, however, will reduce the impor-
tance of national sovereignty.
In such circumstances Northern Ireland will become a European region and
British rule will become a less important issue. There will always be a cultural
division between Protestant and Catholic communities, but there will be some
blurring of sovereignty between Ireland, Britain, Northern Ireland and the EU
itself. Furthermore, regional aid is increasing. Northern Ireland may well enjoy
a similar economic renaissance to that of the Irish Republic, underpinned by
EU subsidies. Since some of the ‘troubles’ have their origins in economic depri-
vation, growing prosperity can only ameliorate sectarian conflict.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 Explain the nature of the sectarian divide in Northern Ireland.
2 To what extent can the Good Friday Agreement be considered a
success?
3 Why did the Good Friday Agreement apparently succeed where
previous attempts to achieve peace had failed?
4 What problems remain to be solved in Northern Ireland following the implementation of
the Good Friday Agreement?
5 What are the main distinctive features of the devolution settlement in Northern Ireland?
Why did it differ so much from devolution in Scotland and Wales?
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CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM BEFORE 1997
Attitudes to reform
The attitude of most governments towards constitutional reform during the
twentieth century has been essentially conservative. This has, of course, partly
been the result of the dominance of the Conservative party for most of that
century. But when Liberals or the Labour party have been decisively in power
there have always been other policy issues which have tended to dominate.
There are few votes in successful constitutional reform so it has often been
squeezed off the political agenda. At the same time Liberals and Socialists in
Britain have rarely been able to agree among themselves on what reforms are
desirable. So the Conservatives have had a relatively clear field in the consti-
tutional arena. The dominant ‘conservative’ view can be described in the
following terms:
 There has been a reluctance to make changes to the constitution on the
grounds that this is likely to be disruptive to the political process.
 Change has largely been the result of a breakdown of the system, rather
than from any conscious policy decisions. For example, the powers of the
House of Lords were reduced as a result of the Liberal government budget
crisis in 1909, Ireland was partitioned in 1921 in order to avoid a civil war,
the institution of life peers was developed in 1958 to head off growing
demands for abolition of the House of Lords. In all these cases, reform was
forced on government.
11Constitutional reform
 Review of constitutional reform before 1997
 Analysis of the reasons behind the Labour reform plan of 1997
 Descriptions of the main reforms
 Analysis of the reforms
 Prospects for future reforms
 It has always been assumed that the uncodified, flexible nature of the
British constitution has allowed it to adapt naturally to the need for
change. So, for example, the non-political role of the monarchy has
gradually evolved for over a century. Similarly, parliament has rarely
experienced any dramatic changes to its powers and procedures, but has
adapted itself to the nature of modern government cautiously and
gradually.
Reform before 1997
The main changes in Britain’s constitutional arrangements have consisted of
the severance of political links with the Republic of Ireland and the disman-
tling of the Empire, mostly after World War II. Internal reform, on the other
hand, has been relatively modest. Three areas of internal change are identified
below.
Without any legislation the political role of the monarchy has been gradually
eroded. This process has its origins in the eighteenth century, of course, but it
has been the last hundred years that have seen its final demise. It is now
accepted that the monarch plays no active part in policy making, even in times
of war, and will only become involved in government formation if all other
systems have failed. Outright republicanism is weak in Britain so there have
been only limited calls for abolition. But it is true that the monarchy has little
more than a symbolic role in Britain today.
The role of the House of Lords has been gradually eroded after 1911. Its
delaying power was set at two years in 1911 and reduced to one year in 1949.
It was not allowed to interfere in the financial affairs of government after the
1911 Parliament Act. In the 1940s the ‘Salisbury Convention’ was developed
– a classic example of how the constitution has evolved without legislation.
The convention (developed by a Conservative peer after whom it was named)
suggests that the House of Lords cannot challenge a manifesto commitment of
the elected government. In essence the Convention accepts that the unelected
Lords has a much weaker degree of political authority than the elected
Commons. The decline in the influence of both the House of Lords and the
monarchy represented important examples of how traditional authority has
been replaced by elective authority.
Particularly after 1979 there was been a steady ‘drift’ of power away from local
government towards the centre. This has been achieved by the transferring of
powers and responsibilities. There has also been a huge increase in the amount
of political or financial control which central government exercises over local
authorities. The fact that Britain has no codified and superior constitution has
meant that the process has occurred gradually, through individual pieces of
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legislation. No individual statute caused a major change, but the accumulated
effect has caused a significant change in the distribution of power.
The sum total of these changes is not very great. When we think of how much
change there has been in the constitutions of other European powers during
the twentieth century, we realise how conservative Britain has been over the
period. This comparison can be viewed in two ways: either it is symptomatic
of the deep-seated conservatism of the British political establishment which
has contributed to Britain’s relative economic decline, or it is a powerful
demonstration of stability.
LABOUR’S AGENDA IN 1997
Why Labour came to support radical 
constitutional reform
Significant constitutional reform was a key element in the New Labour
‘project’ which was developed by Neil Kinnock, John Smith and Tony Blair in
the 1990s. The party, which had been transformed by the three leaders and
their allies, was essentially a ‘modernising’ force. It was committed to
reforming economic policy making, industry, foreign and defence policy and
the public services. Partly for its own sake and partly to pave the way for
pushing through reforms, it was seen as necessary to make significant consti-
tutional reforms. The following three factors made a constitutional reform
programme possible and desirable when Labour took power in 1997.
1 The Labour party has always wished to promote constitutional reform but has
rarely had sufficient political control to be able to do so. As a party, Labour has
always sought to promote popular democracy, equal rights and the reduction
of traditional ‘establishment’ powers. By the mid-1990s it was clear that the
party was going to win the next general election comfortably and, what is
more, had the prospect of at least two consecutive terms in office. Reasonably
secure in this knowledge, the party could include constitutional change in its
political programme.
2 Despite the prospect of power, the Labour party had experienced two long
periods of Conservative government – 1951–64 and 1979–97 – during which
they had felt totally excluded from influence. The constitutional reforms
proposed were, therefore, partly designed to prevent a situation where one party
would be able to dominate the political agenda so completely. It is, of course,
ironic that Labour’s hold on power had become, by the end of the century, so
secure that the constitutional changes it proposed could be directed against
themselves when it had been developed to break Conservative hegemony.
3 There was clearly considerable public support for reform. Public opinion
polls had long since indicated that a majority would be in favour of change,
but this support had always been considered ‘soft’. In other words it was not
high on anybody’s list of concerns. By the mid-1990s, however, it was
becoming obvious that demands for reform were hardening. This was
demonstrated by growing support for the Liberal Democrats, who strongly
advocated reform, for campaign groups such as Charter 88 and for Scottish
and Welsh Nationalists.
The principles of Labour’s reform
We can divide Labour’s reform programme into the following processes.
● Democratisation. Too much of the British political system was seen as undemo-
cratic. The prime targets were the unelected House of Lords, and the notori-
ously unrepresentative electoral system.
● Decentralisation. As we have seen above, Labour had been scarred by the
experience of watching powerlessly as successive Conservative administra-
tions gathered increasing amounts of power into the centre. Part of the
programme was, therefore, designed to disperse power away from central
government to the regions and localities.
● Restoration of rights. During the 1980s there had been consistent fears that the
rights of citizens in Britain had been consistently eroded. In fact the process
could be traced back to earlier periods, but Labour concentrated on what had
occurred under the Conservatives. In addition, Labour wished to bring Britain
more into line with European practice in constitutional matters. They
therefore proposed the incorporation of the European Convention on Human
Rights into British law. In addition a Freedom of Information Act was seen as
essential.
● Modernisation. As we have seen above, the Conservative party had done much
to modernise the Civil Service during the 1980s and 1990s. The Labour party
wished to extend this programme further, but also turned their attention to
parliament. Changes in the composition of the House of Lords were a key
element in this, but there were also hopes that reform of the House of
Commons to make it more efficient and effective could be undertaken.
We can now see how extensive the Labour proposals were in 1997. Of course,
experience tells us that the new government fell some way short of imple-
menting the whole plan. However, in order to evaluate the process, it is
important to be able to compare Labour’s original aspirations with its subse-
quent actions. These can now be considered in more detail.
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DEVOLUTION
The details of the devolution settlement are described in a separate chapter.
Labour had attempted to introduce devolution in the late 1970s but had been
foiled by a combination of two factors. Firstly, the government of the day did
not have a parliamentary majority and so could not push the legislation
through. Secondly, forced to rely on referendum approval, with more than a
simple majority in favour required, the government could not summon
enough support in either Scotland or Wales for the proposals. The Welsh voted
decisively against. The Scots did vote yes, but the turnout and majority were
too low to satisfy parliament.
By 1997, however, the political tide had turned decisively in favour of
devolution. Labour had a huge majority and so had a clear field. The Scots
were very much in favour and voted for devolution in 1997 by a large margin.
Support was lukewarm in Wales, but a narrow referendum vote in favour was
enough to persuade the new government to go ahead.
Though falling well short of the aspirations of Scots and Welsh Nationalists
(who want either full independence or at least a federal arrangement with
extensive sovereignty transferred from London) devolution represents a huge
shift in power away from London. The Scottish parliament became a centre of
power away from London which had not been seen in Britain since it had last
been abolished in 1707. The Welsh, meanwhile, had never had a true
government of their own, so this was a unique political development for them.
Devolution of power to Northern Ireland was part of the wider Good Friday
Agreement of 1998. It was essential for the possibilities of a long-term
peaceful settlement there. All the sectarian groups needed some political
representation and this was provided. At the same time it was important for
the British government to withdraw from most Northern Ireland affairs, as it
had come to be seen as a mistrusted element in the sectarian conflict.
THE HOUSE OF LORDS
The jewel in New Labour’s constitutional crown was undoubtedly devolution.
However, the introduction of a codified set of rights and reform of the House
of Lords followed close behind. Over many years Labour governments had
suffered from obstruction from a house which had always had an in-built
Conservative majority. In the past, attempts at abolition and reform had failed
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so it was not surprising that, when the party did have a decisive majority and
time to spare, it should decide to take the opportunity while the going was
good. Reform has occurred in two stages.
Stage 1
Immediately after taking office the Labour government took steps to remove
the voting rights of hereditary peers. These eight hundred or so members of
the nobility were either permanent absentees or were invariably committed to
the Conservative cause. The number of Labour or Liberal Democrat hereditary
peers was extremely limited. The party had also been severely affected by an
incident in 1988 which was to spell the ultimate demise of the political role of
the hereditary peerage. The incident entered the collective memory of the
Labour party so that, when they returned to power, it was hardly surprising
that it should occupy their immediate attention.
In 1988 Margaret Thatcher’s government was trying to force through legis-
lation to introduce the poll tax into local government. The poll tax was
extremely controversial, being seen in many quarters as unfair as it was not
based on ability to pay. The whips forced the Bill through the House of
Commons with relatively little difficulty. The Lords, on the other hand, were
threatening to thwart the government’s will. It was at this stage that the
government, with its back to the wall, decided to persuade large numbers of
hereditary peers to come to London to vote through the new tax. Many of
these peers – sometimes known as ‘backwoodsmen’ – never normally voted.
Some did not even know where to go to vote. However, the plan worked and
the legislation was passed. Labour, as we have said, never forgot the incident.
The days of the hereditary peerage were numbered, though no one knew it at
the time.
At first the legislation to remove the voting rights of hereditary peers was held
up. Not surprisingly the large Conservative majority there were unhappy with
the proposals. Many meetings were held behind closed doors to find a
compromise. Conservative leader, William Hague, feared that the obstruction
would lead Labour to even more radical reform. He therefore persuaded his
colleagues in the Lords to accept a limited reform. Ninety-two hereditary peers
– less than an eighth of the total – were to remain on a temporary basis. These
peers were to be elected by the rest of the hereditaries. They were still a
Conservative majority, but the government now had the opportunity to redress
the political balance by creating many new Labour-supporting life peers.
It was always asserted that this was only the first stage of reform. The next
stage was initiated with the appointment of a commission to consider a long-
term solution. By appointing a Conservative peer – Lord Wakeham – Tony Blair
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signalled the fact that he did not expect any radical change. Wakeham obliged
with a moderate report. Its main principles were as follows:
 The powers of the House of Lords were to remain substantially unchanged.
It was to be clearly subordinate to the House of Commons.
 A minority – possibly as few as 20 per cent – was to be elected by propor-
tional representation on a regional basis.
 There were to be no more hereditary peers in the House.
 The rest of the House was to be appointed.
 An independent appointments commission would ensure that appropriate
people were appointed and to prevent the excessive use of political
patronage by party leaders.
 The political balance of the house would prevent domination by any one
party. Independent ‘crossbenchers’ would hold the balance of power.
Stage 2
After a second decisive election victory in 2001, the Labour government was
encouraged to complete its reforms. Its proposals, however, proved to be more
controversial than the government had expected. The plan unveiled in late
2001 was as follows:
1 20 per cent of the chamber would be elected by proportional represen-
tation.
2 20 per cent would be independent peers, appointed by the appointments
commission. These would be crossbenchers without political allegiance.
3 60 per cent would be appointed through party patronage.
4 The appointments commission would ensure that nominations were people
of ‘suitable character’. They would also ensure a political balance so that
party nominations would be apportioned in proportion to their strengths in
the House of Commons. Overall, the balance would be maintained so that
no single party would have an overall majority.
5 The appointments commission was to appoint representatives of religious
and ethnic groups in society.
6 The powers of the Lords would remain largely unchanged.
A storm of protest from all sides greeted the plans. In general terms, the
counter-proposals looked like this:
 Liberal Democrats: A fully elected chamber.
 Conservatives: 80 per cent elected and the rest appointed by parties.
 Charter 88 and other constitutional reform groups: Fully elected.
 Substantial Labour backbench opinion: Variations between 50 per cent and
fully elected.
So the government’s policy had few friends. Even the cabinet was undecided
about how to proceed. The proposals were therefore put on the back burner.
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By autumn 2002, no further progress on reform had been made. Two alterna-
tives were envisaged. One was a shelving of further reform. The other was a
revised plan to meet some of the demands of the backbenchers.
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
New Labour also pledged to make reforms to the House of Commons in order
to modernise it. In the event, however, this proved to be one area of reform
which appeared to be stillborn. This was despite widespread and growing
concern that the Commons was becoming, at best, ineffective and, at worst,
impotent and irrelevant. It was in need of streamlining certainly, though
whether it needed more power was problematic.
A modernisation committee was set up early in Labour’s administration, but it
has had little effect. A few cosmetic changes have been made, including the
reduction of Prime Minister’s question time from two short sessions to one
longer one. The facilities for MPs have been improved with a new office block
and there are increased allowances for secretarial and research backing. But
nothing substantial has altered. Indeed, after 1997, most commentators saw
the Commons as declining in importance, especially as Labour won two
thumping majorities in succession.
Robin Cook, who took over as Leader of the House in 2001, has shown some
willingness to promote change, but experience of the past suggests that any of
his proposals are unlikely to be given much prominence by the government.
The one major change which Cook has made was, in fact, forced on him by his
own backbenchers. They insisted that membership of the departmental select
committees should be placed in the hands of MPs rather than the party whips.
In the long term this may prove to be a significant reform, but as long as the
government has a large majority, the balance of power is likely to remain
firmly with the executive.
Ironically, it has been the Conservatives who have made most of the running
on Commons reform. It was Margaret Thatcher herself who had backed the
creation of departmental select committees in 1979, perhaps the most
important parliamentary development of the twentieth century. These
committees certainly improved the Commons’ ability to call ministers to
account and are still the main way in which our representatives are able to
scrutinise the work of government. In fields such as foreign policy, defence
spending, health administration and police matters they have been especially
effective in throwing extra light on official or unofficial policies.
More recently the Norton Committee, chaired by a Conservative peer, has led
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the calls for further changes. His report, published in 2000, contained many
recommendations, the most important of which included:
 the restoration of two Prime Minister’s question times;
 longer ministerial question time sessions with more in-depth questions;
 more opportunities for backbench MPs to raise issues;
 debates should have shorter speeches so that more members can partic-
ipate;
 more research resources available for the Opposition parties;
 more research facilities for select committees;
 the MPs should control their own select committees rather than the party
whips;
 standing committees which consider legislation should have more time to
use outside witnesses, along the model of the US Congress;
 more resources for the Commons to consider EU legislation;
 select Committee chairs to be paid a minister’s salary so that there is an
alternative career option for MPs to being a minister. This would break
much of the influence of the prime minister and the whips.
These recommendations represent something of a consensus on how the
Commons’ work could be made more effective. However, Blair’s government
shows no enthusiasm for them, especially as it had been too busy struggling
with a rebellious House of Lords to worry about the Commons. We may also
reflect on the comments of former Cabinet secretary Lord Butler in a 2001
lecture to the Politics Association. He suggests that only the reform of the
electoral system could bring about any truly meaningful change in the role
and influence of the Commons.
HUMAN RIGHTS
A brief description of the events surrounding the introduction of the Human
Rights Act needs to be included here.
Why the Human Rights Act was proposed
A number of factors led the Labour party to incorporate the European
Convention on Human Rights into British law. These were:
 A general desire to bring the British constitution into line with the rest of
Europe, all of whose states have special arrangements to protect individual
rights.
 The increase in the powers of the police and the courts which had occurred
in the 1980s and 1990s were now seen as a major threat to our rights.
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 The British government had been brought before the European Court of
Human Rights (which seeks to enforce the Convention) over fifty times
since 1966 and had lost most of the cases. Although the decisions of the
court are not legally binding, these cases had been an embarrassment to
the government.
 New Labour stressed the idea of active citizenship. This concept included
the principle that citizens have responsibilities to their communities and to
the country as a whole. In return for these responsibilities it was believed
that rights should be better understood and safeguarded.
 It was part of the devolution settlements that the Welsh and Northern
Ireland assemblies and the Scottish Parliament should be bound by the
Convention. This was designed to reassure the citizens of these nations
that devolution would not threaten their rights.
So it was that the Human Rights Act made the European Convention part of
British law in 2000.
How the Human Rights Act works
The Human Rights Act states that the European Convention on Human Rights
is binding on virtually all public bodies in virtually all circumstances.
Furthermore, it can be enforced by any British court of law. In essence,
therefore, the following individuals and bodies are bound by the Act:
 the Welsh, Scottish and Northern Ireland political systems in their entirety;
 local authorities;
 government ministers, civil servants and their departments;
 all government executive agencies;
 all quangos (non-government public bodies);
 any other organisation engaged in ‘public business’ – this includes the
media, all schools and colleges, charities etc.
Any regulation or action by any of these bodies can be scrutinised in a court
of law and may be declared unlawful. This will result in the action being
cancelled and may result in compensation.
The main exception to this law concerns parliamentary legislation. In order to
preserve the constitutional principle of parliamentary sovereignty, the
Convention cannot be considered superior to parliament. A minister who
introduces proposed legislation in parliament must make a declaration. This
declaration will state whether the government believes the proposal to be
either compatible or incompatible with the Convention. If it is thought to be
incompatible the fact will be taken into consideration when parliament
debates the Bill. However, if a Bill received parliamentary approval it will be
enforced by the courts.
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The European Court of Human Rights may still hear appeals against UK
national legislation and may declare an Act to be in breach of the Convention,
but its judgments are still not binding in Britain.
The Human Rights Act in context
In some senses the Act can be considered to be an extremely radical example
of constitutional reform. Indeed some commentators have suggested that it is
the most important development since the Great Reform Act of 1832 when
parliament began the road to democratisation.
Certainly it is the first example of the codification of rights in British history.
What is familiar to most Europeans and all Americans – a clear statement of
enforceable individual rights – has not been seen here since Magna Carta in
1215. It also represents a huge advance in the protection of individuals against
the power of the state.
On the other hand, critics suggest that the Human Rights Act does not go
far enough. By preserving parliamentary sovereignty and making parlia-
mentary legislation an exception to its jurisdiction, the Act fails to deal with a
fundamental problem in the British constitution. That is the enormous power
of central government and its almost complete control over parliament. Had
the Human Rights Act been binding on parliamentary legislation it would
have represented a major check on governmental power. But it stopped short
of this.
ELECTORAL REFORM
Background
Both the Labour and Liberal (now Liberal Democrat) parties have long since
espoused the cause of electoral reform in the UK. The Liberal (Democrats)
have been more consistent in their support and, by the 1960s, it was firmly at
the centre of their political beliefs. The Labour party’s interest, on the other
hand, has ebbed and flowed.
Cynics suggest that the interest of both these parties has been fundamentally
self-motivated. The decline of Liberalism after the 1920s meant that they
could not hope to recover their strong position under the first-past-the-post
system. Once the party had lost most of its seats in the House of Commons, a
vote for them was seen as wasted. Furthermore, the Liberal (Democrats) have
always had a very dispersed support. The lack of any concentrations of voting
power has also meant that the traditional electoral system works against
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them. With a more proportional system, the party believed that it could
reverse its fortunes and challenge for at least a share of power again.
Similarly, Labour has watched while the electoral system has tended to
exaggerate the support for the Conservatives. It has tended in the past to
convert votes into parliamentary seats more generously for the Conservatives
than for Labour. Three election defeats in a row from 1951 to 1964 and an
even longer period in opposition from 1979 to 1997 both resulted in renewed
interest in electoral reform within the Labour party. Certainly after their 1992
defeat many in the Labour party began to believe they might never win again
under the first-past-the-post system.
Both parties have refuted these criticisms, of course, arguing that their support
for electoral reform is, in fact, principled. In other words, they argue that first-
past-the-post is unfair, undemocratic and unrepresentative. The Liberal
democrats add that it results in governments which have large parliamentary
majorities and are therefore able to dominate the policy agenda excessively. It
also means that the House of Commons fails to make government properly
accountable.
Two groups have maintained implacable opposition to electoral reform. These
have been the Conservative party and most elements of the traditional left
wing of the Labour party. The Conservatives take a pragmatic view. First-past-
the-post guarantees a two party system and governments with decisive parlia-
mentary majorities. This means stability and certainty, key aspects of Conser-
vative philosophy. Traditional sections of the Labour party have set great store
by the power of the state. This power, they have argued, has been essential to
make the necessary reforms to create social justice. A multi-party system,
which would result from electoral reform, would weaken state power and so
jeopardise any future socialist programmes.
New Labour and electoral reform
In truth, the Labour party which prepared itself for power in the 1990s, was
completely split on the issue of electoral reform. From a pragmatic, self-inter-
ested point of view, a change looked attractive. The dominance of the Conser-
vative party since 1951 showed no signs of disappearing, especially after their
‘against-all-odds’ victory at the 1992 general election. If this hegemony could
not be broken by political means, argued many in Labour, perhaps electoral
reform would do the trick. But this was not the only factor.
As we have seen, New Labour was committed to modernising elements of the
British constitution. The old electoral system was beginning to look out-of-
date, whatever the consequences of reform. There were powerful voices in the
party who suggested that Britain had become fundamentally undemocratic.
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The doubts within Labour were demonstrated by the party’s indecisive
approach to possible reform. In Opposition they had commissioned Lord Plant
to recommend a course of action. The Plant Committee did opt, albeit
unenthusiastically, for reform, suggesting something like the German
Additional Member System as an alternative. Still unconvinced, Tony Blair
offered the electorate a referendum on the issue if Labour won power in 1997.
Labour duly won, but no referendum was forthcoming. Instead another
Commission was appointed, this time under Liberal Democrat Lord Jenkins.
Jenkins reported in 1998. He strongly advocated a more radical system than
Plant had done. This was known as AV plus (alternative vote). Its basic
operation is described below. The party leadership demonstrated little enthu-
siasm for the Jenkins proposals and they have effectively been shelved. Labour
continued to delay and, having won again in 2001, were far from ready to
consult the electorate. However, this did not mean that electoral reform was a
dead issue. On the contrary, various forms of proportional representation were
steadily creeping into the political system.
Electoral reform since 1997
While little progress has been made by the electoral reform movement in
terms of general elections, there has been great progress in other forms of
election. Indeed, Britain since 1997 has resembled a great experiment in how
different electoral systems can work. The descriptions below demonstrate how
electoral reform has progressed.
Northern Ireland (1999)
● System. Single Transferable Vote (STV).
● Operation. Multi-member constituencies in elections for the Northern Ireland
Assembly and in local government. There are several seats in each
constituency (normally four). Parties may put up any number of candidates up
to the number of seats available. Voters may vote for all candidates, from any
party, in any order of preference. First preferences count more, but all prefer-
ences may be relevant. An electoral ‘quota’ is calculated which is the minimum
votes a candidate needs to be elected. The quota is roughly the number of
votes cast divided by seats available, but not exactly. The first four (if that is
the number of seats) to achieve the quota are elected. First preference votes
are counted first and a candidate achieving the quota is elected automatically.
Very few can do this, so second and subsequent preference votes are progres-
sively added until enough candidates have achieved the quota.
● Effect. This is a highly proportional system. Party representation is very close
to the proportion of votes cast for each. Small parties do well and a number of
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independents have won seats. It also maximises voter choice, allowing them
to show all their preferences and to discriminate between candidates of the
same party.
● Why used. It was vital in a very divided society, as Northern Ireland is, to
reflect the many different groups in the assembly. So a highly proportional
system was needed. Fourteen different parties or independents were elected
in a small assembly.
Scottish Parliament (1999), Welsh Assembly (1999),
Greater London Assembly (2000)
● System. Additional member system (AMS).
● Operation. A mixed or hybrid system. About two-thirds of the seats are elected
by the first-past-the-post system. However, each voter has a second vote. This
is for a party. About one-third of the seats (known as ‘top-up seats’), are elected
from a list of candidates put up by the parties. These seats are awarded
according to the proportion of these second votes won by each party. However
this proportion is adjusted. Parties which do well on the constituency votes will
have their list proportion adjusted downwards. Conversely, those who do
poorly in constituencies will win more than the normal proportion of seats on
their list. In this way small parties receive a boost from the top-up list system.
● Effect. The system has meant that Labour still dominates. However, in all
three places where it has been used, no party has won an overall majority. In
Scotland and Wales, Labour has had to go into coalition with the Liberal
Democrats. In the Greater London Assembly, no party dominates and there are
signs of political inertia as a result. The Conservatives, who lost all their parlia-
mentary seats in Scotland and Wales, won a fair proportion of seats in the
elections to the devolved parliament and assembly. The Welsh and Scottish
Nationalists did well from the system.
● Why used. Had first-past-the-post alone been used in these elections, Labour
would probably have won decisive majorities at the first elections. This would
have defeated part of the object of the exercise – to disperse power away from
Westminster. By introducing an element of proportional representation, the
Nationalists have received fair representation and the systems do appear truly
democratic.
Elections to the European Parliament (1999)
● System. Regional list system (closed list).
● Operation. A very common system in Europe. The country is divided into
large regions. In each region voters are presented with a list of candidates from
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each party. They vote for a list, not an individual candidate. Seats are awarded
off each list in accordance with the proportion of votes cast for each party.
Therefore it is strictly proportional. The system first used (there are proposals
for change in the future) was a ‘closed list’. This means that the party leader-
ships decide which individuals are elected off their lists. An open system
would mean that the voters would choose not only a party list, but would be
able to determine which individuals are elected off their chosen list.
● Effect. There are no constituencies, though members do represent a region in
an indirect way. The result is fully proportional. Small parties do well and the
Green (2 seats) and UK Independence (3 seats) parties won representation. It
was roundly criticised because the closed list system means that voters have no
say in which individuals are elected. This is in the hands of party leaderships.
● Why used. Something of an experiment in an election which was not
considered of great importance at the time. It brought Britain more into line
with most other European states. It also satisfied in some small way, demands
for greater proportional representation. Constituencies were abandoned as
this is not seen as particularly important in the context of the European
Parliament.
The Jenkins Proposal (1998)
● System. AV plus. In full, alternative vote plus list top-up.
● Operation. This is the same as the additional member system described
above. However the constituency MPs would be elected differently. This would
be by the alternative vote system, which is used in Australia. Voters make a
first and second choice on the ballot paper. If a candidate wins at least 50 per
cent of the first choice votes (s)he is elected. If no candidate achieves this, the
second choice votes (i.e. the alternative votes) are added to those who have
come first or second. In this way, one of the two must have an overall majority
of first plus second choice votes.
● Effect. Though never used, it was estimated that this system would most
favour the third party – i.e. the Liberal Democrats. Very small parties would
probably gain few or no seats. It would be difficult, but not impossible for a
major party to win an overall majority. Voter choice would be greatly
enhanced without electing too many small party candidates.
The future of electoral reform
One word can sum up the prospects for future reform. That word is ‘uncertain’.
The Labour leadership has gone cold on the issue as far as general elections
are concerned. There are a number of reasons for this.
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 New Labour in the mid-1990s assumed it would need the co-operation of
the Liberal Democrats to be able to govern effectively. To secure their
future collaboration the party had to be prepared to entertain electoral
reform, the likely price for Liberal Democrat support. This turned out to be
a correct assumption in the case of Scotland and Wales, but not at
Westminster. So Labour duly delivered on electoral reform for the devolved
governments, but has prevaricated in the case of general elections.
 Two enormous election victories in a row both exaggerated Labour’s
success by converting votes into seats generously. In 2001, for example, a
40.7 per cent share of the vote netted 62.6 per cent of the seats. The party
was, therefore, unenthusiastic about changing a system which was now
working to their advantage.
 Conversely, the first-past-the-post system, which used to favour the
Conservatives, was now working against their interests. In the 2001
general election, the Conservatives’ 31.7 per cent share of the voted
yielded only 25.2 per cent of the seats. Furthermore, Conservative repre-
sentation for Wales and Scotland at Westminster had been all but wiped
out. The desire to defeat Conservatism in the long term runs deep in
Labour mythology, so these figures strengthen the resolve not to change
the system which is helping to keep them out.
 Above all, perhaps, the leadership of the party is largely opposed to reform.
No matter how many MPs want to see change, without the support of the
majority of the leadership, especially Tony Blair, their hopes are in vain.
The best hope for reformers is that local government will be next in line for a
new system. The very low turnouts in local elections are causing concern and
some form of proportional representation might go some way to reviving
public interest. Many local authorities are already controlled by two party
coalitions, so a change to PR would not cause major disruption but would give
voters more choice.
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
The lack of any citizens’ right to obtain publicly held information was one of
the features of the British constitution which lagged behind the European and
American experience in the 1990s. The Labour party, supported by the Liberal
Democrats made a firm commitment to introduce such a measure. In 1997,
however, the legislation, when it appeared, proved to be a disappointment to
civil rights campaigners.
There are two strands to freedom of information. The first gives the right to
citizens to see information which is held about them by public bodies. These
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include government, schools, medical bodies and other institutions of the
welfare state. This has been relatively uncontroversial. Indeed, the right to
view records held on computer files had long been established already under
the Data Protection Act. The main disappointment here was that the right
would not come into existence until 2005.
The second strand has caused more problems. This concerns the right to see
documents and reports which are held by government and its agencies. In
other words there was to be a public right to see inside the very workings of
government. The ability to suppress information would be limited, while the
media and parliament would have much greater access to information. In
theory this represents a major move towards more open government. If imple-
mented in full, freedom of information would have virtually ended the British
culture of secrecy in government.
As with electoral reform, the new Labour government proved to be less enthu-
siastic about reform once it was in office than when it had been in opposition.
The legislation which appeared in 2000 was very much a watered down
version of similar measures in operation elsewhere in Europe. The security
services were completely exempt while the rest of government was given a key
concession. The ‘normal’ situation is that governments have to justify any
reason for suppressing information. The British version, however, gives
government the right to conceal information if it feels it might prejudice the
activities of government. In other words, the onus is on the ‘outsider’ to prove
that a document or other information should be released.
Civil rights groups see the new Act as virtually useless. It will not be possible
to reveal more information than before in any field which the government
considers critical. Hopes that there might be a dramatic shift in power over
information towards citizens and the media had been dashed.
LONDON GOVERNMENT
The abolition of the Greater London Council (GLC) in 1986 by Margaret
Thatcher’s government was a bitter experience for the Labour party and it left
a lasting scar. The GLC had been seen as something of a socialist experiment,
especially when it had been controlled by its left-wing leader, Ken Livingstone.
Its programmes of subsidised education, transport, employment schemes and
housing were designed to counterbalance much of the social deprivation
which, it was believed, was largely the result of Thatcherite policies.
When Labour saw the prospect of returning to power, therefore, the restoration
of London government stood high on its political agenda. There was, however,
Constitutional reform 167
no prospect of re-creating such a powerful body as the GLC again. A powerful
lesson had been learned – that it was dangerous to create a political institution
which could rival central government power in its own heartland. Devolution
was all very well, but autonomous government in London was too radical for
New Labour. Instead the Labour party proposed a limited form of government
in the capital.
The most prominent proposal – to elect a mayor for London – was a unique
measure. No part of the British political system had ever seen, throughout
its history, a single elected figure. True, all local authorities had had mayors
as figureheads for centuries, but these were not elected, but appointed by
the rest of the council. The ancient institution of Lord Mayor of London, was
also an appointment, in this case of the traditional livery companies which
control the small ‘City’ of London. The idea of an elected mayor was
imported from the USA and France and represented a complete break with
the past.
The people of London took to the idea with enthusiasm and a 1999 refer-
endum endorsed the measure decisively. Thereafter, however, matters began
to take an unpleasant turn for the Labour government. Firstly, the party’s own
candidate, Frank Dobson, was thoroughly beaten by Ken Livingstone, who had
left the party to stand as a radical independent candidate. Secondly, the
Greater London Assembly (GLA) of 25 elected members, was not, as the party
had hoped, dominated by Labour candidates. In fact, the Conservatives
secured as many seats as Labour – 9 each – so Labour’s influence in London
was extremely weak.
The Labour government had never intended that independent London
government should be strong, but Labour’s setbacks at the first elections
ensured that it should remain weak, however much Ken Livingstone might try
to raise its profile. In effect the GLA has some control over public transport and
traffic management, together with powers to veto major building develop-
ments. It started with a small budget – £4 billion – and little power to raise
any of its own funds. It is not allowed to raise local taxes, for example.
Furthermore there is an almost permanent deadlock between the mayor and
the assembly, which has power to veto many of his proposals.
Thus autonomous London government has proved to be largely cosmetic. The
battle over how the London Underground is to be funded was won decisively
by central government. Their plan to involve the private sector in a
partnership with the state prevailed over Livingstone’s desire to see the service
totally state funded. This demonstrated the inherent weakness of the elected
mayor. So the city has its figurehead, but even a charismatic figure such as Ken
Livingstone cannot overcome the built-in limitations to his role.
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT
As with London, the government’s enthusiasm for reform of local government
in general withered very quickly after Labour was elected to office in 1997.
Cities, towns and districts have been given the opportunity to elect mayors
following a local referendum. However, in the first few years, very few had
held referendums and fewer still had voted in favour of an elected mayor.
Furthermore, if the new mayors suffer the same fate as Livingstone in London,
it will prove to be an ineffective reform.
Similarly, local authorities have been given the option of changing to a
‘cabinet’ system of government. This involves the creation of a central cabinet
of leading councillors from the dominant party or from a coalition who may
take over central control of the council’s work, making key decisions and
setting general policy. This replaces the former system where the work of the
council was divided between a number of functional committees.
As with elected mayors, the take-up for the new cabinet system has been
patchy. Moreover, it is generally acknowledged that this kind of internal
change does not tackle the real problems of local government. These are seen
as threefold:
1 lack of autonomy from central government;
2 lack of accountability to local electorates;
3 largely as a result of the first two problems, very low public interest in local
government and politics.
The Labour government elected in 2001 does promise progress on these
fronts. However, reform of local government remains low on the list of prior-
ities and it seems unlikely that any radical change will be forthcoming for
some time to come.
AN ASSESSMENT OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AFTER 2001
The position with regard to constitutional reform in Britain at the start of the
twenty-first century is certainly paradoxical. On the one hand, the years after
1997 have seen the greatest constitutional changes in Britain probably since
1832 and, some have suggested, even since parliament became effectively
sovereign in 1688. On the other hand, New Labour’s reforms have disap-
pointed many, inside and outside the party.
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The Liberal Democrats and constitutional pressure groups such as Charter 88
and Liberty see reform as only half completed. They point to the following
gaps in the programme needed to make Britain a truly modern democracy.
● The new largely appointed House of Lords falls well short of being properly
accountable, authoritative and representative. Only a fully elected second
chamber, they argue, is acceptable.
● The House of Commons remains ineffective and inefficient. Lack of
government accountability is seen as a fundamental problem and only a
reformed, revitalised House of Commons can provide this.
● The Human Rights Act, though a vital development, has not been given the
political status it needs. The fact that the European Convention cannot
overrule Acts of Parliament, means that rights can still be trampled on by
powerful governments. The anti-terrorism measures which were enacted after
the 11 September terrorist attacks on the USA were seen as a case in point.
● The Freedom of Information Act is too weak and allows government to remain
over-secretive.
● Perhaps most importantly, Labour has failed to deliver electoral reform for
parliamentary or local elections. It is this measure which is most often seen as
the way in which the political system can be fundamentally changed for the
better.
Whether future Labour governments will listen to these criticisms and act
upon them remains to be seen.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 Why did the Labour government institute a programme of
constitutional reform after 1997?
2 What arguments have been advanced in favour of, and against,
electoral reform on the UK?
3 Why has parliamentary reform been so difficult to implement?
4 In what ways have the rights of citizens become more safeguarded since 1997?
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BACKGROUND
Movements which were dedicated to the introduction of greater self-
government for Britain’s national regions can be traced back as far as the
nineteenth century. There has been a Scottish Nationalist movement for over
a century although the Scottish National Party (SNP) did not come into
existence until 1928. Welsh nationalism is a younger phenomenon, but Plaid
Cymru – the Welsh Nationalist party – does date back to 1925. Both these
movements were certainly influenced by the fact that Ireland had been
granted virtually full independence in 1921.
The situation in Northern Ireland has been, quite
clearly, very different. The full circumstances of
nationalist movements are described in a separate
chapter of this book. It should, however, be empha-
sised that Northern Ireland was granted devolved
government in 1921 and enjoyed a large measure
of independence until 1972 when direct rule from
London was established. Since 1972, the idea of
devolution receded in Northern Ireland. The repub-
lican or nationalist communities wanted to see re-unification with the Irish
Republic. The Loyalists or Unionists were more concerned with resisting nation-
alism than with re-establishing devolved government.
12Devolution
 Review of the background to devolution
 Past attempts to introduce devolution
 Analysis of the reasons why devolution was introduced after 1997
 How devolution was implemented in various parts of the UK
 Analysis of different political attitudes towards devolution
 Speculation as to how successful the implementation of devolution has been
independence
If one of the countries of the
UK became independent it
would become a separate
sovereign state, with full
sovereign powers and a
separate independent seat in
EU institutions and the United
Nations. It would also cease to
recognise the authority of the
crown.
The origins of devolution
Much of the background to the devolution movement refers specifically to
Scotland and Wales for reasons described above. Despite the long history
of nationalism, the modern devolution story really begins in the 1970s. In
that decade there was a distinct rise in nationalist
feeling. The most obvious symptom was an
increase in voting for nationalist parties at
elections. The SNP had 1 seat at Westminster 
up to 1970. By the October 1974 election,
however, the party had 11 seats as a result of
winning over 30 per cent of the vote in Scotland.
Plaid Cymru secured 11.5 per cent of the vote in Wales in 1970 but no seats.
However, by October 1974 it had 3 seats and had established itself in Welsh
politics.
The reasons why there was an upsurge in nationalist voting in Britain in the
1970s are complex, but a number of key strands can be identified.
1 The poor performance of the British economy in comparison with most of
Europe and the United States was blamed on inadequate government in
London. In Scotland and Wales there was a feeling that locally based
government could do a better job. It can be noted that there was a simultaneous
rise in voting for the third party – the Liberals – in the 1970s. This was a further
indication of disillusionment with the performance of the two main parties.
2 More specifically, the decline in traditional industries was under way by the late
1960s. These industries, including iron and steel, shipbuilding, coal and
engineering were heavily concentrated in Wales and Scotland. The decline
caused a great deal of resentment against English government. This was
exacerbated by the fact that the south-east was becoming noticeably more
prosperous than the rest of the kingdom. So the gap in economic well-being
between England (especially the south) and Wales and Scotland was widening.
3 During the second half of the 1960s there was a widespread movement,
largely among the young, who had become dissatisfied with political authority
in general. There were demonstrations and riots throughout Europe and the
United States, often led by a coalition of students and workers. Although most
of this revolutionary youth movement demanded such reforms as women’s
rights, racial equality, greater democracy and extensions of civil rights, it also
had the effect of creating new recruits for nationalist movements.
4 The discovery of huge deposits of oil in the North Sea gave an enormous boost
specifically to Scottish nationalism. The oil had two effects. Firstly, it
suggested that Scotland could become a viable independent country if it
enjoyed use of this hugely valuable national resource. Secondly, it was claimed
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devolution
The transfer of powers to
regional assemblies and
executives, but not sovereignty,
i.e. powers can be taken back
by the central authority.
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by Scots that the tax revenues from the oil (in the form of petroleum revenue
tax) were mainly being used to the benefit of England, though most of the oil
was geographically in Scottish waters.
Why devolution?
The nationalists were, on the whole, interested in full independence. In the
1970s this was an impossible aspiration. The union of the United Kingdom
was strong and the people of Scotland and Wales would certainly not have
voted for it. Neither of the main parties could have survived politically had
they advocated independence. But the challenge of nationalism had to be met.
Compromise was, therefore, in the air.
Federalism had to be considered. This would have involved the transfer of large
degrees of actual sovereignty to regional bodies. There were plenty of models
to choose from, including the USA and Germany.
But again this looked to be too close to
independence for most Westminster politicians to
stomach. Granting powers to Scottish and Welsh
Parliaments which could not be ultimately
controlled or taken back by Westminster was
simply too radical to succeed.
The solution was to propose something similar to
the Northern Ireland form of government which
had existed before direct rule was imposed in
1972. This became known as ‘devolution’. A Royal
Commission – the Kilbrandon Commission – had
developed the idea for Scotland in 1973. The word
‘devolution’ was a new one in British politics. It
reflected the idea that power could be transferred
to a region, without ceding actual sovereignty. In other words, the national
governments would be semi-independent, but would always be subject to
oversight from London. Devolution was, therefore, adopted as the compromise.
It was hoped that it would satisfy moderate nationalist opinion, but also be
acceptable to MPs at Westminster.
The failure of devolution in the 1970s
The Labour government which was elected in October 1974 enjoyed a very
narrow parliamentary majority. It was therefore clear that it would need to
rely on the support of smaller parties to survive for long. The small parties in
question were the Liberals, the SNP and Plaid Cymru. All three were pressing
the government for some transfer of powers to Scotland and Wales. The
federalism
The transfer of sovereignty to
regional government. These
powers could not be restored,
i.e. the new arrangement would
be entrenched.
subsidiarity
A principle of the European
Union established at Maastricht
in 1992. It requires that
government should be carried
out at the lowest level possible.
It implies that many powers
should be developed to
regional and local bodies.
Labour party itself was split on the issue. The Scottish and Welsh Labour MPs
were mostly in favour (with the notable exception of Tam Dalyell, the West
Lothian MP who remained implacably opposed for many years to come and
was to play a key part in the devolution story in the 1990s). These MPs saw
and feared the rise of nationalist sentiment. Their seats were, after all, in
danger from the new movement. Most English Labour MPs were less enthusi-
astic but many recognised that support for devolution might be essential.
The new Labour government had shown a lukewarm commitment to
devolution and this was reflected in a series of abortive attempts to push legis-
lation through the House of Commons. By 1976 the position of the government
had become critical. It had lost its majority altogether as a result of by-election
defeats and was hanging on to a shaky alliance with the Liberals – the so-called
Lib–Lab pact. It was time to press for devolution more decisively.
The Scotland and Wales Bills, which appeared in 1977, revealed a limited set
of proposals for the transfer of power to elected bodies in the two countries.
However, the Liberals were reasonably satisfied and agreed to support the
government. This would secure a majority for the government in favour of the
measure. At this point, however, a group of dissident Labour MPs (including
Tam Dalyell) entered an alliance with the Conservatives which was to deal the
devolution movement a mortal blow.
In January 1978 an amendment was passed to the Scotland and Wales Bills
concerning the referendums which were required to approve devolution. The
original legislation required only a simple majority vote. The amendment,
however, required that approval would be needed from at least 40 per cent of
the total electorate. Given that it was expected that up to one-third of the
electorate would not vote, this was a difficult threshold to meet. In March
1979 the Welsh voted decisively against devolution in any case, but the Scots
produced a ‘yes’ vote. But only 33 per cent of the Scottish electorate had
approved, so the Conservative amendment had its desired effect.
The political fallout was dramatic. Apart from the subsequent events, political
commentators pointed out how unusual the events of 1978 had been. The House
of Commons had defeated the government on a major piece of its legislative
programme. This was something which had not been seen since World War II.
The government was clearly doomed. Shortly afterwards a vote of no confidence
was passed and prime minister Jim Callaghan resigned. The election which
followed ushered in eighteen years of continuous Conservative government.
Apart from a failed experiment with devolution in Northern Ireland during
1982–84, devolution was put on the political back burner. Nationalist sentiment
declined markedly as prosperity began to rise in the second half of the 1980s.
We can identify three main reasons for the failure of devolution in 1978–79:
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1 In the end there was simply insufficient enthusiasm for devolution,
especially in Wales.
2 In London there was not sufficient political will within the Labour party to
force the measure through. The small number of MPs who defied the whips
and supported the Conservative referendum amendment in 1978 were in
fact representative of wider opposition in the party.
3 Devolution was an idea whose day was coming, but 1979 was too early. It
would take a more worldwide movement for nationalism in the 1990s to
see Scotland and Wales swept along to partial self-government.
As we shall see, by the second half of the 1990s the conditions described above
had been reversed so the whole devolution picture was transformed.
THE DEMAND FOR DEVOLUTION IN THE 1990S
As we have seen, there was a lull in interest in devolution for most of the
1980s. The prosperity of the mid-1980s helped to head off nationalism
temporarily, but it re-emerged after the 1987 general election. The reasons for
this were very different to the circumstances of the 1970s. Among them were:
● Under Margaret Thatcher’s three administrations the Scots and Welsh began
to resent the fact that, however dominant the Conservatives might be in
England, their mandate in the two countries was weak. In Scotland, where
there were 72 parliamentary seats, the Conservatives won only 22, 21, 11 and
10 seats respectively in the elections of 1979, 1983, 1987 and 1992. In Wales’s
38 seats, the Conservative showing declined from 14 in 1983 to only 6 in
1992. So, as Conservative support in the two countries declined, demands for
self-government grew.
● The Labour party in Scotland and Wales felt threatened by a new growth in
nationalist voting. They feared they may suffer the same fate as the Conserv-
atives. The Scottish Labour party in particular changed its attitude markedly
during the late 1980s.
● In Scotland there was huge resentment at the fact that the unpopular poll tax
had been introduced there one year earlier than in England and Wales. Many
Scots felt they were being used as mere guinea-pigs, a trial run for the wider
introduction of the tax. It was a hated measure in Scotland and resulted in the
collapse of support for the Conservatives.
● The Scottish Constitutional Convention of 1988, which was led by the Labour
party, but also contained a wide range of Scottish political opinion, came out
firmly in favour of devolution as a solution to Scotland’s problems.
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● In 1993 the Welsh language gained official recognition. Signs and documents
were to be in two languages, Welsh was to be offered in all schools and
individuals could opt to speak Welsh in court cases. This created a fresh
impetus for Welsh nationalism.
● On a global level, the end of the Cold War saw a huge upsurge in national
feelings all over the world. This new spirit of nationalism and the desire for
popular self-determination spread to Wales and Scotland.
● John Smith, who took over the Labour leadership in 1992, was a convinced
devolutionist.
● As we see in this book’s chapter on constitutional reform (11), the Labour
party in the 1990s believed it would probably need the co-operation of the
Liberal Democrats to secure and retain power. Devolution was a key policy for
the Liberal Democrats so it made pragmatic sense for Labour to adopt it as a
firm proposal.
Devolution, therefore, was made a priority by the incoming Labour adminis-
tration of 1997. It wasted little time in bringing forward the legislation.
HOW DEVOLUTION CAME ABOUT
Principles
The Scottish Constitutional Convention which had reported in 1988 provided
the blueprint for a devolution settlement. However, when Labour was
constructing its election manifesto in 1997 it adopted three key principles.
Firstly, it differentiated between Scotland and Wales. In Scotland, where it was
expected that the people would embrace devolution enthusiastically, there was
to be a parliament with extensive legislative powers. The Scots were also to be
offered some control over taxation. In Wales, where approval was not ensured,
it was decided that legislative power could not be devolved and there was to be
much less financial flexibility there. This proved to be a wise device. Nothing
less than a Scottish Parliament would do for the nationalists there, but the
Welsh might certainly be frightened off if too much power were offered.
The second principle was the intention to use a form of proportional repre-
sentation – the additional member system – when electing the Scottish
Parliament and Welsh Assembly. It was essential that devolution was not seen
as an attempt to tighten Labour’s grip in the two countries. Under first-past-
the-post Labour would probably have won outright majorities, just as it had
done in Westminster elections. This would have defeated the object of
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devolution, which was to disperse power and not centralise it. Much as the
Labour party might have liked to control the new governments, it had to be
pragmatic in relinquishing full power. It was part of the price of making
devolution acceptable. Furthermore, it was vital that the nationalist parties be
given their fair share of the seats. The additional member system was the ideal
way of achieving this.
Thirdly, there were to be referendums on the devolution proposals. This was
needed for a number of important reasons:
 New Labour accepted the general principle that any major constitutional
change would require popular approval.
 A positive referendum result would head off opposition from UK unionists
and Conservatives.
 It was vital to secure popular consent for the measures in Scotland and
Wales. Without it the new institutions might not command respect.
 Referendums would help to ‘entrench’ the changes. In other words it would
make it very difficult for any future government to unravel devolution, at
least without a further referendum.
The programme
The progress towards devolution proved to be relatively smooth. The steps
were as follows. In some ways they can be seen as a model of how constitu-
tional change can be effected in a parliamentary democracy such as Britain’s.
1 Labour, of course, had to win the general election with devolution as a clear
part of its manifesto. This would provide a mandate for change. It was
important for Labour to win decisively to prevent any questioning of its
authority to carry through radical changes. This was achieved comfortably.
2 It was not just important for Labour to win. It also needed to win well in
Scotland and Wales. A resurgence of Conservative voting there would call the
devolution idea into question. If, on the other hand, the nationalists were to
make significant gains, it would suggest that the proposals were not radical
enough. In the event, the Conservatives failed to win a single seat in Scotland
and Wales in 1997. The nationalist parties, meanwhile, made little progress.
Labour support held up well, suggesting that it had got its devolution plans
about right.
3 Before the legislation was to be considered, referendums were held. These
took place in 1997, soon after the general election. Two factors were
important in these referendums. Firstly, there needed to be a good turnout. In
the event just over 60 per cent of Scots voted – just enough to give the result
authority. In Wales, however, the turnout was only just over 50 per cent
and this has certainly had the result of reducing the effectiveness of Welsh
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self-government. Secondly, of course, a ‘yes’ vote was needed. There were no
problems in Scotland: 74.3 per cent voted in favour of devolution and 63.5 per
cent voted separately for the tax-varying powers which had been hotly
contested in the general election campaign. In Wales, however, the ‘yes’
majority was only 50.3 per cent. Nevertheless, the government decided to
approve Welsh as well as Scottish devolution.
4 The legislation had to be passed. With a huge parliamentary majority, this was
unlikely to be a problem and so it proved. The only major stumbling block was
the proposal to allow the Scottish parliament to vary UK income tax in their own
country by 3 per cent up or down. The Conservatives had dubbed this a ‘tartan
tax’ – a means of raising taxes by stealth (so-called ‘stealth taxes’ had formed a
major element in the Conservatives’ 1997 election campaign). The new
government, however, was not to be diverted and the legislation – the Scotland
and Wales Acts – survived largely intact. The Acts were passed in 1998.
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THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST DEVOLUTION
For
• There has been a growing popular demand for more self-government in the national
regions.
• The national regions have different needs to England which should be reflected in
stronger regional government.
• By conceding devolution the demands for fuller independence will be headed off, thus
preventing the break-up of the United Kingdom.
• It is more democratic because government will be brought closer to the people.
• It will reduce the workload of the British parliament and government.
• It recognises the new idea of a ‘Europe of the regions’ rather than separate states.
Against
• Conservatives in particular believe it may lead to the break-up of the United Kingdom
because demands for independence will be fuelled by devolution.
• It was argued that demand for devolution was over-exaggerated, especially in Wales,
so it was unnecessary.
• It creates an extra layer of government which will increase costs to the taxpayer.
• In Scotland it was feared that taxes there would inevitably rise because Scotland is less
prosperous than the United Kingdom as a whole.
• It will lead to confusion because there is an additional layer of bureaucracy.
• Nationalists have argued that devolution does not go far enough. British government
has retained all the important powers for itself.
• Nationalists also argue they should have a separate voice in Europe but devolution does
not give them this.
5 The final hurdles were the actual elections to the Scottish Parliament and
Welsh Assembly. Would enough people turn out to vote? Would the results be
such that it was possible to form viable governments. As with the referendums,
support in Wales was lukewarm, with a turnout of 46 per cent. In Scotland,
there was a better result – 58 per cent – but there was still some concern that
too few people were interested in the devolution project. The results by party,
however, were more encouraging. Though Labour dominated both elections,
the party failed narrowly to win overall majorities in both countries.
So it was that, in 1999, the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly came into
existence. The Scottish Executive was formed from a coalition between Labour
and the Liberal Democrats. Donald Dewar, the Labour leader in Scotland (who
had died by 2001) became the country’s first minister. In Wales, Labour
formed a minority executive under Alun Michael. Michael was replaced by
Rhodri Morgan in 2001 following a kind of coup d’etat by Labour assembly
members. In the same year Labour gave up trying to govern with a minority
and formed a coalition with the Liberal Democrats. In both countries the main
opposition duties are shared between the Conservatives and the Nationalists.
DEVOLUTION IN SCOTLAND
The Scottish Parliament
This came into existence, after a gap of 292 years, in 1999. There are 129
seats; 73 of the seats are elected by normal, first-past-the-post constituency
elections. The other 56 seats are the result of voting for party lists, where each
party is awarded seats from its list according to a combination of what
proportion of the votes were won by them in both the constituency and the
party list elections. In other words each Scottish voter has two votes – one for
a constituency MSP (Member of the Scottish Parliament), the other for a party.
The electoral system is known as the additional member system (AMS). The
parliament sits in Edinburgh. It has fixed electoral terms. Elections take place
every four years. Following the first elections to the Scottish Parliament in
1999, the strength of the parties was as shown in table 12.1.
Table 12.1 Allocation of seats in the Scottish Parliament after 1999
Party Seats won
Labour 56
Scottish Nationalist 35
Conservative 18
Liberal Democrat 17
Others (Green and Independent) 3
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We can see that no party won an overall majority in the Parliament. As the
largest party, Labour were asked (by the British government) to form an
executive. They did so, but decided they would have to form a coalition with
the Liberal Democrats. The coalition’s joint tally of 73 seats gave them a
comfortable overall majority.
The powers and functions of the parliament
It is important to note that the Scottish Parliament was granted the power to
make primary legislation in selected areas. The term primary legislation
essentially means two things. Firstly, it refers to the laws as we understand
them: what is prohibited, how organisations must behave, what responsibil-
ities citizens are expected to carry out. Secondly, it grants powers to other
bodies to make regulations and rules which are as binding as other laws. We
call this enabling legislation. Thus, for example local authorities, members
of the executive and other public bodies will be given powers to make
secondary legislation. Secondary legislation involves orders which do not
need to be passed through the same process as primary legislation. They are
simply announced and become law if there is no successful objection to them
in parliament.
The decision to grant powers of primary legislation was crucial to Scottish
devolution. It meant that the Scots were given the opportunity to make
themselves and their society distinctive. It should also be remembered that
Scotland has always had its own laws, especially criminal and civil law, but that
after 1707 these laws were made by the British Parliament in Westminster. In
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Functions of Scottish Parliament
1 To pass primary legislation in those areas of policy making which have been devolved
to Scotland.
2 The main policy areas devolved are: criminal law; civil law; education; social services;
local government; building and planning regulations; agriculture; fisheries; health;
transport; emergency services.
3 To determine the level of income tax to within 3 per cent higher or lower than the
general British rate set in Westminster.
4 To approve the overall Scottish budget.
5 To call the executive to account for its actions and policies.
6 To elect a first minister to form the executive (i.e. government).
7 To form committees to scrutinise legislation and the work of Scottish executive depart-
ments.
8 To oversee and scrutinise secondary legislation produced by Scottish ministers, local
authorities and other public bodies.
other words the final say on Scottish law rested with the British government.
With its own primary legislating powers after devolution, however, Scotland
was granted a significant amount of autonomy. As we shall see below, the Welsh
Assembly was not granted the power to make primary legislation and so has to
consider itself very much an inferior body.
Constraints on Scottish Parliament
1 It can only pass legislation in areas allowed under devolution legislation.
2 It cannot pass legislation which conflicts with British law.
3 It cannot pass legislation which conflicts with European Union law.
4 Its legislation must conform to the European Convention on Human Rights.
5 It cannot raise its own national taxes, other than a 3 per cent variation in income
tax levels.
6 It cannot amend the devolution legislation, i.e. it cannot change the system of
government in Scotland.
The Scottish Executive
The term ‘executive’ is used in the devolved systems to replace ‘government’.
This is to avoid confusion with British government in London.
The Scottish Executive is headed by a first minister, who is effectively the
Prime Minister of Scotland, without being given that title. The first minister is
effectively chosen by being leader of the largest party in the parliament.
However, he or she must be elected to office by the whole parliament.
The rest of the executive is formed by the heads of the various departments
which make up Scottish government. The role of the executive is as follows:
1 To formulate policy for Scotland and draft appropriate legislation to be
presented in parliament.
2 To negotiate with the British government for funds.
3 To implement policies which have been developed within the executive and
approved by the Scottish Parliament.
4 To make decisions under powers delegated to it by either the British or the
Scottish Parliament.
5 Liaison with the British government where there are overlapping functions
such as law enforcement, environmental and industrial policies
6 To negotiate with institutions of the European Union (though Scotland has
no seat at the Council of Ministers) for regional funds and favourable
policies.
7 To organise and oversee the provision of services by executive departments
(i.e. the Scottish Civil Service), local authorities and other public bodies.
Devolution 181
DEVOLUTION IN WALES
The Welsh Assembly
In Wales, the representative body is known as an assembly rather than a
parliament. This reflects the fact that it has considerably fewer powers than its
Scottish counterpart. In particular, it has no powers to make any primary legis-
lation. This is a key difference. It means that the British parliament and
government still rules Wales.
The assembly was elected at the same time as the Scottish Parliament, using
the same AMS electoral system. There are 60 seats in all. They were allocated
as shown in table 12.2.
Table 12.2 Seats in the Welsh Assembly after 1999
Party Seats won
Labour 28
Plaid Cymru (Welsh Nationalist) 17
Conservative 9
Liberal Democrat 6
As in Scotland, Labour failed to win an overall majority but was the largest
party. However, unlike in Scotland the party decided to try to govern alone,
without a coalition party. Within two years this proved to be impractical and
so they formed a coalition, again with the Liberal Democrats.
The assembly meets in Cardiff and, as with Scotland, has a fixed term of
four years.
The powers and functions of the Welsh Assembly
The following list indicates the main policy areas devolved to Wales:
 education;
 social services;
 local government;
 building and planning regulations;
 agriculture;
 fisheries;
 health;
 transport;
 emergency services.
The most important element of Welsh devolution is that the assembly (note
that it is not called a Parliament) does not have the power to make primary
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legislation. This means it has to rely on Westminster for all its legislation. This
is a considerable limitation. What is left to the Welsh Assembly, therefore, is as
follows:
Functions of Welsh Assembly
1 It calls the Welsh Executive to account by questioning department heads both in
committee and through the full assembly.
2 It elects the head of the Welsh Executive. It can also dismiss him/her.
3 It discusses Welsh affairs and makes resolutions which they hope will be influential on
London and on Cardiff.
4 It discusses the implementation of policy on Welsh affairs.
5 It attempts to direct the Welsh Executive in its implementation of policy and allocation
of funds to various uses.
6 It debates and requests changes to the Welsh budget.
Constraints on Welsh Assembly
1 It cannot pass primary legislation.
2 It cannot grant powers to members of the Welsh Executive.
3 It cannot call London government to account directly.
4 It cannot raise any special taxes in Wales.
The Welsh Executive
This is, to a large extent the government of Wales. However, because relatively
few powers were devolved it must share this function with London, the Welsh
Office in particular. The head of the executive is elected by the assembly and
he/she appoints the heads of the Welsh departments. These department heads
are accountable to the assembly, which can, effectively remove them. As we
have seen above, the first Welsh Executive was a Labour minority government,
but has since become a Labour/Liberal Democrat coalition.
The functions of the executive are as follows:
 to allocate funds, which are provided by the British government, among
competing needs such as health, education, transport and industrial
development;
 to negotiate with the Welsh Office in London for those funds;
 to negotiate appropriate legislation for Wales with the Welsh Office;
 to organise the implementation of devolved policy areas in Wales;
 to represent the interests of Wales at various institutions of the European
Union, even though Wales is not separately represented in the Council
of Ministers.
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AN EARLY EVALUATION OF DEVOLUTION 
IN WALES AND SCOTLAND
Before attempting to assess how well devolution is working it is useful to
consider what pieces of evidence we should look for. If we are to judge
devolution a ‘success’ what are the signs to look for. Here are some suggestions:
1 High turnout at elections.
2 Public opinion surveys indicating high levels of satisfaction with devolved
government.
3 A rise in the sense of ‘national identity’ in the two countries. This may be
assessed by surveys, but is generally difficult to judge and the evidence is
likely to be uncertain.
4 Have Scotland and Wales developed significantly different policies from those
which apply in England? Let us remind ourselves of why devolution was
introduced: because it was felt that Scotland and Wales may have different
needs and demands to England. If this assumption is true, it must follow
that there will be differing policies. In this respect, it is clear that Scotland,
with powers of legislation, is bound to have become more independent.
5 Arguably, we could consider whether demands for federalism or full
independence have subsided. If they have, devolution could be said to have
achieved one of its objectives – to satisfy demands for more self-government.
If not, it could be argued that devolution has failed in its primary objective.
At the time of writing, devolution is only a few years old and it is too soon to
make a valid assessment. However, the early signs are interesting. Overall
indications certainly suggest that devolution has been more successful in
Scotland than in Wales.
Wales
There are signs of general dissatisfaction with Welsh devolution. The exper-
iment got off to a bad start when the first chief executive, Alun Michael, was
seen as merely a puppet of Labour party headquarters in London. It was
suspected that he had been put there in order to prevent any radical policies
emerging from Wales. He was replaced by the more popular Rhodri Morgan
who has proved to be much more acceptable to the people of Wales.
During the foot-and-mouth epidemic, the Welsh Executive was heavily criti-
cised (Wales is more agriculturally based than England) for failing to take
Wales’s different interests into account. Indeed there has been a general
feeling among Welsh farmers that devolution has not fulfilled its promise.
At the same time, surveys indicate low levels of interest in or support for Welsh
government. It seems to have made little difference – a reflection of its limited
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powers. Part of the low public esteem of the assembly has been the high
degree of adversary politics and party ‘in-fighting’ which has been seen.
Having said this, there is no sign of growing Welsh demands for full
independence. This suggests a successful outcome. The head of the executive
– Rhodri Morgan – has proved to be personally popular and has given Wales
some sense of independence.
Scotland
The picture here looks brighter for devolution. The first indication is that
Scottish government has made a difference in some areas. Four examples are
interesting:
1 The foot-and-mouth crisis was handled more successfully in Scotland and
it escaped the worst effects.
2 The Scottish Parliament forced through a measure to make all care of the
elderly in special homes free on demand (only medical care is free in
England and Wales).
3 The extra tuition fees for Scottish higher education students was abolished.
It was retained in England and Wales.
4 While the British House of Commons was locked in an exercise of mutual
frustration with the Lords over foxhunting, the unicameral (single
chamber) Scottish parliament had little difficulty in responding to public
demands for its abolition.
While these legislative innovation were taking place, the feared rises in
Scottish taxation have not emerged. Surveys indicate reasonable levels of
satisfaction with the operation of the Scottish Parliament and executive. As in
Wales, there are also few signs that demands for full independence are rising.
The Scottish National Party made no progress in the general election of 2001
– a sure sign that nationalism remains quite weak.
On the other hand, there is little evidence of a stronger sense of Scottish
identity emerging. There has always been a strong sense of Scottish cultural
identity, but there is little evidence that this is turning into patriotism, which
involves pride in one’s political institutions.
NORTHERN IRELAND
Devolution in Northern Ireland has to be seen in the context of the Good
Friday Agreement of 1998, which is described in the chapter on Northern
Ireland (10). However, we can identify a number of reasons why devolution
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in Northern Ireland had to be very different in character from the constitu-
tional developments in Wales and Scotland.
There is a deep sectarian divide in Northern Ireland. This is more fundamental
in character than the division between those English people who favour a close
union within the United Kingdom (largely Conservatives) and those who wish
for more independence in Scotland and Wales, mostly nationalists and liberals.
The Northern Ireland devolution arrangements had to take into account the
fact that, in many policy areas, it would be difficult to find any consensus.
The normal, ‘British’ model of parliamentary government tends to ensure that
a clear majority government emerges. Both the electoral system of first-past-
the-post and the practice of forming executives from one single party, or at
least dominated by one party, have ensured one-party government. In Wales
and Scotland, Labour is the dominant party in the new executives and is likely
to remain so for some time, even though it has a junior coalition party. In
Northern Ireland the domination of all political life by the Protestant Unionists
from 1921 to 1972 was the main source of discontent. A new system which
simply restored majority Unionists rule would be unacceptable. Devolution,
therefore, had to break the Unionist hegemony.
The electoral system had to reflect the diversity of the political community
in the province. It is too simplistic to think of it as a duopoly of Unionists
and Nationalists. The two communities have their own internal divisions,
largely along the lines of moderates and extremists. There is also a large part
of the political spectrum which does not hold dominant views on the
relationship with the UK. They are interested in such issues as economic devel-
opment, relations with Europe, agriculture and fisheries or women’s rights.
They have, in the past, been swamped by the Unionist–Nationalist split. So it
was essential to develop a pluralist political system where all groups could
participate.
It was clear that a power-sharing system was needed, for reasons described
above. This meant that there would have to be a great deal of innovation.
Devising ways of ensuring that political decisions are only made with a
consensus of support is not easy and requires original thinking. This is
especially true when there is a very fundamental division within the
community. The Scottish and Welsh settlements were something of a combi-
nation of the British parliamentary system and coalition systems which are
common on mainland Europe. Such a compromise was not appropriate in
Northern Ireland. A unique settlement was therefore forged, not like any seen
in the more stable political systems of Europe.
For these reasons devolution in Northern Ireland is very different from the rest
of Britain. Having said that, the actual powers which were devolved to the
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Northern Ireland Assembly and executive are not dissimilar from those trans-
ferred to Scotland. The main powers are:
 primary legislation;
 education;
 health;
 social security;
 social services;
 transport;
 agriculture and fisheries;
 local government;
 environment;
 housing and planning;
 regional industrial development.
This is an extensive list, but the most important functions of the state remain
in the hands of the British government, the Northern Ireland Office in
particular. These include:
 defence and foreign policy;
 relations with the Irish republic;
 security and policing;
 economic policy;
 taxation.
The governmental system has three main features designed to achieve the
objectives described above. They are:
The electoral system
This is the single transferable vote (STV), as used in the Republic of Ireland.
It is a complex system whose essential features are as follows:
 There are multi-member constituencies, normally four.
 Each party can put up as many candidates as there are seats.
 Voters can vote for all candidates, placing them in order of preference.
 The result is based on counting, not just of first preferences, but also subse-
quent choices, right down to near the end of the list.
 The complex counting system ensures that some of the elected candidates
are those who have the support of a wide range of the community, not
simply their own party supporters.
 The system also ensures that those from small parties and independents
have a chance of winning seats.
The result of the first election (table 12.3) demonstrates that STV achieved its
objectives – to reflect the diversity of the community and to prevent any party
winning an overall majority.
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Table 12.3 Northern Ireland election result, 1999
Party Seats won
Ulster Unionist 28
Social Democratic Labour party 24
Democratic Unionist 20
Sinn Fein 18
Alliance party 6
Northern Ireland Unionist 3
United Unionist 3
Women’s Coalition 2
Progressive Unionist 2
UK Unionist 1
Independent Unionist 1
The result is highly proportional, reflecting very closely the division of political
support for parties and candidates. Even the additional member system, as
used in Wales and Scotland, does not produce such a proportional result.
Legislation
The legislative procedure of the Northern Ireland assembly is relatively simple.
However, it must be emphasised that the make-up the assembly, which
prevents an overall majority by one side of the community, means that a broad
consensus must be found. Furthermore, the standing committees of the
assembly which consider amendments are also constructed so there is no
single party majority.
As in Scotland, all legislation must conform both the European Convention on
Human Rights and to any European Union legislation which is binding on the
UK, Naturally, the assembly can only make laws concerning powers granted to
it by the devolution settlement.
The executive
It is perhaps the method for the formation of the executive that is most
unusual in Northern Ireland. As with all the other arrangements the main
objective has been to ensure consensus and prevent single party domination.
The main features are:
 The first minister must be approved by both sides of the sectarian divide in
the assembly. However, it is accepted that the first minister will be the
leader of the largest party. David Trimble, Ulster Unionist leader, was
therefore the clear choice in the first executive.
 The deputy first minister comes from the other community from the first
minister. This creates a balance in the senior positions. Thus the first
deputy first minister was Seamus Mallon from the Nationalist SDLP.
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 The rest of the 12-strong executive is drawn from the various parties
according to the number of seats won in the assembly (by a method known
as d’Hondt ). This ensures that some of the smaller parties may achieve
some representation in the executive. The parties are free to nominate
whom they wish (provided they are assembly members) to fill their
allocation. Controversially, this system meant that Sinn Fein were able to
choose two members. One of them, Martin McGuinness, was an acknowl-
edged former IRA terrorist. This resulted in the extraordinary situation that
a Republican extremist sat in the same executive as the moderate
Unionists, their former avowed enemies. The more extreme Unionists, Iain
Paisley’s Democratic Unionists, were unable to face sitting down with Sinn
Fein and decided not to take up their two seats.
So, despite teething problems, this innovative system achieved the apparent
impossibility of creating an executive in which bitter political enemies from
the past could coexist. It remains an uneasy set-up, but it survived into 2002
despite a number of crises and suspensions.
The real test, of course, remains whether the executive can achieve meaningful
change in Northern Ireland. Certainly progress has been made in the restruc-
turing of agriculture, improving higher education, in supporting the important
fishing industry and in securing funds for industrial development. There has
also been a good deal of innovation in urban re-development and support for
the arts. In under-18 education, a key area given the trouble background of the
province, attempts are under way (led by controversial education minister
Martin McGuinness) to create more non-sectarian schooling. Little has yet
been done, but at least the issue is on the political agenda.
Above all, however, the main success of Northern Ireland devolution is that it
has survived (four years at the time of writing). Violence has not disappeared
but has abated and most terrorists have been marginalised. It is believed that
the longer the new institutions survive, the greater the hope for a lasting peace.
THE FUTURE OF DEVOLUTION
Three years after its introduction, devolution appears to be reasonably well
established. The Conservative party has dropped its opposition and has
committed itself to leaving the new system in place. At the same time they
vehemently oppose the transfer of any more powers. As long as there is no
major decline in support for the institutions, devolution may be here for many
years to come. Of course, the Northern Ireland settlement is more fragile for
its own special reasons, but there is greater permanence already established in
Wales and Scotland.
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The key question is whether there will be any further extensions in decentral-
isation. The possible options are:
1 There may be devolution to English regions, perhaps along the lines of the
Welsh arrangements. Labour was committed to this in 1997, but seems to have
dropped the idea. There is some administrative devolution through regional
development agencies, and twelve Civil Service offices, but there is no sign of
elected assemblies.
2 The Welsh Assembly might be granted powers to make primary legislation. As
devolution has not established itself well there, this remains a distant prospect.
3 Greater tax raising powers may be given to Scotland and Northern Ireland.
This may hold back demands for greater independence of a more fundamental
nature.
4 There may be demands for federal system, as favoured by the Liberal
Democrats. This would not necessarily involve the transfer of any new powers
and functions, but would make the transfer of power more permanent,
preventing Westminster taking its powers back in the future. In short it would
mean the transfer of sovereignty rather than mere power.
5 Full independence might follow in due course. Certainly if a future Scottish
Parliament and referendum were to vote for it there would be a major consti-
tutional problem. Could the British Parliament resist Scottish calls for
independence? Wales and Northern Ireland are a long way from such a devel-
opment. Indeed in the case of Northern Ireland, reunification with the rest of
Ireland is as likely as independence.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 Why was devolution introduced in the UK at the end of the twentieth
century?
2 For what reasons was devolution opposed?
3 Why did devolution vary in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland?
4 In what senses has devolution been a success?
5 Will devolution lead to the break-up of the United Kingdom?
Understanding British and European political issues190
The development of European integration 191Issues concerni g women
POST-WAR EUROPE
After two world wars, both of which devastated European industry and
threatened permanently to sour relations between its states, Europe woke up
to the belief that a lasting solution to continental conflict had to be found. The
inter-war League of Nations had failed and the United Nations was to be a
world-wide organisation which would not solve Europe’s problems. Therefore
an entirely new kind of arrangement had to be found.
It soon became apparent that there were two rival plans for European
integration. One was essentially a cultural, legal and political union. This was
promoted by Britain, in particular by Winston Churchill, who had been prime
minister from 1940 to 1945. The other was based on the concept of an
economic union which would serve a dual purpose in making the states of
Europe more interdependent, while at the same time speeding the economic
recovery of the continent. This was essentially a French plan, led by one of its
most prominent civil servants, Jean Monnet.
These two proposals had the same objective – to remove the fundamental
conditions for conflict – but suggested completely different ways of achieving
them. Political integration, underpinned by cultural convergence and a unified
legal system, would provide institutions within which future disputes could be
settled. The cultural dimension would also go some way to preventing
extremist movements, notably fascism and communism, from emerging again
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in western Europe. The economic plan, on the other hand, would result in the
great European powers having such a strong vested interest in peace, that war
would become unthinkable. Put another way, once there was economic inter-
dependence, the benefits of peace would always outweigh gains to be made
through war.
The debates over Europe’s future have to be seen in the light also of the
geopolitics of the time. Firstly, there was an overwhelming desire to prevent a
resurgence of German power. Furthermore, any future arrangements would
need to ensure that Germany, which was likely to become the strongest
economic power after it had recovered from the immediate devastation of war,
should not be able to dominate the new Europe. Secondly, the important
continental European states – notably France, Germany and Italy – were
extremely wary of any British attempt to dominate a future settlement.
Thirdly, it was clear that Europe would have to rely on American aid for many
years to come. A new European community could not be allowed to threaten
United States’ interests in the region. Therefore, the idea of a military alliance
in Europe which did not include the United States was unthinkable.
It is also worth considering at this stage some of the reasons why Britain
became detached from the European ‘project’ even at its early stages. The
distancing of Britain from Europe was to affect continental relations to the end
of the twentieth century.
One issue was undoubtedly Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the United
States. Certainly, Winston Churchill saw this as an opportunity for Britain to
play a pivotal role in the post-war world. If she was able to position herself as
a bridgehead between America and Europe, with close institutional links with
both, she would be able to dominate the future of Europe. Interestingly, this
same idea seems to have occurred to Tony Blair after 1997. However, the large
European states were suspicious of British motives and were not prepared to
consider any plans which would result in excessive American influence.
A second important factor in the estrangement of Britain and Europe was the
strong influence of socialism on the early project. Many of the ‘pioneers’ of a
European community were socialists or social democrats. They saw integration
as a means to introduce greater equality and social justice throughout the
continent. Although Britain had a quasi-socialist Labour government from
1945 to 1951, it was Conservative led by the time a more integrated Europe
began to emerge in the 1950s. Naturally enough, the Conservative party was
less than enthusiastic in supporting what they saw as a socialist enterprise.
Finally, we should remind ourselves that Britain was still an imperial power.
Apart from the difficulties of reconciling Britain’s special relationship with her
colonies with membership of a European economic union, this led the other
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Europeans to be suspicious of her motives. Could Britain be a truly European
partner while its attention lay firmly in the wider world outside Europe? As we
have seen above, this feeling also applied to the UK–United States axis.
For these reasons western Europe in the period after World War II was very
much prepared to ‘go it alone’ at least in the economic sense. They were ready
to accept American aid for reconstruction (the ‘Marshall Plan’) and to join
NATO for collective security after the onset of the Cold War, but the economic
situation was different. There was to be no permanent economic union with
the United States as the latter would be too dominant. If an integrated
political union was proposed they feared it would be British dominated.
So the development of a European Community was, therefore, very much a
west European affair, with Britain and the United States kept at arm’s length.
Nevertheless, it is useful to consider the less successful of the two plans – the
Council of Europe.
THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
In 1948 Winston Churchill, then leader of the Opposition in Britain, delivered
a speech to European leaders at the Hague in the Netherlands. When one
considers how Euro-sceptic the bulk of the Conservative party had become by
the end of the 1990s, this speech was breathtaking in its radical tone. Churchill
not only proposed a new pan-European organisation, but also suggested that
each state should be prepared to give up some of its national sovereignty.
Most of the states of Europe has recently fought two wars in order to preserve
or regain their status as independent nation states. The concept, therefore,
that they should be prepared to surrender some of that independence was
optimistic to say the least. In the event, it was indeed unrealistic. Inevitably,
the full plan was rejected. In its place, a watered-down version of the Churchill
plan was adopted. The Council of Europe came formally into existence in 1949
with an initial sixteen member states.
The general idea of the Council was to create a new ‘European culture’. It was
to emphasise what Europeans have in common and so eliminate its differ-
ences. This common culture included such features as:
 emphasis on the importance of the arts and ‘high culture’;
 a respect for fundamental human rights;
 an attachment to democracy and the rule of law;
 stress on the importance of education.
In the event, the Council has proved to be a great disappointment to those who
have hoped for cultural integration. The Assembly of the Council, which
contains delegates nominated from member states, does little more than
discuss matters of mutual interest. No decisions are binding and no contro-
versial issues are ever adopted by members.
That said, the Council did enjoy one major success. This was the development
of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Court which adjudi-
cates on disputes under the Convention. The Convention, which was signed in
1950, has had a profound impact on the status of rights in Europe. Virtually
all the members have adopted the Convention, either in its entirety, or as part
of their own rights legislation. The last significant member to resist adopting
the Convention was Britain. It was not until 1999 that the terms of the
Convention were included in the Human Rights Act.
The European Court of Human Rights (which is not an institution of the
European Union) hears appeals from European citizens who believe their
rights have been abused. Britain has been especially affected by the powers of
the court, having lost over fifty cases since the 1960s. These have included
issues such as the treatment of prisoners in Northern Ireland, press censorship,
the method of trial for juveniles and night flights over Heathrow which
deprive residents of sleep.
Apart from the important activities of the Convention and the Court, the
council has had a limited role. It does arrange cultural exchanges, organises
educational programmes to improve European understanding and discusses
such concerns as crime, drugs, terrorism and the media, but these are of little
political significance. The narrowness of the Council’s role demonstrates that,
as an experiment in political integration, it is a failure.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
While the Council of Europe was proving a disappointment to its supporters,
the alternative institution – an essentially economic union – moved from one
level of integration to the next with relative ease. Most of its members shared
a common goal and enjoyed a great degree of unity in achieving it.
Two Frenchmen – Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman – believed that the most
effective way of creating an integrated Europe was to pursue an economic
union. There is no doubt that they both foresaw a wider political union in the
future, but understood that a single economic market would be the first step
towards such an objective. The first stage was a relatively modest arrangement
and can be seen as something of a prototype for the European Community
which was to follow.
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The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
In 1951 the Treaty of Paris brought together six countries – France, West
Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (the last three
named known collectively as Benelux) in a single industrial enterprise.
In itself the ECSC was a limited system. It provided for a single market in coal
and steel among the member countries. Fair trade was established between
them and a common external tariff established against these goods coming in
from abroad. In this way it was hoped that the industries would flourish,
encouraged by free competition within the community and some protection
from the outside. The Paris Treaty also provided for a central body to regulate
production among the member states.
At first sight this innovation – known as the Schuman Plan – seemed to be a
modest one. With the benefit of hindsight, however, we can see how revolu-
tionary it was. The radical measures which brought about the ECSC included
the following vital principles.
Each member state was prepared to give up some of its national sovereignty
to the Community. This idea, of ‘pooled’ or ‘shared’ sovereignty in specific
functional areas was the first of its kind in the world. It set the tone for all
future developments towards the creation of the European Union. All previous
supranational bodies (such as the Council of Europe or the League of Nations)
had allowed member states to retain their national sovereignty. This meant
that they could choose whether to adopt any agreed measures or to ignore
them. The ECSC, on the other hand, insisted that, to be a member, all states
had to agree to conform to all decisions. It was this insistence on shared
functional sovereignty that kept Britain out of the community. The Labour
government of the day, which had recently nationalised both industries (coal
and steel), was not willing to give up one ounce of British independence. This
was to set a pattern for the British attitude to Europe for nearly two decades
to come.
The three branches of national governments – the legislature, the executive
and the judiciary – were to be replicated, in an amended form, within the new
set-up. Thus there was created the following bodies:
● The High Authority: a kind of senior Civil Service which was to develop policy
and organise the implementation of decisions.
● The Council of Ministers: ministerial representatives from the member
countries which would make all important decisions.
● The Assembly: nominated members from the six states which were to give
general advice to the High Authority and the Council of Ministers.
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● The Court of Justice: to deal with disputes between member states. The judges
were nominated from the different states and were to be independent.
The economic integration which was established in the ECSC was, it was
clearly stated, to be the prelude to an even closer political union in the future.
Although the structure of the ECSC was essentially experimental – nothing like
this had been attempted before – it proved to be so acceptable that, when the
more ambitious successors of the ECSC, leading to the European Union itself,
were formed, they followed much the same blueprint.
The ‘Common Market’ (EEC)
Encouraged by the success of the ECSC, and determined to take integration
further, negotiations began among the six members to extend the scope of the
market. During 1956 the creation of the ‘Common Market’ (European
Economic Community: EEC) was discussed and the following year, 1957, the
Treaty of Rome was signed. This was effectively the founding document of
European integration. An additional treaty, for the pooling of nuclear energy
resources was also signed. This was known as Euratom.
Britain did not take part in these early discussions. Both prime ministers of the
period – Anthony Eden (who resigned in 1957) and Harold Macmillan (who
took over from Eden) – made it clear that political and trade links with the
Empire and Commonwealth were more important to Britain than a European
system. It was also true that, following the humiliation of the failed Suez
episode in 1956, Britain was licking her wounds and certainly not in a position
to take part in the great experiment. The other potential members around the
fringes of the central six were also less than enthusiastic. Spain and Portugal
were still ruled by fascist dictators (Franco and Salazar respectively) and their
intense nationalism did not allow them to consider integration. The Scandi-
navian countries, with their tradition of neutrality were also far from inter-
ested. So it was to be a small exclusive club. The Treaty of Rome contained five
main agreements.
Treaty of Rome: main agreements
• to abolish tariffs among member countries;
• to establish a common external tariff – i.e. all members would charge the same tariffs
on goods and services imported from outside the Common Market;
• the removal of all barriers to free competition among all members states;
• the intention to create the free movement of all goods, services, capital (i.e. finance)
and labour between member states by 1970;
• a more general intention to establish a Common Agricultural Policy. This was part of
France’s price for joining.
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The Treaty of Rome also established the institutions of the Common Market,
very much along the lines of what we see today and modelled on the set-up of
the ECSC. The functions of these bodies is described and discussed below. Put
simply at this stage, however, they were:
Institutions of the Common Market
• The Commission: an unelected bureaucracy to develop policies designed to
implement the Treaty of Rome.
• The Council of Minister: elected ministers from the member states who would effec-
tively ratify the laws and regulations of the Common Market and discuss future policy.
• The Assembly or Parliament: to advise the Commission and council on policy, but
unable to make or amend European law.
• The Court of Justice: to handle disputes between members and to deliver interpre-
tations of European law.
We can see how similar this arrangement was to that of the ECSC.
So, in 1957 the great European project was under way. Only six original
members had signed up and success was far from assured. By 2002 it had
grown to fifteen members with several others queuing up to join. A single
market had been established and twelve of the members were using a single
currency. At first sight this seems an impressive achievement in a relatively
short time, and so it was in many ways. However, a glimpse at the institutions
which were established in Rome tells us that the economic development of
Europe has not been matched by political progress.
Towards the European Community (EC)
By 1962 plans for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) were complete. The
CAP is a complex system described more fully later in this book.
CAP: basic principles
• All agricultural products were to be traded freely within the community. There were to
be no tariffs and any regulations, such as health or content standards, would be
common to all members.
• There would be protection from outside competition in the form of tariffs and subsidies
for producers within the community who found it difficult to compete with the outside
world.
• Producers of a wide range of goods would receive guaranteed minimum prices.
• A system was established whereby the Community would buy up surpluses of goods in
order to keep prices up. These surpluses could be used if there were serious
shortages in the future, but could be destroyed if necessary.
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The CAP was more than merely a free-trade system. It was also a device for
protecting key industries and reaping the benefits of specialisation. As such it
represented an important step in the further integration of Europe.
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), which had similar aims to the CAP and
was also designed to preserve fish stocks, was signed much later, in 1983. It
proved as controversial as the CAP, not least because the issue of territorial
waters is one where national interest tends to clash with European integration.
In some ways, therefore, its establishment was an even greater achievement.
The first phase of integration – the establishment of a tariff and regulation-free
zone with free movement of goods, labour and finance – had been effectively
established by 1968, ahead of schedule. Three years earlier, in 1965, the three
European institutions, Euratom, the ECSC and the Common Market had been
joined by the Merger Treaty. It was therefore time to consider the next phase
of development.
In the meantime the Community was expanding at last. Three countries joined
in 1973. These were Britain, Ireland and Denmark.
The Single European Act 1985–87
By 1985 the Community was ready to take a further step forward. This was
movement towards the creation of a single market. This involved three main
provisions:
1 There was to be completely free movement of goods, capital and people
between member states. There was already such a provision in theory.
However, in practice there were still various forms of restriction. For
example members were still preventing some people from moving from one
country to another. This inhibited the idea of a free labour market. There
were still various forms of restrictions and concessions on the movement of
goods through borders. Duty free concessions were an example, as were
variable health and safety regulations. Banking practices also varied so that
there was not a truly free capital market.
2 Each member state was to incorporate the Single European Act into their
own laws. This meant that it would be illegal in terms of each country’s own
domestic laws to discriminate against any goods, labour or capital being
exchanged within the EC. Each member was thus fully committed to the
single market and would no longer be able to obstruct progress.
3 A target date of 1992 was set for the final completion of the single market.
The Single European Act (SEA) was finalised in 1985, ratified at the Council
of Ministers in 1986 and had been incorporated into the law of every member
state by 1987. It is, of course, an irony that the SEA was fully supported by
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Britain’s Prime Minister of the day, Margaret Thatcher. Possibly the most
important step in the development of European integration (perhaps with the
exception of the single currency) was therefore backed by the leader who was
later to become one of the most implacable opponents of the extension of the
European union.
The SEA also gave the European Parliament some additional powers, notably
to veto the introduction of new members. More importantly, however, the SEA
extended the scope of qualified majority voting. At this stage it may be useful
to discuss the issue of qualified voting.
Qualified majority voting (QMV)
When European integration began, and especially when there were only six
members, it was assumed that all decisions would require the agreement of all
the members. This effectively meant that each member would have a veto over
all decisions. The importance of this principle cannot be over-emphasised.
If a member state can veto decisions it means that it has not sacrificed its own
national sovereignty to Europe. It also means that each state had an equal
status since everyone’s veto was worth the same. Little Luxembourg could
obstruct a decision as easily as Germany, the biggest member. This is all very
well in terms of sovereignty. However, it makes decision-making extremely
difficult. In order to make progress, therefore, the Community had to introduce
majority voting.
A straight forward majority vote system, as applies in domestic parliaments is
not, however, desirable. This would take away the power of states to an
unacceptable extent. Conversely, it would mean that an alliance of the smaller
states could thwart the will of the larger members. For example, when there
were six members, the four smallest states would have been able to outvote
France and Germany together! Clearly a compromise was needed. A system
was required which would take account of the differing size of member states,
but would also protect the small states from being ‘bullied’ by the larger ones.
The answer was qualified majority voting. Each state is given a differential
voting power, according to size. With 15 members the voting powers were as
shown in table 13.1.
It needs a total of 62 votes to pass any measure through the Council of
Ministers. Thus a small group of countries, say UK, Italy, Belgium and Luxem-
bourg, who total 27 votes, can prevent a measure being adopted. Conversely,
even the four biggest members together cannot force a measure through as
they only have 40 votes.
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The QMV system has steadily been extended, both at Maastricht (1992) and
Nice (2000). So more and more sovereignty has been given up by members.
But the unanimous vote remains for crucial issues.
Jacques Delors, 1985–94
Jacques Delors, a French socialist, became President of the Commission and
thus the most senior permanent policy maker in 1985, the year the Single
European Act was developed. His election (by the Council of Ministers) marked
a new direction for Europe. He wanted to see progress in two areas.
Firstly, Delors recognised that there would eventually have to be monetary
union if Europe were to move towards a genuinely single market. His idea was
a four-part plan:
1 Prospective members of a single currency system would be required to
adhere strictly to the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) which already
existed. He understood that this system of fixed exchange rates to bring the
economies of Europe closer together had to be supported.
2 The economies of member states would have to ‘converge’. Convergence
meant that key economic variables such as inflation, interest rates,
government borrowing and unemployment would have to become similar
in all the member states. This would reduce the potentially disruptive
effects of adopting a single currency.
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Table 13.1 EU members’ voting strengths 
before 2004 enlargement
Country Votes
Germany 10
France 10
Italy 10
UK 10
Spain 8
Belgium 5
Holland 5
Greece 5
Portugal 5
Austria 4
Sweden 4
Ireland 3
Denmark 3
Finland 3
Luxembourg 2
Total 87
Qualified majority 62
3 There would be an interim phase during which the currencies would be
absolutely fixed against one another and interest rates would be set for all
members by the European Central Bank. This would prevent disturbances
in the finance markets of Europe. It would also enable countries to adopt
the single currency smoothly in a short period.
4 There would be a rapid changeover to the single currency by all member
countries at the same time.
In the event the Delors plan was adopted and came to fruition on 1 January
2002.
Secondly, Delors wanted to see progress towards closer political union. It was
this intention which infuriated Margaret Thatcher. During the negotiations for
the Single European Act she had accepted what was seen as an inevitable
development. After the SEA, however, Delors wanted to see further progress
as quickly as possible. His determination led to Thatcher’s speech at a
European conference in Bruges in 1988 in which she repudiated the idea of a
closer union. This marked a clear watershed in Britain’s relationship with
Europe. The Conservative party moved decisively towards a Euro-sceptic
position. Even so Britain did join the Exchange Rate Mechanism (a decision
which Thatcher agreed to with great reluctance). In theory, therefore, Britain
could have entered the single currency system up to the point when she was
forced out of the ERM in September 1992.
Delors was undaunted by Thatcher’s opposition and moved steadily towards
the ratification of his plan. He was finally successful at Maastricht in 1992.
Maastricht Treaty 1992
Formally known as the Treaty of European Union, Maastricht marked a signif-
icant step forward. The name of the organisation changed to the European
Union. This change was more than cosmetic. The term ‘Union’ suggested that
members intended to form a closer, more permanent institution.
Maastricht had a number of facets, making it not only one of the biggest steps
forward, but also one of the most extensive. Its main provisions were as
follows:
 The future political development of the Union was to be based on the
principle of subsidiarity. This established that government institutions
should be as de-centralised as possible. The concept of subsidiarity is
discussed in more detail below.
 The Single European Act was incorporated into the Treaty of Rome. In
effect this gave the European Union a ‘constitution’ for the first time.
 A number of further decision-making areas were to become the subject of
qualified majority voting rather than unanimity. The significance of this
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has been described above. By removing national vetoes over a number of
functions, national sovereignty was further eroded. It was this measure
which caused the British Prime Minister, John Major, so many problems
with his own party.
 A commitment was made to establish in the future a European Defence
force and to move towards a common set of foreign policies.
 There was a final commitment to move towards a single European
currency. The year 2002 was agreed as the target date. Three countries,
including the UK were allowed to opt out of this aspect of the Treaty.
 In order to facilitate and maintain the single currency, the principle of
convergence was developed. It was recognised that it was essential, if the
Euro was to work, for all members of the system to adopt economic
policies which would prevent major disruption of monetary union. Thus,
for example, it was recognised that member countries would have to keep
control over inflation, public borrowing and unemployment according to
fixed targets. In this way a single interest rate, set by the European Central
Bank, could be applicable to all the European economies.
 It was agreed that there would be movement towards the idea of ‘European
citizenship’. This implied completely free movement of people between
member countries (a process which had already begun as a result of the
Schengen Agreement of 1985), equal citizenship rights throughout the
Union and some progress towards common policing for international
crimes. In the longer term there was an intention to create a ‘European Bill
of Rights’ which would be binding on all members.
 An attempt was made to reduce the democratic deficit in the Union’s
political institutions. In particular, the Parliament was given greater
powers of legislative amendment and veto. There were also increased
powers given to the Court of Auditors which would better enable them to
investigate cases of corruption.
 The Social Chapter was negotiated. This established a wide range of
rights for workers such as the ‘working hour directive’ to prevent exces-
sively long hours of work and short holidays, rights for women workers
with or without children, equal treatment for part-time workers and
stronger safeguards against unjustified job losses. As with the single
currency issue, Britain negotiated an opt-out from the Social Chapter
based on demands from the Conservative party. It was felt that the protec-
tions offered would make the labour market considerably less flexible and
make Britain uncompetitive. In the event, the Labour party made a
commitment to sign the Social Chapter and did so as one of its first acts
when it won power in 1997.
The first four clauses of article B of the treaty is worth reproducing in full as it
summarises clearly the direction the Union is to take:
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TREATY OF EUROPEAN UNION, 1992
Article B
The Union shall set itself the following objectives:
• To promote economic and social progress which is balanced and sustainable in
particular through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the
strengthening of economic and social cohesion and through the establishment of
economic and monetary union, ultimately including a single currency in accordance
with the provisions of this Treaty.
• To assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation
of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common
defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.
• To strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its member
states through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union.
• To develop close co-operation on justice and home affairs.
So the European Union became wider and deeper. Maastricht was very much
the creation of Commission President Jacques Delors and proved to be his
greatest achievement. This is not to say that it was an unqualified success for
the supporters of European integration. We can assess the significance of the
Treaty by comparing its successes and failures.
Successes
 At least twelve of the members did commit themselves to closer union.
Indeed the outcome of Maastricht was entitled ‘Ever Closer Union’.
 All signatories to the single currency accepted that they would have to
accept economic disciplines in order to maintain stability under the
convergence criteria.
 The Social Chapter represented a major step forward for the rights of
workers and for establishing a genuinely open labour market throughout
the continent.
 The single currency issue was resolved and, as we now know, the timetable
towards union proved to be realistic and achievable.
 By insisting on the concept of subsidiarity the European Union made some
progress towards allaying fears that it was becoming little more than a
centralised bureaucracy.
Partial failures
 The treaty failed to establish a firm principle of citizenship. Although there
was an intention to move towards common rights and responsibilities, no
specific measures were taken.
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 Despite committing themselves to the idea of common defence and foreign
policies there was little progress in determining how this might be
achieved.
 Schengen had begun the process of establishing free movement but
Maastricht failed to persuade all members, notably the UK, that they
should abandon border restrictions.
Failures
 Clearly the fact that the UK remained determined to opt out of key
elements – mainly the single currency and Social Chapter – can be seen as
a failure to persuade John Major to stand up to the rebels in his own party.
In the event this proved to be a disaster for the Conservatives. Britain’s
uncertain position at Maastricht split the Conservative party and
contributed to its heavy defeat in the 1997 election.
 Attempts the democratise the political institutions were feeble and did
little to reduce claims that the Union was not really interested in
democracy.
So we can see that Maastricht enjoyed limited success. It is likely that the
movement towards a single currency will prove in the future to have been its
principal achievement.
Amsterdam Agreement 1997
Negotiated between 1995 and 1997, the Treaty came into force in 1999. If
Maastricht had been a series of intentions, Amsterdam was a confirmation of
those policies, converting them into commitments. It was also designed to
establish and modernise many of the Union’s institutions. This was for three
purposes. Firstly, the various bodies needed the necessary powers to carry
forward the plans which had been agreed at Maastricht. Secondly, the changes
were intended to make the institutions more democratic. Finally, the
agreement anticipated the enlargement of the EU.
The areas covered were:
 The establishment of common rights for all, completely free movement of
people, common policies on asylum and immigration. This to include a
common system of freedom of information for all citizens.
 Common standards in the fields of the environment, consumer protection
and public health standards.
 There was a more precise commitment to common defence and foreign
policies. A ‘High Representative’ to express common foreign policy and
represent the Union as a whole was to be appointed (in the event Javier
Solana was the first holder of this post).
Understanding British and European political issues204
 The voting allocations in the Council were agreed to take account of the
next group of new members.
 A series of proposals to democratise the institutions of the Union before
they were to be enlarged by the addition of new members.
It was especially recognised that future new members might have extremely
variable standards of human rights, treatment of immigrants, health and
consumer protection arrangements. By establishing these standards new
members would be left in no doubt as to what was expected of them.
Potentially, however, it was the institutional changes which are likely to have
the most profound results. These are described in more detail in the ‘Institu-
tions’ chapter of this book (14).
THEORIES OF INTEGRATION
Now that we have reviewed the various stages by which European Union has
evolved and integration has matured, we can examine the various theories of
integration which have guided the process and which are likely to inform the
debate about future developments.
International co-operation
This is the weakest form of integration. It means that groups of nations may
meet regularly to discuss matters of mutual concern. However, if they are
unwilling to give up national sovereignty, action can only be taken if they
succeed in reaching agreement among themselves. Countries may be legally
bound by the resulting agreement if a treaty is signed, but nobody needs to
feel coerced.
In such a scenario, each issue must be negotiated in its own right. There is a
general commitment by countries to try to reach agreement, but this may not
prove possible. If there is no supra-national body to which they have given up
sovereignty, the organisation need not be threatened if agreement cannot be
reached. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has always operated
largely on the basis of such co-operation. Members sacrificed no national sover-
eignty to NATO, but have agreed from time to time to engage in mutual action,
sometimes even committing their own troops to military action under ‘foreign’
commanders. But in every case the member countries have been free to
withdraw co-operation without losing their membership of NATO. The British
Commonwealth is a further example of this kind of organisation. It only acts if
members can agree (for example to adopt sanctions against the apartheid
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regime in South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s). The Commonwealth, like
NATO, has never been able to act independently of its own membership.
Had the European Community adopted this form of integration, there can be
little doubt that it would have made little progress towards a single market
and may not, indeed, have survived at all. The steps needed to create a single
market and monetary union were so radical, that they required members to
accept that they had to cede some sovereignty to the Community.
Neo-functionalism
When the European Coal and Steel Community was created there began a
process by which European countries began to transfer national sovereignty to
a supra-national body. In these early stages it was clear that the way forward
was for various government functions to be given over by member states. At
first it was control over the trade in coal, iron and steel. When the European
Community itself was formed, controls over trade in general were transferred.
As we have seen in the review which is described above, more and more
functions have moved over to Brussels. Policy and law on agriculture, fisheries,
environmental control, consumer issues, working conditions and many others
followed trade as functions which member governments were willing to
give up.
This approach to integration can be described as neo-functionalism. It is a
gradualist approach which is attractive to those of a more conservative dispo-
sition. Countries do not have to give up control over a function if they do not
wish to. The European Community has always allowed members a veto over
any change in functional responsibility. Thus Britain was able to negotiate opt-
outs from the single currency and the Social Chapter when Conservative
governments felt they were a step too far, functions which they were not
willing to give up. By the same token, functionalism means that a consensus
is always needed if further integration is to take place.
The alternative to functionalism is to transfer political sovereignty to the
supranational body and then allow that body to decide which functions it
wishes to take over. The end result may appear similar, but the process of trans-
ference in functionalism is more cautious and remains in the control of
individual members. It is this latter principle which has always governed the
way in which European integration has proceeded.
Pooled sovereignty
Opponents of European integration have always stressed the fact that national
sovereignty has to be sacrificed if progress is to be made. In other words the
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transfer of sovereignty is seen as a negative development. In some ways this is
a valid argument. It is undeniably true that members of the European Union
have had to give up some of the independent functions of their national
governments.
A less sceptical view can, however, be considered. This suggests that members
are not giving up sovereignty, but simply sharing it with others or ‘pooling’ it.
The losses of national sovereignty are, in this way, compensated for by gains
in sovereignty over other states in the Union. Thus, for example, when Britain
finally signed the Social Chapter in 1997 it lost some national sovereignty over
the regulations concerning conditions in the work place. On the other hand,
any future developments in this field have to be negotiated and Britain will
have some say in future working conditions in Germany, Greece, Spain and
every other member state.
There are also functions which are, by their very nature, supranational. This
certainly applies to environmental protection (pollution, for example, does
not recognise national borders). Similarly, as an increasing proportion of
output is accounted for by multi-national companies, national governments
become unable to control their operations. Policy on competition (i.e.
opposing monopoly power) must, therefore, be carried out at supra-national
level. In such cases sovereignty has to be pooled.
This notion of pooled sovereignty will not do for its opponents They have
argued that national sovereignty is of a much higher order than shared sover-
eignty. The domestic government has much more interest in managing its own
affairs – after all national governments are elected primarily to do that – than
in interfering in the affairs of others.
Federalism
This model of integration has been a common way in which groups of
sovereign states have come together to form a larger union. Perhaps the most
celebrated example of a federal settlement was the creation of the United
States of America in 1787. Germany is another prominent example, as are
Nigeria, Russia and India.
Federalism is the consequence of a tension which exists between two opposing
forces. One is an overwhelming desire to create a new state. The Americans
felt that they could not survive in a hostile world as thirteen separate
countries. In Germany the driving force for union was partly economic, partly
cultural, a need to unite the Germanic peoples and restore national pride. The
other is the determination of the states which are to be absorbed by the new
union to retain some of their own sovereignty.
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The result of such a conflict is a federal settlement. All the uniting states agree
to give up sovereignty over certain government responsibilities. Furthermore,
their decision is permanent. They do not expect ever to repossess these
sovereign powers. At the same time the participants identify which powers
they wish to retain for themselves. Here it is understood that the central, or
federal, authority will never be able to take over these ‘reserved’ sovereign
powers without the permission of the separate states.
At first sight, federalism seems an attractive blueprint for the constitutional
future of the European Union. Member countries would retain their own
sovereignty and there would be no way that Brussels would be able to get its
hands on them in the future. But there remain problems, the main examples
of which are shown in the box.
Problems with federalism
• A European federal state would be a new state which would stand above the member
states. In other words, national governments would be downgraded and seen as
inferior. This is certainly the experience of other federal states.
• Federalism also implies permanence. Under existing arrangements member states feel
they have the opportunity to change their relationship with the centre through negoti-
ation. This is not the case with a federal settlement which would be ‘entrenched’.
• There is a fear that there would be a tendency for the federal authority to gather more
and more powers to itself. Until President Reagan began to reverse the process in the
1980s, it was certainly true that the federal government of the United States gained
power over the individual states.
• In all other federal arrangements, the most important powers have been given to the
centre. These include economic and monetary control, defence, foreign affairs and
internal security. The individual states have, by contrast, been confined to less funda-
mental activities such as social policy, transport and planning.
Nevertheless federalism is seen by some as the way forward for Europe.
European government
Opponents of complete political integration tend to refer to this vision as the
European super-state. Supporters see such a development as possibly inevitable
and certainly desirable. The latter view is both radical and genuinely interna-
tionalist. It is based on the proposition that the independent nation-state has
had its day. They believe that its survival will hinder progress and argue further
that the nation-state has been a historical phenomenon which is not appro-
priate in the modern age of globalisation and interdependence.
Ironically, it was a great Conservative politician, Winston Churchill, who was
one of the first post-war statesman to dare to suggest the idea of a European
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government. He suggested that a single sovereign government for Europe
would be the only way to prevent conflict between the nations of the
continent. To those who feared that such a government would destroy cultural
diversity, Churchilll replied that culture was a European phenomenon in itself,
more important than national cultures.
In the event Churchill’s ideas were far too radical for most British politicians.
Meanwhile, on continental Europe, they were rejected as an attempt to
sponsor British domination. There remain a few supporters to this day, but the
idea of sacrificing all national sovereignty to a European state is unlikely to
find widespread favour in the foreseeable future.
Subsidiarity
This principle was adopted for the European Union at Maastricht in 1992. It
is fundamentally a liberal idea, but has also been shared by many socialists
and even some conservatives throughout the continent.
To understand it we should be aware that government in Europe can be carried
out at four different levels. These are: supranational (Europe), national,
regional, local.
We can now consider what functions of government can and should be carried
out at each level. Clearly there are some functions which should be divided
between two or more levels, but the principle of subsidiarity suggests that
there is normally a rational division of powers. The box demonstrates a likely
scheme of subsidiarity.
A scheme of subsidiarity
• Supranational. International trade; environmental protection; defence; foreign affairs;
long-distance transport; finance; some indirect taxation; energy planning; competition
control; consumer protection; workers’ protection; agriculture and fishing.
• National. Health care; criminal law; direct taxation; micro-economic development; arts
and culture; personal taxation; national transport; welfare benefits; environment;
higher education.
• Regional. Regional transport; environment; urban planning and regeneration; rural
affairs; economic development; some indirect taxation.
• Local. Education; personal social services; local planning; local transport; local
environment; crime prevention and detection; provision for the aged; mental health
provision; local taxation.
There are two striking features of such a scheme. The first is that a large
number of key functions are shown at supranational level. This may appear
alarming to defenders of national interests. However, it should be pointed out
these are issues which do not impact on the everyday lives of citizens so that
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European government may not bear down on citizens quite as heavily as may
be feared.
The second feature is that most functions in this scheme are not placed at
national level. To some extent this is a natural process. It is becoming increas-
ingly impractical for nation-states to be able to control many issues. Some
examples can illustrate this second point.
● Defence. Traditional wars of invasion and defence are over. Conflicts are
increasingly international, highly technical and can only be dealt with through
international action. Problems in the Balkans, the Gulf and with terrorism
after 2001 are clear examples.
● Foreign policy. Individual countries have insufficient influence to be able to
shape international events. As Europe becomes a single economic bloc, issues
concerning trade and economic issues must be conducted collectively.
● Environment. Environmental problems such as global warming, emissions
control, energy depletion, conservation issues do not recognise national
boundaries.
● Competition. Since most large corporations are now multinational, control of
monopoly power must also be carried out on a supra-national basis.
At the same time the process of European integration itself has taken functions
away from nation-states. Again some examples are shown below:
● Monetary union. Control over finance, interest rates and money supply is now
European based.
● Single labour market. Uniform regulations concerning working conditions etc.
needed.
● Single product markets. Consumer protection and trade regulations are
controlled in Europe.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 In what ways and to what extent has European integration eroded
the sovereignty of nation-states in Europe?
2 Why was the Maastricht Treaty considered a major step towards
European integration?
3 Identify, describe and analyse the key stages in European
integration since 1957.
4 Is Europe destined to become a new ‘super-state’?
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PROBLEMS FOR STUDY
One of the errors which is often made in studying the institutions of the
European Union is to attempt a comparison with national political systems.
This carries a number of difficulties. The EU is not like a national state (though
it may be ever closer to becoming one). There are crucial distinctions which
must be borne in mind. These include the following.
The EU remains an organisation of nations rather than a full-scale suprana-
tional body. The members are not yet prepared to abandon national interests
completely. Instead, they have shown a willingness to reach a series of agree-
ments with other states. This may involve compromises, deals and accommo-
dations to the interests of others, but it does not mean that national distinc-
tions can be put aside. This affects very deeply the nature of the EU’s
institutions. They have to have different functions and methods of operation
to national governments. The latter do not have the problem of attempting to
reconcile national differences (though divergent regional interests are often a
problem). This is not the case with the EU.
Partly because of its international nature, and partly because of the great
variations between member states, the EU lacks political coherence. This
means it is difficult to find common purposes in the way that individual states
do. Britain in the years following 1997, for example, has had a clear need and
14Institutions of the European Union
 Introductory information concerning the study of institutions
 Analysis of the concepts used to assess the nature and operation of the
institutions
 Descriptions of the role, composition and operation of the main institutions:
the Commission, Parliament, Council of Ministers and Court of Justice
 Analysis of some of the problems and issues concerning the institutions
 Brief descriptions of the role of other, less central institutions of the EU
desire the improve public services. Germany has had to overcome the
problems of reunification since 1991. Poorer countries like Portugal, Ireland
and Greece have naturally been concerned with the need for economic devel-
opment. France worries about the future of its agricultural base. The EU has
had one overwhelming goal – to achieve the single market and monetary
union – but thereafter its purposes are less clear. Also less coherent are the
main political issues and conflicts. This is what makes the party system
meaningful and gives the electorate a clear picture of what government is
doing and how it is performing. Conflicts within the EU tend to be national in
nature, rather than about political issues. We tend to think about political
institutions in terms of parties, policies, manifestos and mandates. This does
not work so well with the EU.
Each member state has its own distinctive political system. Furthermore,
political control of each country may change at any time. As we have seen
above, the EU is very much about negotiation between member states, so
problems are bound to arise when the political situations within member
states are liable to change at any time. For example, when the issues
surrounding the single currency and the Social Chapter were being resolved,
Britain was governed by a party which was both fundamentally split on these
concerns and eventually decided to opt out. After 1997, however, the British
position changed, particularly in the case of the Social Chapter. Thus the
landscape of discussion has altered. Similarly, we may consider the practice
of Denmark and Ireland to put important constitutional changes to a refer-
endum. Thus Denmark voted against the Maastricht Treaty (on deeper
economic and monetary union) and Ireland against the Nice Agreement (on
enlargement). Both events caused consternation and delay within the EU.
The European Union does not operate in a vacuum. Its institutions,
therefore, must take account of the fact that it is at the mercy of political
currents within member states. After enlargement this problem is likely to
grow more serious.
We must also be careful, when considering the institutions, not to assume that
they carry out the same functions as their apparent ‘counterparts’ in national
governments. The European Parliament, for example, cannot be described
accurately as a ‘legislature’, even though that is its title. Its functions are
certainly different in most respects from that of Westminster. Similarly, we
may think of the Council of Ministers and the Commission as the Union’s
government and bureaucracy respectively. This would be a mistake. The
Commission, as we shall see, carries out some functions normally assigned to
government. The Council, meanwhile, is, to a large extent, the main legislative
body. The Court of Justice does interpret law as national judiciaries do, but the
main judicial role is played by national courts.
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Useful approaches for study
If it is dangerous to think of institutions purely in terms of functions and
processes, how can we usefully study them? An answer may be to apply a
variety of political concepts to them. In this way we can judge how well they
perform and where there are weaknesses which need to be addressed. Some
examples of this approach are shown below:
Democracy
If we use the term democracy in its broadest sense, i.e. government being open
to the influence of popular opinion and ensuring its decisions are based on
popular will, every institution can be usefully interrogated. Does the European
Union respond meaningfully to European opinion? Is it possible to have
influence over the institutions? Do decision makers take opinion into account?
Do parties and pressure groups reflect opinion effectively through the institu-
tions? These are all important questions about European democracy.
Representation
Political institutions have a primary duty to represent the people and the
various groups which make up civil society. All the EU institutions seek to do
this. They have a special difficulty in that they must be nationally represen-
tative as well as seeking to reflect the many political ideas and interests which
flourish throughout Europe. All the four main institutions – Parliament,
Commission, Council and Court of Justice – have arrangements to try to make
them representative. How well these arrangements serve the people, however,
is another matter which we will consider below.
Accountability
This is a special problem in so large a political community as the EU. It is also
difficult as only one body – Parliament – is directly elected. The ministers who
meet regularly to make key decisions are accountable to their own people and
parliaments, but not to the people of Europe as a whole. If you are a British
citizen, some decisions which will affect you are made by ministers from Italy,
Belgium, Portugal and the rest. But these ministers cannot be made respon-
sible to that British citizen.
Authority and legitimacy
Political power should only be exercised in a democracy where there is proper
authority for that power. Only with such authority can an institution be said
to be legitimate. European Union institutions draw their authority from less
secure sources than do national bodies. Parliament is elected, of course, which
helps a great deal. However, turnouts to these elections vary and it is rarely
clear how well or otherwise an MEP (member of the European Parliament) has
performed his or her duties. They also represent huge electorates who cannot
be expected to know where they satand on many issues. The leading Commis-
sioners are appointed by the European Council, which gives them a high form
of authority, but we are used to members of the government needing a more
direct form of authority. The Council of Ministers carry the authority as
individuals of their own governments. However, as a collective body they have
much weaker authority, especially as we may not know how individual
ministers have reached their own decisions.
Limited government
It is a basic principle of liberal democracy that government should have strict
legal limitations placed on its powers. There should also be instruments in
place to ensure that it does not overstep these limits. We may usefully ask,
therefore, whether strong enough safeguards do exist and, if so, how well they
are enforced.
Students of European government and politics may well consider other
democratic concepts in the same way. For example such issues as human
rights, the separation of powers, the rule of law and open government may be
treated in the same way.
The European Commission
Role
It is difficult to sum up the role of the Commission in one single word. In some
ways it is like a cabinet which discusses policy and sets agendas, it is a bureau-
cracy which administers the operation of the EU and it is also a policy-making
machine. The term executive is possibly the best single term if we are to insist
on one, but even this is not wholly satisfactory. One thing the Commission is
certainly not is a decision-making body. It has no democratic legitimacy and
no popular mandate to be able to do so.
The main thrust of the Commission has been to drive forward the strategic
development of the Union. In particular this has involved the creation of the
single market and, since 1992, the achievement of monetary union. The
Commission has developed the timetable and procedures for such change and
has recommended the measures needed to realise the aims of greater union.
At each stage towards closer union the Commission has produced initiatives
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which provide the Council of Ministers (which is the union’s regular decision-
making body) and the European Council (which makes strategic decisions)
with the framework for progress. In effect the Commission therefore produces
draft treaties and amendments to existing ones or draft legislation and regula-
tions for discussion by the Council of Ministers or European Council.
It also administers the existing systems of the European Union, such as the
Common Agriculture and Fisheries Policy, environmental protection, regional
policy, transport projects, competition policy and the Social Chapter. Working
with member governments the Commission is occupied with the task of
ensuring that all these programmes operate effectively. In cases where it feels
that a country may be in breach of laws and regulations it will report the
matter to the European Court of Justice for possible legal enforcement. Part of
this wider task is to produce an annual budget for the Union. This means
setting the level of contributions from member states (according to agreed
formulas) and determining how the finances should be distributed through
the programmes referred to above. The budget must be approved by the
European Parliament so there may be a period of prolonged negotiation before
it is settled.
Particularly after 2000, the Commission has a special role to play in the
enlargement of the Union. It must make the plans for the admission of new
members. This may involve special transitional arrangements, adjustments to
existing policies and major reform of budgetary arrangements. As new appli-
cants have emerged, the Commission have conducted negotiations and
research into the prospective member’s suitability.
The European Union, as a single political entity, must deal with other states
and organisations. This may involve trade disputes and agreements, transport
arrangements, environmental protection, diplomatic problems, issues of inter-
national crime and the like. Though the heads of government may often
capture the headlines at international conferences, it is the Commission which
deals with day-to-day international relations.
We may now summarise the Commission’s functions as follows:
 developing policies to realise full economic and monetary union;
 managing existing European Union programmes;
 developing the Union’s annual budget;
 making the necessary arrangements for enlargement;
 managing the union’s external relations.
Structure
The Commission is headed by its President. He or she is the most visible
symbol of European unity and can therefore be seen at the outset as a
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figurehead. As we shall see, the Commission is divided into nineteen
functional sections, but the President is able to represent the Commission as a
whole. It is the President who represents the strategic policies coming out of
the Commission. He or she has the authority to deal with members’ most
senior ministers up to head of government level, and can also deal personally
with other states and international organisations outside the Union. The best-
known President was, arguably, Jacques Delors (1985–94) whose vision and
drive led to the development of full economic and monetary union. His
successor, Jacques Santer (1994–99) was charged with the realisation of
monetary union. Romano Prodi (1999–) has been very much concerned with
issues surrounding enlargement and a common defence and foreign policy.
The President is nominated by the European Council on the retirement of the
existing holder. This nomination must be approved by the European
Parliament. Naturally, it is a crucial decision and the subject of extensive
political activity. Three main issues arise: the nationality of the candidate,
their political stance in domestic politics and their more general position on
the future of Europe.
A word of caution is needed at this stage. The term ‘President’, like so many in
the Union, may be misleading. Normally a political President is a country’s
head of state. He or she becomes the representative of a whole people who
takes the lead in international affairs, crises and emergencies. Presidents also
involve themselves in the business of government formation, often
nominating heads of government and other ministers for parliamentary
approval. This does not describe the EU President. There is no European state
(yet!) so there can be no head of state. He does not have the legitimacy of
national presidents because he is not elected by the people and so has no
popular mandate. There is also no European ‘government’ in the normal sense
of the word so he has no role in that direction. The use of the word ‘President’
simply refers to the fact that he is head of the Commission.
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European Commission
Presidency Development and Humanitarian Aid
Vice Presidency (Administrative Reform) Enlargement
Vice Presidency (Transport and Energy) External Relations
Agriculture Trade
Competition Policy Health and Consumer Protection
Internal Market Regional policy
Research Education and Culture
Enterprise and Information Budget
Economic and Monetary Affairs Environment
Employment and Social Affairs Justice and Home Affairs
The rest of the Commission is divided into nineteen sections, each one headed
by a Commissioner.
This list also demonstrates the range of activities which are the current
concerns of the European Union.
Commissioners are appointed by the relevant Council of Ministers. Their
nomination must be approved by the European Parliament and they can be
removed by the Parliament. They are required to be politicians who have held
a ‘prominent’ position in their own countries before entering the Commission.
Some of Britain’s commissioners illustrate this principle. Chris Patten was
Conservative party Chairman, cabinet minister and the last British Governor of
Hong Kong, Leon Brittan had been Home Secretary and Neil Kinnock was a
former leader of the Labour party. Each operates with a small ‘cabinet’ (not to
be confused with the British-style Cabinet) who are close advisers. Below them
comes a small army of European civil servants, who make up the European
Union bureaucracy. They number 15,000 approximately. This is, in fact, a very
small figure. It would, for example, represent the same size as a single small
government department in Britain. The limited size of the Commission reflects,
firstly, the fact that its role is limited and, secondly, that much of the adminis-
trative work of Europe is carried out by member countries themselves.
Each Commissioner must work closely with their own Council of Ministers
(see below). They must also forge close links with relevant ministers in all the
member countries. Their role is, therefore, political in the sense that they must
attempt to resolve conflicts and seek compromises or consensus. They are not,
however, political in that they are expected to be politically neutral and not to
favour any single member state.
As a group the Commissioners sit as the Court of Commissioners – the nearest
the European has to a cabinet, though it does not finalise any decisions. They
are presided over by the Commission President. The court co-ordinates the
policies of all the sections and discusses and recommends future policy for the
Union as a whole.
Operation and processes
Each section of the Commission is expected to formulate policies which will
carry forward the aims of the Union in their own particular area of jurisdiction.
These policy suggestions are known as initiatives. They are often confused by
the media with decisions. Initiatives are not decisions. They are merely
proposals for discussion by the Council of Ministers or the European Council.
In developing policy the Commission consults very widely. Apart from the
governments and other politicians from member states, pressure groups centre
a great deal of their activities on the Commission. Political groupings in the
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Parliament may send delegations, as may parties from individual states. Much
of the process also involves senior members of the bureaucracies of member
states. Indeed each state has a permanent Civil Service establishment in
Brussels whose role is to liaise with Commissioners.
Initiatives are sent both to the European Parliament and the Council. A
number of outcomes may result. They may simply be rejected outright. They
may be amended by Parliament or the Council and referred back to the
Commission. The Commission may accept amendments, but, if there can be
no agreement, they may insist that amended proposals are passed by a
unanimous decision of the Council, rather than just a majority. In some cases
the initiative will be accepted unaltered.
When a policy has been adopted the Commission is charged with the task of
implementing the decision. As we have already said, this may involve making
arrangements with member governments. In such cases they will oversee the
operation of the policy. In some cases the Commission itself will implement
the policy.
Commissioners must appear regularly before the European Parliament and its
committees. On these occasions they must account for what their section is
doing and may be asked to explain their policy initiatives. The budget which
the Commission produces annually is also the subject of parliamentary
scrutiny. Often the Commission is forced to reconsider the budget after it has
been rejected by the Parliament. In extreme circumstances the Parliament can
also dismiss the whole Commission or an individual commissioner. The best
known example of such an event occurred in 1999 when the entire
Commission was forced to resign amid charges of corruption and nepotism
against some of its members. Since then the European Parliament has
conducted much closer scrutiny over commissioners.
Problems and issues
Many of the arguments concerning the ‘democratic deficit’ in Europe have
centred on the Commission. This is because it has not been accountable
enough for its activities. However, its legitimacy can also be questioned as can
its credentials as a representative body.
Before 1999 the Commission was usually seen as a law unto itself, exposing
itself to the minimum of accountability. In its defence the Commission could
always claim that it was not the decision-making body of the Union and
control was therefore exercised by the Council of Ministers. This has certainly
been true. However, its strategic position means that it has had a huge amount
of influence over the development of the EU. As such, it has always needed to
be accountable. Since 1999, when the whole Commission was forced to resign
by parliamentary action, commissioners have been forced to report to
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Parliament on a regular basis. Corruption of any kind can mean instant
dismissal. Parliament also now reserves the right of veto over major appoint-
ments. So, to some extent, the problem has been addressed.
Representation is said to be assured by the fact that every member state shall
have one of its nationals as a commissioner. The larger countries have more
than one. This is largely a cosmetic device as commissioners are required to
put aside any national leanings they may have. It should, therefore, not be
necessary for them to be drawn from a representative sample of member
countries. Despite this there remains a problem. As an unelected body the
Commission cannot be said to be truly representative. It has no elective
mandate and the peoples of member states have no say in their appointment.
It may be that, in the future, there will be demands for at least the senior
commissioners to be elected.
The Commission draws its authority, and therefore its legitimacy, from the
Council of Ministers. This is a partially democratic process, but the
appointment of commissioners remains shrouded in some mystery and may lie
very much in the hands of the larger countries. A greater involvement for
Parliament may improve the situation, but popular participation in the
formation of the Commission, which would enhance its authority most effec-
tively, looks to be impractical.
The final major issue for the Commission concerns enlargement. With more
members it may be that there will have to be a larger Commission simply to
ensure that each country is properly represented. On the other hand, increased
size may have the beneficial effect of diluting the influence of larger countries
in both appointments and policy making.
The European Parliament
Role
Despite its name and the fact that it is directly elected, the Parliament is not the
legislative body of the European Union. It does not make law, nor legitimise it,
nor does it act as the source of authority for the executive branch. It is not
required that a proposal receives parliamentary approval to be enforceable. It
is also not in a position to develop and propose legislation of its own. The
government of the EU is shared between the Commission and the Council of
Ministers or European Council. None of these bodies are drawn from the
parliament. In other words the European Parliament does not perform three of
the most important functions of most national parliaments.
Having established what it is not, we must ask what the European Parliament
actually does. Its main role is a consultative one. It would be false to suggest
that the Parliament has the power to veto a proposal outright. The role of the
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Parliament in legislation is a complex one and it is not the intention here to
describe it in full. To simplify the system, which was mostly established at
Maastricht in 1992, we can identify a number of activities:
● It can attempt to reject a proposal. However, if the Commission and Council
are determined enough, they can force most measures through. However,
Parliament can insist that some proposals require the unanimous approval of
the Council.
● It can suggest amendments. This is more powerful than the veto, but in most
cases an amendment need not be accepted by the Council of Ministers.
● It can refer proposals back to the Commission and the Council for further
consideration, i.e. a delaying power.
● It can approve proposals and so give them greater legitimacy.
As we have seen above, Parliament also has some of the functions we would
expect of a representative assembly. It can:
 oversee and veto the appointment of senior commissioners;
 insist on the dismissal of commissioners who may be corrupt or incom-
petent;
 question commissioners on Union policy and administration;
 examine the annual budget, reject it and seek amendments to it;
 request the Commission to consider new policy initiatives;
 represent and publicise during debates the views of important interest
groups in the Union;
 it has the right to approve or veto an application for membership from a
new country.
Structure
The membership of the Parliament is very complex. It is divided on both
national and political lines. This means that each member (MEP) represents a
nation, a region within that nation and a political position. At different times
and on different issues an MEP might adopt a variable stance. Green party
representatives, for example, are likely to see environmental issues on a
Europe-wide basis and therefore not consider national and regional interests.
Typical Conservatives, on the other hand, will tend to be more interested in
their own nation’s interests. A Liberal might be European oriented on human
rights issues, but protective of regional interests where economic development
is concerned. Table 14.1 shows the representation of the parliament in terms
of nations and of party groupings:
All these MEPs are elected directly and represent areas which are roughly
similar in size. The party groupings are inevitably loose. However, they do
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attempt to act in a unified way wherever possible and where a political issue
is clear cut. However, this is often not possible because of the contrasting
regional, national and political allegiances which MEPs have.
As with most representative assemblies a great deal of the work of the
European Parliament is done by committees of MEPs. These are mainly
standing committees, but there are also special committees convened to deal
with special temporary circumstances. These approximately ‘shadow’ the
main sections of the Commission. Indeed there has developed a growing
relationship between commissioners and their cabinets and the relevant
parliamentary committee. It is through committees also that the accounta-
bility of the Commission can be achieved. The committees also act as focus of
attention for the many pressure and interest groups which now operate at the
European level.
Operation and processes
Since the Maastricht Treaty was ratified in 1994 the main legislative work of
the Parliament has been known as codecision. This suggests that, in a variety
of policy areas, the Parliament has equal power with the Council of Ministers
to approve new laws and developments. The following subjects are subject to
codecision procedure:
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Table 14.1 National and party representation in the European Parliament
National representation Party groups (1999)
Germany 99 European Peoplesa 233
France 87 Socialists 180
UK 87 Liberal Democrats 51
Italy 87 Greens and radicals 48
Left-wing coalition 42
Spain 64 Nationalists 30
Others 42
Holland 31
Greece 25
Belgium 25
Portugal 25
Sweden 22
Austria 21
Denmark 16
Finland 16
Ireland 15
Luxembourg 6
Total 626
a Essentially conservative parties.
 labour markets;
 research and technology;
 matters related to the single market;
 environment;
 consumer protection;
 education and culture;
 health issues.
This list may appear to be quite impressive, until one appreciates what is left
off. Policy areas such as the common agricultural and fisheries policy, taxation,
defence and foreign affairs, new treaties, and regional policy are not yet the
subject of codecision. In other words, Parliament can only pass an opinion on
such issues, a process known as co-operation.
For codecision procedures a proposal is normally considered by a senior
committee member, known as a rapporteur who summarises the proposals
and sets up the discussions. Committees consider proposals, taking evidence
from commissioners and interested groups along the way. They then make
recommendations for amendments or overall approval to the Parliament as a
whole. This is not unlike the legislative system which operates in the Congress
of the USA.
Parliament in plenary session (i.e. all members meeting), normally considers
proposals in two readings. One reading considers amendments, the other
looks at the complete proposal. The decision of Parliament is communicated
to the Council of Ministers who may accept or reject the decisions of the
Parliament. Where a dispute arises a special committee is formed to try to
make compromises and reach a consensus. Where the Parliament only has co-
operative powers, the decisions are also made known to the Council of
Ministers, but the Council does not have to accept them.
In addition to its legislative powers the parliament, as a whole, or as individual
members, may take up the grievances of groups of citizens or even individuals.
This will involve calling commissioners to account for their decisions. A
system of petitions exists whereby large groups from the Union can request
special consideration from Parliament.
Special procedures exist for the other functions of Parliament, including the
admission of new members, consideration of the annual budget, questioning
of commissioners and disciplinary hearings.
Problems and issues
Alongside the Commission the European Parliament stands at the centre of the
issue of the Union’s democratic deficit. This is understandable. When consid-
ering any political system, it is natural to fix our attention on such matters as
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elections, representation, legislation and accountability. These issues always
revolve around the legislature. The striking feature of the Parliament at first
view is its weakness and this is the best place to begin a critique.
WHY IS THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT SO WEAK?
It is a very large, unwieldy body. Even before the post-2002 enlargements it
contained 626 members who are divided, as we have seen, along political,
national and regional lines. Parliaments need a degree of coherence to be able
to act decisively. The European assembly lacks this. It may be in the form of a
party majority, as normally occurs in the United Kingdom, or a logical
coalition of parties, such as a Conservative group of the type which often
dominates the French system. There is certainly no sense of ‘government and
opposition’ which can reduce issues to clear alternatives.
The executive sections of the Union – the Council and Commission – are
not drawn from the Parliament. Indeed the two branches of the political
system are completely separated. This has two effects. On the one hand, it
prevents the executive branch from dominating Parliament. There is no
patronage system to keep MEPs in line, nor are their strong, unified party
groupings. This prevents coherence of the type described above, from devel-
oping. On the other hand, the decision-makers in the Union do not rely on the
support of the Parliament. Most important decisions can be forced through the
Council if it is determined and united enough. Using the American model,
therefore, the Parliament does not act as a ‘check’ or ‘balance’ to the power of
the executive. They do not rely on each other so Parliament does not occupy
a powerful central position.
MEPs have no clear political mandates. When they are elected it is on the
basis of their national rather than European political allegiance. Most voters in
Europe have limited knowledge of EU issues. This prevents them from
granting any clear authority to those whom they elect. When it comes to
European decisions, therefore, MEPs cannot claim to have the authority of
their electorates. European ministers understand this and are not prepared to
submit themselves to the weak authority of parliament. Indeed it can be
argued that the popular authority of national ministers in the council is
stronger than the uncertain authority of MEPs. This greater claim to authority
is inevitably translated into political power. It is therefore more appropriate to
think of Parliament as having influence, rather than power. As a representative
body it can reflect the fluctuating interests and views of the European people,
but its legitimacy actually to make laws is very shaky.
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The power of legislatures is often based on their ability to call government to
account. The European Parliament does have this power over the Commission
and it has, indeed, been strengthened in recent years. However, power in
reality lies with the European Council and the Council of Ministers. These
bodies are not accountable to Parliament. In fact, individual national ministers
are accountable only to their own parliaments.
Many EU decisions are extremely complex in two senses. Firstly, they are
difficult to understand in terms of their consequences. Secondly, they are
difficult to agree and implement because each decision must be applied to
fifteen separate countries. Policies which tax the experience and expertise of
full-time administrators in the Commission are often impenetrable for MEPs
who are rarely experts in the field. The technicalities of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy, the effects of environmental schemes or the implications for
European labour markets of new regulations for part-time workers, for
example, may be simply too complicated for MEPs to consider in a meaningful
way. Where there are clear party groupings and political mandates, such issues
may be reduced by leaders to their bare essentials. It is unusual for this to
happen in the European Parliament.
Parliament has a President who presides over their deliberations, but in
general it has no leaders of its own. Without leaders who can act as figure-
heads and unifying forces the Parliament finds it difficult to deal as a body with
external organisations. This has been especially noticeable in relations with
the developing world. Many MEPs favour stronger European initiatives in the
Third World but have difficulty in presenting a coherent case. With its own
powerful leaders, this kind of parliamentary initiative might have a better
chance of success.
HOW IS PARLIAMENT BECOMING STRONGER?
For supporters of parliamentary power the picture is not totally gloomy. After
the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties the European Parliament became
considerably more powerful. The codecision procedure gave it almost equal
legislative powers with the Council of Ministers over an admittedly limited
range of jurisdiction.
It is also true that the Commission and individual commissioners are more
accountable to Parliament than before. The events of 1999 when the whole
Commission was removed, demonstrated to parliamentarians the true extent
of their potential. In future the nomination of new officials, not least the
President of the Commission himself, will have to take careful account of
parliamentary opinion.
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The party groupings have, correspondingly, become more meaningful. The
Socialist grouping, for example, has acted together very effectively in the field
of workers’ rights, while the Conservative Peoples’ Parties grouping tends to
take a special interest in agricultural affairs. As one would expect the Green
alliance is extremely active in its own special field of interest.
The Commission has responded by strengthening its links with the Parliament.
Their initiatives are now subjected to closer scrutiny by standing committees
so they must take more account of how MEPs are likely to react.
With the d’Estaing Commission (see below) established in the spring of 2002,
more reform is promised. It is widely assumed that the position of Parliament
will form the centrepiece of any new proposals.
THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL
Although this body has a grand title and appears to be of great importance,
given the fact that it is made up of heads of government, we need not spend
too much time in discussing it. This is partly because it normally meets only
twice a year and partly because it is largely only the confirmation of
decisions which have been made elsewhere. Nevertheless, it is the EU body
which received perhaps the most media attention. We must also be careful
not to confuse it with the similarly named Council of Ministers, which is
discussed below.
The European Council is the name given to the normally twice-yearly meeting
of the heads of government of the member states. They meet under the ‘presi-
dency’ of one of the members. Each country takes a turn at the presidency for
six months. This means that a member will be President of the Council every
seven and a half years (less often after enlargement, of course). Being
President is largely symbolic and carries with it the now considerable expense
of organising an international conference. The only other advantage of the
presidency is that the holder may be able to add a few minor items on the
meeting’s agenda which are of special interest to that country.
The Council exists to ratify key strategic decisions. These proposals will have
been negotiated by ministers and officials for months before the actual
meetings. It is at the European Council where the principles of new treaties are
agreed. It also maps out the immediate future of the Union. The heads of
government have the opportunity to settle any final matters which are in
dispute and to find out where each of their fellow members stand on
important issues.
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THE COUNCIL(S) OF MINISTERS
Membership
There is not one Council of Ministers, but several. In fact, the term refers to all
meetings at ministerial level on every subject which comes under EU juris-
diction. Thus there are meetings of all ministers in charge of their own countries’
financial affairs, agriculture, transport, trade, defence, foreign relations etc.
There are normally over a hundred meetings of the various councils in a year.
When ministers meet it is to settle the remaining issues which need to be
resolved. In other words they do not confront each new proposal from scratch.
During the course of the year, a body known as the Committee of Permanent
Representatives (COREPER) prepares the way for ministerial meetings.
These bodies contain civil servants (i.e. not politicians) from member states
who have the permanent role of representing their own countries in the consid-
eration of policies. COREPER is, in many ways, one arm of the senior Civil
Service of the European, the other being senior members of the Commission.
Role and procedure
Before considering the work of the Council itself, we should consider further
the position of COREPER, the permanent form of the Councils. COREPER is
effectively the point at which the interests of the EU as a whole, represented
by the Commission, meets the interests of the various member states – repre-
sented by their permanent officials. It is here, from day to day, that the supra-
national nature of the EU is played out and confirmed. Some national interests
have to be sacrificed for the sake of progress and agreement. Others cannot be
given up and so create problems which may have to be referred to the full
Council of Ministers. Few people outside politics are aware of the existence of
COREPER, but in many ways it is one of the key institutions of Europe.
When the ministers themselves meet they form the sovereign body of the EU.
Their approval is needed for any proposal to become European law. In some
cases, as we have seen above, a codecision is needed with Parliament, but on
the whole it is the Council which is the ultimate source of authority. The
Council has a number of alternative course of action when faced by proposals
and initiatives. It can:
 reject them outright;
 refer them back to the Commission for amendment;
 amend them on the spot and then accept the amended version;
 where there is a difference of opinion with the Parliament they may be
referred to a special committee for a compromise to be reached;
 they may accept proposals as they stand.
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These procedures are relatively formal as this is effectively a law-making
exercise. The system of voting is described in chapter 13, on European
integration. Most decisions, as described there, require a qualified majority,
which means that a minority of states can be outvoted. Where a unanimous
decision is needed – that is, in all key decision-making areas – each member
of the Council has a veto.
Law making is not the only function of the Council. General debates on policy
also take place and the Council may decide that an issue should be referred to
the Commission for detailed policy to be established. They may also issue
instructions to EU officials where negotiations with foreign powers and organ-
isations are needed.
Problems and issues
The Councils remain one of the more democratic institutions of the EU.
Ministers are certainly accountable to their own parliaments and share some
of their powers with the elected Parliament. However there are still a number
of key issues which have to be faced if there is to be future reform.
Meetings take place largely in secret. Since the Councils are effectively making
law, this seems remarkably undemocratic. We now expect the proceedings of
Parliament to be fully public; why not the Council? There remains at present
the suspicion that deals and agreements are being reached by ministers
without popular knowledge or approval.
Although the balance of power between the Councils and the Parliament has
swung recently in the latter’s favour, it can still be argued that the unelected
Councils should not be superior to the elected Parliament. As things stand this
is not the case. Democratic politics normally insists that the law-making body
should be fully accountable to the people. The line of both authority and
accountability between the Councils and the people is indirect.
Ministers attend the Council meetings without clear mandates. True, they are
delegated from their national governments and must report back to them, but
there is no popular mandate. It is difficult for electorates to judge how their
representatives have performed when most decisions are not openly reached.
Of course it is said, understandably, that it is impossible to mandate ministers
strictly as it is expected that they make compromises and accommodations
with their counterparts from other countries. Nevertheless, the freedom of
action of ministers may be too great to satisfy democratic principles.
It remains controversial which decisions should be the subject of unanimous
votes and which require only a qualified majority. This question begs another:
what issues concern vital national interests and therefore need a national veto,
and which could be the subject of compromise and so only need a majority?
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THE COURT OF JUSTICE
Role and membership
Firstly, it is necessary to emphasise what the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
does not do. It does not prosecute individuals who may have breached EU
law. This is the task of the courts of member countries themselves. They may
hear appeals, but not cases of ‘first instance’. They perform in the following
circumstances:
 Where there is a dispute over the meaning of one of the EU treaties.
 An individual or organisation (usually the latter) may appeal to the Court
on the grounds that a Commission decision, or a decision by a member
government may have breached Union law or may be contrary to natural
justice.
 If there is any dispute concerning the meaning and operation of a Union
regulation or directive.
 If an individual or organisation believes that an interpretation of Union law
by a court within the member country was wrong, they may ask for a final
judgment.
 States which are members of the Union may be brought before the Court
for breaches of Union laws and regulations.
 Disputes between member states over the meaning of the laws and treaties
may be brought to the Court.
The judges in the court number fifteen and are drawn from all member states.
Each judge sits for six years. As with virtually all democratic states judges
cannot be removed on the basis of the decisions which they reach. Judges will
not normally sit in judgment in cases involving their own country of origin.
They are all highly experienced lawyers who have specialised knowledge of
European law.
A flavour of the Court’s work can be gained by reviewing the most common
subjects of cases. In 2000–1, for example, the following subjects accounted for
the majority of the court’s time:
 agriculture (the Common Agricultural Policy);
 fisheries (the Common Fisheries Policy);
 competititon policy;
 environment;
 freedom of business;
 freedom of movement of workers;
 social issues (e.g. pensions, working conditions);
 taxation.
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It is also interesting to review the record of individual countries in the Court.
If we look at cases brought against countries for not complying with Union law
(brought either by other states or by the Commission), we can see who are the
most common offenders:
 France: 25
 Italy: 22
 Greece: 18
 Germany: 12
 Holland: 12
It is interesting to consider that the UK, thought to be one of the more Euro-
sceptic of members, recorded only 4 cases in that year! Only Sweden seemed
to be more conformist.
Issues
The ECJ is perhaps the most respected of European Union institutions. It
conforms to the key democratic principle – that the judiciary should be
independent of government. The judges are placed under no political pressure
and have no vested interest in favouring any single party. It is fully represen-
tative in that judges are drawn from all over the Union. There can be no
suggestion that the larger, richer countries might be favoured.
This is not to say, however, that the Court is uncontroversial. In some ways it
is symbolic of the degree to which member countries have given up sover-
eignty to the EU. Domestic courts can be overruled by the ECJ. Furthermore,
laws which have been passed by the parliaments of member states may be set
aside if the Court decides that it does not conform to EU law or one of the
treaties. On the other hand many individuals and organisations have cause to
be grateful to the Court for the establishment of their rights. In some of its
most celebrated cases the Court has, thus, confirmed the right of professional
footballers to move freely from one club to another when out of contract (the
famous ‘Bosman’ ruling), equalising the pension rights of men and women,
granting part-time workers the same protections as full-timers and forcing car-
makers to treat consumers equally in all countries.
So the Court is seen as both restrictive to individual countries and as the
guardian of equal rights for all within Europe. There are some who resent the
fact that ‘foreign’ judges can interfere in domestic affairs, but there are others
who value the role of the Court in preserving freedom and equality.
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OTHER EU BODIES
The Committee of the Regions
In recent years the concept of a ‘Europe of the regions’ has grown in impor-
tance. This embraces the idea that, as nation-states become less important,
regional identities will take over. As economic integration gathers pace, the
significance of national borders will diminish. Rather, economic issues will
affect regions. It is therefore natural that this body has become more
prominent. Created under the Maastricht Treaty and meeting first in 1994 it
has steadily gained in status.
Although its members (222 in number) are nominated from regional bodies
within member states, its role can be seen as quasi-legislative and Britain has
seen it as a potential second chamber for the parliament based on regionally
elected representatives.
Its role is to ensure that regions are properly represented in decision-making
processes. In this sense it further undermines the claim of the Parliament to be
an effective body. The Commission, Parliament and Council of Ministers are
now required to consult with the Committee in case there are regional impli-
cations of any new proposals. They are also charged with the task of ensuring
that Union funds destined for regional projects are shared out fairly.
Above all, however, the Committee is taking a proactive role in promoting the
interests of the poorer regions of Europe such as Greece, southern Italy,
Northern Ireland, south-west England and parts of Spain. It fights for an
increased share of the EU budget and presses for more regional programmes
in such fields as the environment, transport infrastructure, urban regener-
ation, rural protection and local employment.
The Court of Auditors
This fifteen-member body, drawn from all members, has the task of protecting
the interests of European taxpayers who finance the Union. They have two
main functions, both of which were strengthened after major inefficiency and
widespread corruption had been revealed in during the 1990s.
Firstly, it examines the efficiency of the work of the Commission and the other
agencies of the EU. It highlights examples of waste and recommends action to
put matters right. Secondly, it investigates possible corruption. This can occur
within member states, in organisations which are in receipt of EU funding
(such as farmers or local government bodies) or within the Commission itself.
It is important particularly because the European Parliament is so weak in
this field.
Understanding British and European political issues230
The Economic and Social Committee
This is a parallel organisation to the Committee of the Regions. It is the same
size and its membership is also nominated from member states. If the
Committee of the Regions represents regional interests, the Economic and
Social Committee represents the great variety of interest groups which flourish
in Europe.
The various decision-making bodies are obliged to consult the committee on
issues such as consumer rights, workers’ rights, welfare provisions, citizenship
rights, free movement of labour and trade union law.
It does not have the same high status as the Committee of the Regions, since
many member states see it as a threat to their independence. Its role appears to
be to speed the process of integration in many new areas. The Committee on the
Regions, on the other hand represents a decentralising force which can bring
benefits directly to people. However, if the EU is to maintain any claim to be a
pluralist body it needs to ensure that group interests are properly represented.
The European Ombudsman
This individual, who is backed by a large body of investigators, is an agent of
the Parliament. It hears complaints from European citizens who believe they
have been the victims of unfair treatment or maladministration by a Union
body.
Although the department of the Ombudsman is busy, hearing several cases a
year, it is largely a cosmetic exercise. Few cases are upheld and the more
serious claims tend to appear in the Parliament or the Court of Justice. The
European Union has an Ombudsman mainly because it has become an
essential feature of any democratic organisation.
The European Central Bank
The European Central Bank (ECB) came into existence in 1998 and resides in
Frankfurt, Germany’s financial centre. It was needed during the preparations
for the introduction of a single currency in 2002 and became a key body when
the euro came into full use. Some basic economic principles must be under-
stood in order to grasp why this body is so essential. Three ideas summarise
the position:
1 With a single currency there must be control over the total money supply in
the Union. This used to be the responsibility of each member country, but,
with one currency, it must be done centrally. Control of total money supply is
essential to maintain confidence in the currency and to prevent inflation.
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2 A single currency means a single financial market. Banks and other financial
institutions will have to operate in full competition with each other. As such,
they must all operate within similar interest rate levels. It is therefore
essential, in order to maintain stable financial markets, to set a single
European interest rate.
3 The fiscal policies of each country are likely to affect the total supply of
money. When governments borrow money to finance their expenditure,
most of the borrowing is raised from the banking system. In order to finance
government borrowing, banks are allowed to create new money. Thus, if one
country decides to borrow significant amounts of finance, it will have the
effect of increasing total money supply. Before the single currency this only
affected the country in question. With a single currency, however, the
actions of one country may affect the money supply of all. Therefore,
countries must be subject to fiscal disciplines, i.e. to keep borrowing down
to a reasonable level. This principle has been enshrined in the so-called
‘stability pact’ among member states. To demonstrate its importance, even
Germany, the Union’s biggest economy, received a warning over its high
borrowing levels early in 2002.
The ECB is charged with the task of maintaining the three principles described
above. It does this by controlling money supply, setting an interest rate for the
euro-zone and by ensuring that members keep within set borrowing levels.
Although the Bank is non-political, its role can be politically controversial. Its
problem is that the same interest rate does not necessarily suit all countries
at the same time. Those who are suffering slow growth and unemployment
want low interest rates to stimulate borrowing, investment, spending and
therefore production levels. At the same time, countries enjoying a strong
economy do not want low interest rates as this might over-stimulate their
economy and lead to inflation. The ECB must, therefore, balance the
contrasting interests of different countries when setting rates. Similarly, they
may be forced to exercise control over borrowing when individual govern-
ments may feel they have very good reason to borrow heavily. They may
argue that the expenditure is needed to stimulate employment and growth or
to promote better public services. In such cases the bank is liable to find itself
in conflict with some member governments.
In order to prevent any charges that it might be put under political pressure
the ECB is an entirely independent body. However, the fact that its directors
are not accountable to any democratic bodies has led to criticism that there is
no adequate control over how it operates.
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OVERVIEW
The institutions of the European Union have tended to grow and expand without
any coherent plan. Extra bodies have been added as new issues and problems
have emerged. The existing bodies have also evolved to meet new circumstances.
Since the Treaty of Rome, however, no serious attempt at overall constitutional
reform has been made. In 2002 this situation was about to change.
The prospects for further reform are considered below as one of the issues
facing the European Union in the new era of economic and monetary union.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 What problems have been associated with the role and performance
of the Commission of the European Union?
2 What problems are associated with the role and operation of the
European Parliament?
3 How are the main institutions of the European Union likely to be
affected by future enlargement?
4 To what extent has the European Union become a ‘supranational’ body and to what
extent is it still ‘intergovernmental’? Illustrate your answer with reference to the main
institutions of the Union.
5 How democratic is the European Union?
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THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 
AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
The nature of the democratic deficit
The issues concerning individual institutions of the European Union are
described in chapter 14, on EU Institutions. However, a number of general
remarks can be made at this stage. The main concerns which politicians from
member countries and commentators have include the following:
● It is generally felt that the institutions of the European Union are not
accountable enough.
● There is too much secrecy in the EU and too much of its proceedings are
carried out behind closed doors. This is connected with the lack of accounta-
bility, as it is clear that if the public and their elected representatives are not
provided with information, they will be unable to make judgements about the
performance of the institutions.
● Representation in much of the EU is indirect. The Parliament is elected, but no
other bodies are (unless we accept that the Council of Ministers is indirectly
elected).
● No decision-making bodies have a clear mandate. The public of Europe cannot,
therefore, judge how well their political leaders are responding to their demands.
● There is no European constitution. The political system of the EU has been
formed though the various treaties which have been negotiated since 1957.
This means that the relationships between the institutions are not clear.
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 Descriptions of the main issues facing the European Union
 Review of these issues
 Speculations as to the future course of the issues
● There is a lack of a system of ‘checks and balances’ within the system. For
example, the Parliament is a single chamber, without an upper house to check
its power, Parliament itself has limited powers over the executive branch (i.e.
the Commission and Council of Ministers combined). The European Court of
Justice does provide some degree of control, but the absence of a constitution
means they have little documentary evidence on which to base their decisions.
● Some member countries such as the UK and Denmark have argued that there
cannot be any further political integration until the democratic deficit is
addressed. Others, such as Germany and Italy, on the other hand, have
suggested that, if Europe can move towards a federal system, many of these
problems will be automatically resolved. Meanwhile the impending
enlargement of the Union makes the need for democratic reforms more
pressing. The new members will want their interests safeguarded and will be
unwilling to accept the general lack of accountability. The democratic problem
is particularly acute for those countries, such as Poland and the Czech
Republic, who have quite recently escaped from the yoke of totalitarian
communist regimes.
Some solutions
In recognition of these problems the European Union set up a Constitutional
Convention in the spring of 2002 under the chairmanship of Valery Giscard
d’Estaing, a former French President. With over a hundred delegates from both
existing and prospective members, it has been given eighteen months to report
back on political and constitutional reform. If the Convention fails, the future
progress of the EU will be seriously impeded. Should it produce workable and
effective proposals, the prospects for greater integration will be enhanced.
What kind of issues and possible solutions will the d’Estaing Convention
consider?
 Reform of the Parliament to make it more representative, accountable and
effective.
 Changing the nature of the Commission, probably making it more
accountable, possibly making arrangements for more control over
appointments by the Parliament. It may also recommend popular elections
to the Commission. The way in which the Commission works may also be
made more transparent.
 The relationships between the Commission, Council of Ministers and
Parliament will be reviewed to make decision making clearer and more
efficient.
 The problem of the lack of political leadership for the EU may be
addressed. It is conceivable that there will be a proposal for an elected
President for the Union.
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 A British idea is that there should be a bicameral legislature. Some kind of
second parliamentary chamber is certainly on the cards.
 There are proposals for a European ‘Bill of Rights’ which would, once and
for all, establish the basis of citizenship and rights for all members of the
EU, including its millions of new citizens to come.
 Students, academics, media people and politicians may now enjoy a year
or two of speculation, but after d’Estaing reports, it will be up to the heads
of government to make key decisions in this area.
THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was created in 1960, a time when
there were only six members of the Community. Its founders can, therefore, be
forgiven for not foreseeing the many problems which would arise when new
members were admitted. It has to be said that it was France which was the
prime mover in the CAP and it was seen as a price which had to paid for
France’s continued membership. It had a number of objectives:
1 To guarantee the incomes of farmers (and wine growers) even in markets
which are extremely volatile.
2 To prevent agricultural prices from rising too much when there is an
unexpected supply shortage. In this way consumers can be protected.
3 To ensure that European agriculture can survive in the face of world compe-
tition, system of price supports and subsidies provided protection.
4 Ultimately it was hoped that the Community could become self-sufficient in
food. To some extent this was the result of memories of the post-World War
II period, when there were severe food shortages. This aim had been
achieved by 1973.
The ways in which these objectives have been pursued constitute a wide range
of systems of intervention. The main measures are:
● Subsidies to try to ensure that some agricultural sectors can survive despite
low market prices and to maintain high output levels.
● A price support and levy system to protect some sectors from external compe-
tition. If prices fall below a certain level which will not give farmers sufficient
income, tariffs are placed on imports to hold up the price.
● Quota systems in those sectors where there is long-term over-production with
the danger that prices will fall too low to sustain farm incomes. Each country,
region and individual farm may be given a maximum quota or production
limit. In this way the total production of the EU is controlled. Milk, for
example, is produced under this system.
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● Stock intervention is also used in some sectors. This is a scheme which prevents
prices rising too much by releasing stockpiled goods onto the market and so
keeping the price down. More often, however, it is a system of buying up
stocks in order to hold up the price. This is the most controversial aspect of the
CAP as it works against the interests of consumers by keeping prices artificially
high. It has also resulted in huge wasteful stocks of goods building up and
sometimes having to be destroyed. There have, in the past, been infamous
‘wine lakes’ and beef or butter ‘mountains’.
● Over-production is a major problem in the CAP. In the 1990s, therefore, a
system known as ‘set-aside’ was developed. This was a device where farmers
were actually paid to take land out of production altogether.
Problems and reform
An attempt to reform the system in 1965 failed when France exercised its veto.
The consequent deadlock was broken in 1966 by the so-called ‘Luxembourg
Compromise’. This plan meant that the Council of Ministers would retain
control over the CAP and that each member would be able to retain a veto over
key decisions. The EU was saved, but has been saddled ever since with the
problem that reform of the CAP has been made difficult by the power of each
country to block change.
Ever since then, the CAP has proved to be one of the most unpopular aspects
of the EU and certainly the most difficult to reform. Indeed, the CAP illustrates
one of the most important problems for the EU as a whole. National interests
show themselves to be at their most powerful when agriculture is at stake.
Member governments are reluctant to alienate their own agricultural interests
and so fight tenaciously to protect them when agriculture meetings are held.
The idea of a ‘supranational’ body controlling agriculture seems out of the
question for many years to come.
The most frustrating aspect of the CAP for those who do not have an interest
in agriculture, is this difficulty in instituting reform. Indeed, for most members
of the European public, complete abolition of the CAP seems the best option.
The CAP is unpopular for a number of reasons.
 It eats up a huge portion of the EU budget. It is the taxpayers who pick up
this bill. In 2000 a total of 41.5 billion euros was spent on the CAP, nearly
a half of the total EU budget.
 It is seen to be supporting farmers, irrespective of whether they deserve
this support.
 It is a system of trade protection. This raises food prices in Europe and
discriminates against Third World producers. Campaigners argue that the
system keeps Third World farmers poor, while European farmers grow rich.
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 The huge quantities of unused intervention stocks are viewed as obscene
when large parts of the world are on or over the verge of starvation.
 Those countries which do not have large agricultural sectors, the UK being
a prime example, resent the fact that it favours countries which do rely
more on their own agricultural industries.
With the many problems which the CAP throws up, it is hardly surprising that
frequent attempts at reform have been made. Two main stages of reform can
be identified. The first was in 1992 when the set-aside system was introduced
and began to slow-down over-production and so reduced the need for inter-
ventions in the market. Over-production of cereals and oils was partly tackled
in this way. The second tranche of reforms came in 1999 when some subsidies,
for example on cereals and beef, began to be progressively reduced (not least
because the World Trade Organisation has been working towards a progressive
reduction in protective tariffs and subsidies). To some extent countries were
also allowed to apply to divert former subsidies into environmental projects.
Britain is the most enthusiastic supporter of this new innovation and has a
target of converting 20% of agricultural subsidies into environment schemes.
This new system effectively pays farmers to reduce their output and become
guardians of the environment instead.
Under the pressures of enlargement after 2004, the CAP will have to reform
itself more radically. The main issues in this area are discussed in the next
section. It may well be that the enlargement issue will become the fillip
needed to break the influence of powerful farming interests in Western
Europe.
ENLARGEMENT
The increases in the size of the EU up to the end of the twentieth century
created relatively few problems (see table 15.1). The countries which joined
late were already economically well developed and, by and large, had fully
democratic political systems. There were, therefore, relatively few problems
over their ability to make contributions and the demands which might have
been placed on the Union budget. Fears that the membership of Greece and
Portugal – the two poorest of the first fifteen members – might be disruptive,
were largely unfounded. The post-2004 entries, however, were to be of a very
different character.
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Table 15.1 Stages of EU enlargement, 1957–95
Year Entrants
1957 France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg
1973 UK, Ireland, Denmark
1981 Greece
1986 Spain, Portugal
1995 Sweden, Finland, Austria
Conditions of entry
States which wish to enter the EU must conform to a number of conditions
according to the Treaty of Rome. These are:
1 They must accept all existing EU legislation.
2 They must be members of NATO (to avoid any conflict of interest over
foreign and defence policy).
3 They must have adequate safeguards for human rights.
4 They must have democratic political systems.
5 Their economies should be basically capitalist. This does not prevent some
public ownership of industry and public services, but, essentially, free
markets must be allowed to operate. Otherwise, Europe would no longer be
a truly single market.
6 They must be experiencing reasonable healthy rates of economic growth.
This does not mean that they have to be particularly wealthy, but that at
least they are moving forward economically.
7 Since the original conditions were set, it has also been added that new
entrants have to adopt the euro as their currency (after a suitable transition
period).
These conditions are mainly there to protect the interests of the existing
members. However, they have also proved to be an incentive for the candidate
countries. Many of the prospective entrants are former communist regimes
who are desperately trying to restructure themselves economically and politi-
cally after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1990–91. The criteria for entry have encouraged them to introduce free
markets, introduce democratic institutions and improve human rights. It will
be for the Commission to make a judgement on these criteria, although the
final decision on new members will be made in the European Council.
The way forward
The prospective members of the EU have been negotiating for some time, but
the general plan for the admission of new states was agreed at Nice in 2000.
The following scheme is in place:
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 First wave (2003–4?). Cyprus, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, Hungary,
Estonia.
 Second wave (2007?). Bulgaria, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Malta.
 Third wave (?). Turkey, Croatia, Bosnia.
 Distant future. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus.
Although the agreement of the Nice Treaty of 2000 to enlarge the EU on the
lines shown above was held up when the Irish voted against it in a referendum
(ratification of the Nice Treaty requires unanimous approval), it is confidently
expected that these countries will enter close to the scheduled date.
The benefits of enlargement
Although there remain a number of fears about enlargement (shown below),
there has been a considerable amount of enthusiasm for admitting new
entrants. Indeed, it was Margaret Thatcher who pushed the agenda forward in
the 1980s. Her motivation was a belief that a larger community would also be
diluted. She feared closer political integration and believed that, the more
members there were, the more difficult it would be to achieve it. In the 1980s
in general, there was a broad debate between the idea of ‘widening’ and
‘deepening’. In the end, the larger members such as France and Germany,
came to the conclusion that both could be managed at the same time, much
to the chagrin of a sceptical Conservative Party. Apart from Thatcher’s hopes,
there are a considerable number of other perceived benefits:
● Enlargement into eastern and central Europe will finally confirm the end of
the Cold War divide. In other words Europe will feel more permanently secure
as a result of integration.
● It will speed up the process of democratisation and improving human rights
throughout Europe.
● The size of the market will grow considerably. This will widen the opportu-
nities for European companies.
● As the European single economy grows, there will be new opportunities for
greater specialisation and the benefits which that brings. Economists under-
stand that the larger market, the more specialisation with free exchange, the
growing size of industrial or commercial enterprises and increased compe-
tition will all promote growth and efficiency.
● The increased size of the euro-zone will create a bigger and more stable world
currency – indeed it will become the dominant world currency, replacing the
dollar in that position.
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● In terms of geopolitics, Europe will become a major world power (provided it
succeeds in being able to develop a common position of foreign policy). This
may bring benefits in terms of trade and stability.
Potential problems
The effects of enlargement are not all one-sided. It is recognised that many
problems will emerge. Most European politicians believe that the balance of
evidence favours admitting new countries, but this does not mean that the
perils can be ignored. Some of the expected difficulties are as follows:
There will be a huge strain on the Common Agricultural Policy. Many of the
new entrants have strong agricultural sectors. Were they do enter on the same
terms as existing members, it would mean huge amounts would have to be
spent on price support systems and subsidies. There would also be a danger of
even greater over-production – one of the CAP’s main bugbears. The prospect
of the EU having to buy up huge stocks of unsold cereals, dairy products, wine
and meat simply to maintain high farm incomes, is not an attractive one. It
follows that the whole of the CAP will have to be re-negotiated. Western
European farmers will have to accept that the levels of support they currently
enjoy cannot continue. Whatever the size of the agricultural ‘cake’ in the
future, farmers are going to have to share it out more liberally.
Staying with agriculture, two more problems may well emerge from the creation
of a much bigger single market. The first is the danger that farm units will
become much bigger as levels of competition increase. The development of huge
industrial farms, especially in Europe’s so called central ‘breadbasket’ in Poland
and Hungary would have serious adverse environmental effects (memories of
the great American ‘dustbowl’, which was created in the 1930s, spring to mind).
Secondly, an even more powerful agricultural bloc would damage further the
interests of the Third World. If an enlarged European agricultural system were
to continue with protective policies, there might be even less opportunities for
poor farmers from the ‘south’ to penetrate the market.
The prospective members are considerably poorer than the current ones. This
will place a strain on the regional development programme of the EU. It is
recognised that subsidies for the poorer parts of Europe will have long-term
benefits for all – larger markets, greater competition etc. - but in the short and
medium terms, this will be a huge burden on the Community budget. It may
be difficult to persuade taxpayers that some sacrifices now, which hit them
hard, will lead to benefits later which will be much less tangible.
There are many, on both the political right and left, who fear the influx of huge
numbers of economic refugees into Western Europe. In other words, admitting
new members may open the floodgates to new immigrants. There are two
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aspects to this. Firstly – largely a right wing concern – it has a cultural element.
With potentially huge movements of ethnic populations around Europe it is
feared that there will be a major threat posed against traditional Western
European cultures. Secondly – where trade unions are worried – there are
economic concerns. Labour in the candidate countries is cheap. Some of this
labour is likely to move into western Europe, attracted by higher wages and
better conditions. This is likely to have the effect of depressing levels of pay. It
is good news for consumers who may see prices fall, but bad news for existing
workers who will see their wages and job security threatened.
Apart from these main potential problems, there is a collection of concerns
which are more contentious. Some, for example, fear the import of organised
crime from eastern Europe. Similarly there is a suspicion that the way will be
more open for the infiltration of illegal drugs. Business groups have also
expressed fears that they will find it difficult to deal with their counterparts in
the new members as their normal practices are so different from those in
western Europe.
Enlargement and the political institutions
One final set of problems can be treated separately. These concern the changes
will be needed to the Union’s political structure. The effects of enlargement
will be far-reaching, but here we can introduce the three most pressing issues.
Parliament
With many new MEPs the Parliament would become simply too big. It
therefore seems likely that existing representatives will have to cope with
much larger constituencies. A British suggestion is that a second chamber will
be needed in order to represent the regions of Europe as existing MEPs will
find it difficult to do so. We have already alluded to the fragmentation of the
Parliament in the chapter on institutions (14). With perhaps 25 or 30 members
in the future, the range of national groupings increases again. Lessons may
have to be learned from the experience of the USA, where the Senate return
two members from each state, no matter its size, while the House of Repre-
sentatives returns members from large constituencies and is expected to reflect
their regional concerns.
The commission
As things stood in 2002 each member state was entitled to one of the twenty
commissioner posts. The largest five were allowed two. The purpose of this
device was to ensure that each state at least felt represented at senior level.
With further enlargement, it will not be possible for every member to send a
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commissioner to Brussels. It is accepted, therefore, that some countries in the
future ill not be able to have a commissioner. This is likely to prove a
contentious issue in the future.
The Council of Ministers
Enlargement does not present a problem in terms of numbers. However, a
much larger Council does create difficulties with decision making. On those
issues where a unanimous decision is required it will become increasingly
difficult to reach a conclusion. In order to get round this problem, it is
expected that even more decisions will have to become subject to qualified
majority voting. This is all very well and will make decision-making more
effective. However, the larger states are likely to become concerned that they
may be outvoted by a large coalition of smaller states. The new voting
strengths in the Council, which were negotiated at Nice in 2000, go some way
to prevent this, but it remains a future concern. It is in the fields of defence and
foreign policy that this issue is likely to be most acute.
A common defence and foreign policy for Europe
When the Maastricht Treaty was negotiated in 1992, a general intention to
forge a common system of foreign and defence policy was made. The impetus
for this initiative came from the conflict which had broken out in the Balkans
in the 1990s following the collapse of Yugoslavia.
The Balkans was the first major armed conflict to break out in Europe after
World War II. It had the effect of alerting political leaders to the fact that
Europe was going to have to take greater responsibility for its own internal
security. External defence would continue to be provided by NATO, but NATO
had proved to be an unwieldy organisation to deal with a complex issue like
the Balkans war. Attempts to adopt a common European position in Bosnia
had largely failed, so that a more permanent apparatus had to be found. There
was an organisation in place to deal with such issues – the Organisation for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – but it proved to be a toothless
body, lacking the authority of the European Union or NATO. Progress has been
slow, but this is likely to be an issue for many years to come. The conflicts on
Kosovo and Macedonia which followed Bosnia have served as reminders to EU
leaders that a long-term solution needs to be found.
Foreign policy
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was confirmed by the
Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. Two years later a new post of CFSP High Repre-
sentative was created and its first holder, Javier Solana, was appointed. This
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was an important first step , as it is vital for the EU to be able to negotiate with
other states and organisations through a single individual, otherwise any
messages are likely to become confused and lack authority. Solana has a
planning unit to assist him, but the development of an extensive, permanent,
supranational body in charge of foreign policy is slower in coming.
Foreign policy remains in the hands of intergovernmental bodies – the Council
of Foreign Ministers and the European Council (of heads of government). This
makes foreign policy making difficult. Key decisions require unanimous
approval in these councils and every issue becomes an ad hoc negotiation, in
other words each is treated separately. The requirement to reach agreement
among foreign ministers and heads of governments presents a number of
serious problems.
● Member states have existing alliances of their own which may cut across
European Union interests. Britain, for example, has a close relationship with
the USA and Israel and has loyalties to Commonwealth countries. Italy and
France have close links with Arab countries in the middle east, while Germany
has a special interest in Turkey and the Balkans.
● Some countries, such as Sweden, Ireland and Austria now have traditions of
neutrality which may be compromised by a common European foreign policy.
● The simple fact that fifteen countries (more after enlargement) have to reach
agreement on very sensitive subjects is a huge stumbling block to decisive
policy making.
● When foreign policy requires military backing – or at least the threat of it –
there may be no guarantee that member states will support their intentions
with such a commitment.
● Some states are, quite simply, less committed to European integration than
others. This phenomenon is likely to vary as governments change, which they
inevitably do. The British and Danish governments have, for example, been
traditionally ‘stand-offish’.
● Although the European project is designed to end conflict, we have to accept
that old rivalries die hard, making the reconciliation of foreign policy difficult.
France – normally a fiercely nationalistic state – finds it hard to come to
agreement with Germany and the UK, the Dutch are naturally suspicious of
Germany, while Scandinavian countries have traditionally little interest in
southern Europe.
Thus, until most of the members are willing to sacrifice this highly sensitive
aspect of national sovereignty to supranational bodies, it is likely to remain a
problematic subject.
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Defence
The difficulties involved in a common defence policy for the EU are perhaps
more acute than those involved in foreign policy. Yet, surprisingly, progress has
been more impressive. At a series of meetings in St Malo, Cologne, Washington
and Helsinki in 1998–99 the idea of how Europe could move towards an
independent, integrated defence capability was thrashed out. The agreement
of the USA was sought and obtained, with various conditions, mainly
safeguarding the role of NATO.
It was Britain’s Tony Blair who solved the inevitable misgivings which some
members had. He proposed a small, highly flexible force of about 60,000
soldiers. This was far from being a ‘European Army’ which opponents,
mainly Conservatives, had suspected. It was described instead as a ‘rapid
reaction force’. For larger operations it was agreed that the European force
should be effectively the armed forces of the Western European Union
(WEU) which is a section of NATO without the USA. By insisting that the
WEU would be the major European force, the relationship with NATO was
preserved and protected. The WEU cannot act without the wider agreement
of NATO as a whole. In this way the USA retained an interest in European
defence issues.
At Helsinki in 2000 a permanent defence establishment was created and repre-
sents a considerable amount of progress. The bodies which came into
existence are:
 the Political and Security Committee;
 the European Military Committee;
 the European Military Staff.
Despite the apparently successful outcome of the negotiations, there remain a
number of problems with control of a European force.
● The command structure of the force is a major problem, despite the existence
of the European Military Staff. It may be difficult for armed forces to accept
the command of officers who are not of the same nationality. This may not be
a problem in peacetime, but could be a major concern on the battlefield.
● Armed forces need political direction. Although the foreign policy estab-
lishment of the EU appears to have been developed in the form of the Political
and Security Committee and the Western European Union, in practice a
coherent political direction may be difficult to achieve.
● There may still be occasions when the interests of NATO clash with those of
the European Union. One might speculate that middle east tensions, which
spill over into Turkey or Cyprus and southern Europe may evoke a very varying
response from the USA and the EU.
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● A key aspect of defence (and foreign) policy concerns intelligence. It may be
difficult for European powers to share intelligence, an area where there is a
notorious amount of secrecy and national self-interest.
EU defence and foreign policy abbreviations and definitions
• NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Responsible for the collective security of
Europe and the Western World. Comprises most European states plus the USA and
Canada.
• WEU: Western European Union. The section of NATO comprising only European states.
• CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy. The European Union’s commitment to
adopt agreed common foreign policies.
• CESDP: Common European Security and Defence Policy. The agreement to co-operate
on internal defence matters.
• PSC: Political and Security Committee. A permanent body whose role is to provide
political direction for any military actions.
• EMC: European Military Committee. A committee of officials who have the task of co-
ordinating military policy.
• EMS: European Military Staff. Officers of European armed forces who co-ordinate
military arrangements.
EUROPEAN RIGHTS AND CITIZENSHIP
Most European states have adopted the European Convention of Human
Rights. However this does not mean that the principle of human rights has
been fully established throughout Europe. Some states, including the UK, do
not treat it as binding and it is not fully comprehensive.
Civil rights campaigners have, as two of their goals, the establishment of a
European Bill of Rights and a universal concept of European citizenship. At
Maastricht this idea was built into the objectives of the EU, although little
progress has been made since. What does this mean in principle?
1 It implies that there will be a codified set of rights to which all citizens of
the European Union will be entitled. These rights would include those
contained in the European Convention plus the economic and social rights
which are contained in the EU Social Chapter.
2 These rights would be binding on all EU members, so that all laws and
executive actions would have to conform.
3 A European Court – presumably the existing Court of Justice – would have
powers to enforce these rights.
4 All citizens of member countries would gain all the rights contained in the
Bill of Rights.
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5 The rules for citizenship, i.e. who is entitled to call themselves a citizen of
the European Union, would be common to all member states.
6 There would have to be common rules of naturalization and other means
of acquiring citizenship which would apply throughout Europe.
On the face of it, there might be little problem in codifying such a set of
principles. Most countries already conform to most of the same rules and there
would be little argument over those terms already contained in the European
Convention and the Social Chapter. Nevertheless there are potential problems.
Some of the main ones are:
 Those countries and politicians who are worried about the growing power
of the EU and the loss of national identities would perhaps object to the
concept of European citizenship. They would place national identity above
a European identity, and would be concerned if Europe were placed above
the nation in this matter.
 There are likely to be disagreements about the rules by which individuals
could become citizens of Europe. What, for example, would be the future
status of refugees and asylum seekers? Who would decide whether such
people should be entitled to apply for citizenship? It has to be remembered
that, if citizenship were granted, the person concerned would have the
right to live and work in any part of the Union.
 There might not be total agreement about what rights should be granted
to all citizens. Most would be agreed, but perhaps not all. This may be a
particular problem for new members who do not have the same tradition
of rights as the rest of western Europe.
 Some countries, notably the UK with its doctrine of parliamentary sover-
eignty, might be unwilling to accept that a European Court could overrule
elements of its legislation or could overturn the actions of its government.
So the development of European rights and citizenship is likely to remain a
contentious issue. It calls into question fundamental questions of sovereignty
and implies that national governments would lose control over who would be
admitted to their territory. It also brings closer the concept that individuals
may be expected to owe a higher allegiance to Europe than to their nation of
birth or adoption.
THE EFFECTS OF THE SINGLE CURRENCY
The development of the single currency has, of course, been of great impor-
tance to the European project. However, it is no longer a live political issue. The
single currency is here to stay for the time being and its successful introduction
in early 2002 confirms that there is little point in discussing its advantages and
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disadvantages. For the UK and the other two states who did not enter the
system in 2002 it is still a contentious matter, but for the twelve existing
members of the Euro-zone the discussions are over.
But the effects of the single currency will still be far-reaching. It is worth, at this
stage, reminding ourselves what problems and difficulties are likely to arise.
 The role of the European Central Bank, which will control interest rates
and, indirectly, the fiscal policies of member states, is likely to become
controversial, especially as it is unelected and unaccountable.
 If there is an economic crisis or serious recession, there will be those who
suggest that it is the single currency which is the culprit.
 Similarly, if any individual states run into economic difficulty and discover
that the European Bank cannot help them, and that their own governments
find their hands tied by centralised policies, their own public may become
disenchanted with the single currency system.
 If the external value of the euro declines, resulting in European inflation,
support for the euro may ebb away.
 As economic harmonisation increases while the currency has its effect,
there may be a reaction against the uniformity and loss of national sover-
eignty which has arisen from the single currency.
Yet, despite all this, the problems of returning to fifteen or more individual
currencies would seem to be now impractical, so discussion of such issues
remains largely academic and speculative.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 What is meant by the term ‘democratic deficit’? What proposals have
been made to correct it?
2 What are the main problems associated with the Common
Agricultural Policy?
3 Why is enlargement such a problem for the European Union?
4 What are the main problems associated with the development of common foreign and
defence policies for the European Union?
5 Is it possible to develop the concept of European citizenship?
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THE STORY OF BRITISH MEMBERSHIP
Britain stays out
When serious discussions began to establish a successor to the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1956, Britain made it clear that it was not
intending to join any new organisation. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, a
Conservative who valued Britain’s links with its empire and commonwealth,
was opposed to the kind of close, supranational arrangement which Monnet
and Schuman were proposing.
Macmillan also understood that, if Britain were to join the new Common
Market, it would have to give up the system of trade preferences and agree-
ments which it had with its allies in the Commonwealth. It would be seen as
a betrayal to them if Britain were to abandon them in pursuit of its own
interests in Europe. It was therefore decided to stay out and instead form
a separate body. The Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957 with just six
members.
EFTA
The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) contained seven members:
Britain, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Austria and Switzerland. It had
no political organisation and was therefore no more than a group of countries
which agreed to reduce tariffs between them and so increase trade. Britain’s
agreements with the Commonwealth countries were preserved.
16Britain and the European Union
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EFTA reflected the large amount of trade which was carried out among the
seven members, but it was never designed to be a rival to the Common
Market. It was, in effect, an alternative economic system, joined by countries
who opposed the idea of closer political union within a free trade area. It also
recognised the fact that Britain’s alliances should be maintained, while the
traditional neutrality of Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries would no
longer be compromised by a mere set of trade concessions.
Britain’s first two applications
By 1961 Macmillan had come round to the idea that Britain’s fortunes might
improve as a member of the Common Market. The disbanding of the British
Empire was now under way, so this represented less of a tie than before.
Furthermore, Macmillan had become aware that Britain was not the world
power it had once been. He managed to persuade a sceptical Conservative
party that an application should be made. Negotiations began in 1961, only
two years after EFTA had come into existence.
Three major obstacles existed which were likely to prevent British entry. They
were:
1 French President Charles de Gaulle, a vehement nationalist, was deter-
mined that France should dominate the Community. If Britain were to join,
he felt that it would be a powerful rival (West Germany, weakened by post-
war division and the need for reconstruction, did not worry de Gaulle).
2 It was clear that Britain wished to preserve some of the Commonwealth
preference agreements and so gain an advantage over the existing
members. The existing members were certainly not willing to offer Britain
a special deal.
3 In 1962 Macmillan concluded the Nassau agreement with the USA,
whereby Britain would be able to stay in NATO, remain America’s closest
ally, but also retain an independent nuclear deterrent. Once again, France
was suspicious of Britain’s close relationship with the USA. Britain was not
a serious European, they argued.
In consequence of this, France vetoed the British application for membership
(to this day, applications for membership require a unanimous vote in the
Council of Ministers). This action set back relations between France and Britain
many years. The suspicion with which the two countries treat each other, has
remained to this day. It also demonstrated Britain’s attitude to Europe.
Macmillan’s desire to preserve Britain’s links with both the Commonwealth
and the USA are seen by other countries as a lack of commitment to the
European experiment. Like British–French tension, this has endured ever
since. Margaret Thatcher’s constant sniping at attempts to create a closer
Understanding British and European political issues250
Britain and the European Union 251
political union and her opting out of the Social Chapter and the single
currency at Maastricht in 1992 have reminded Europeans that Britain remains
suspicious of European integration. It was, therefore, no surprise that Britain’s
half-hearted attempts at entry were rejected.
In 1967 the British government, now led by Labour’s Harold Wilson, renewed
the application. Once again it was a less than enthusiastic attempt. There were
a number reasons for this.
● A majority of Labour’s membership was probably opposed to membership. It
has to be remembered that Labour was further to the left of the political
spectrum than it is today. The very large left wing of the party saw the
European Community as a ‘capitalist club’, whose motives were to be
suspected. The concept of free trade was seen as benefiting business at the
expense of workers’ pay and rights. Wilson, who stood in the middle of the
party, could not be certain he could carry the day.
● There was a great deal of residual resentment at France, especially after the
1963 veto. De Gaulle was still in power and making negative noises about
Britain.
● Britain was entering a major economic crisis. In particular the UK balance of
trade was in a very poor state so that the country was, effectively, bankrupt.
Loans were negotiated from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
sterling was devalued by nearly 15 per cent. This was therefore hardly an
auspicious time to be undertaking such a radical new project.
Wilson hoped that British membership might provide a long-term solution to
its economic problems. By comparison, the members of the Community were
doing extremely well, with faster growth rates than Britain, falling
unemployment and a surge in trade. However, de Gaulle exercised his veto
once again, so Britain was left almost alone to try to solve its problems.
Britain joins
By 1971 Britain was led by Edward Heath, a Conservative Prime Minister who
was deeply committed to the European ideal. He was a more internationally
minded prime minister than any in Britain since Churchill who had retired in
1955. At the same time de Gaulle had gone, ousted during a period of political
unrest and violence in 1968–69.
The year 1971 also saw the deepening of a recession which affected the whole
of Europe. This did not stop the determined Heath from joining, but it did have
the effect of creating suspicion in the minds of both Conservative and Labour
supporters that membership might not be the economic saviour it had
promised to be. It was also felt that, in his haste and determination to join,
Heath and his negotiator, Geoffrey Rippon, had negotiated a bad deal. Britain
had not, it was claimed, gained enough protection for the Commonwealth,
were paying too much in contributions and was getting a poor return from the
Common Agricultural Policy. Despite the misgivings. Britain joined and
became a member of the EEC on 1 January 1973.
In the general election campaign of February 1974, Labour argued that Heath
had made too many concessions. Wilson therefore promised that, if elected, he
would consider leaving the Community.
The 1975 referendum
Having won both elections of 1974, Wilson was true to his word and began to
prepare for withdrawal. However, he soon realised that leaving the
community might be a worse option than staying in. He therefore decided to
try to renegotiate British terms and persuade the British people that the
change of policy was justified.
Changing policy had created huge problems for Wilson. The Labour party was
hopelessly split over British membership, largely along left-wing–right-wing
lines, with the former opposed. The referendum idea was therefore very
attractive. If Wilson could secure a ‘yes’ vote for membership he could outflank
his opponents.
New terms were negotiated by Chancellor of the Exchequer, Jim Callaghan.
Slightly lower contributions were arranged and an improved deal for
agriculture agreed. Wilson was able to present a better package to the
electorate in the referendum campaign.
The 1975 referendum campaign was an unusual time in British political life
for a number of reasons:
 It was the first time a fully national referendum had been held on a political
issue.
 Because the cabinet itself was split on British membership, Wilson did a
deal with the ‘no’ Lobby that collective responsibility would be suspended.
Cabinet members were free to speak their minds on the issue without any
constraints. This was on the understanding that both sides would accept
the verdict of the people.
 Special rules were made which ensured that both sides in the campaign
were only allowed the spend a limited amount. This was designed to
ensure a balanced contest. It was the first time a political campaign had
been controlled by law.
The result – a win for the ‘yes’ campaign by 66–34 per cent – was mercifully
decisive and the controversy subsided. The government survived both the
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U-turn in policy and the bitter internal divisions which had threatened its
survival. It is an ironic fact that the issue which Labour survived in 1975 –
Britain’s relations with Europe – was the same one which was to tear the
Conservatives apart in the 1990s and consign them to two enormous election
defeats in 1997 and 2001.
BRITISH PARTIES AND THE EU
The events of 1974–75 and of 1992–97, when British involvement in Europe
cut across party lines, threatened the political stability of the country in these
two periods. Some basic principles need to be identified to explain why
Europe has proved to be so divisive.
1 The left wing of British politics sees the EU as a free-trade area which operates
to the benefit of producers and employees at the expense of workers and
consumers. It is therefore deeply opposed to its principles.
2 The right wing of the political spectrum view Europe as a socialist experiment,
designed to establish uniformity and bureaucracy which are opposed to the ideals
of business and place the interests of workers above those of entrepreneurs.
3 Liberals have seen the EU as an opportunity to decentralise some powers in a
‘Europe of the regions’. Conservatives, by contrast, believe that Europe means
increasing centralisation in Brussels. This will therefore enhance democracy,
they argue, whereas many Conservatives see the EU as anti-democratic.
4 Many Conservatives are strong British nationalists. They believe Europe
threatens the sovereignty of the UK.
5 Campaigners who are interested in the environment and the economic plight
of the third world see the European Union as part of a global multinational
movement which places rising prosperity in the west above the interests of the
world as a whole.
6 Supporters of the EU, who come from all parties and who are essentially
pragmatists, believe that economic integration is inevitable, a part of the
process of globalisation. They therefore see opposition to the EU as futile.
7 Nationalists in the UK, such as the SNP and Plaid Cymru are generally pro-
European. They argue that the EU will give them a better deal than the United
Kingdom has done. In other words they believe they can have a louder voice
in Brussels than they have had in London.
This extensive set of attitudes demonstrates how fragmented political opinion
is on European issues. Small wonder then, that it is a major issue both between
the parties and within parties.
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Labour
For most of the period following the Treaty of Rome in 1957, Labour had been
opposed to British membership. Labour had always been something of an isola-
tionist party, unwilling to become involved in world affairs. The disaster of the
Suez expedition in 1956, which Labour had opposed and which humiliated the
Eden government, confirmed their suspicion of an international role for
Britain. In the 1960s the Wilson government had refused to become involved
directly in the Vietnam war, was granting independence to many of the colonies
and initiated the ‘east of Suez’ policy. This last principle stated that Britain
should withdraw from any major involvement beyond the middle east.
It was therefore hardly surprising that there was little enthusiasm in the party
for EEC membership. When Wilson applied for membership in 1966–67, he
could not be sure of carrying his party with him, so the French veto came as
something of a relief.
In the 1975 referendum campaign on membership, Labour was split and only
stayed together through the clever device of consulting the people directly. At
that time and ever since, Tony Benn, the venerated left-winger, led the section
of the party which was opposed to European involvement. As we have seen
above, his view and that of his allies was that it was a capitalist enterprise,
with little in it for consumers and workers. During the 1980s, official policy
was suspicious of Europe, but since the Conservatives were totally dominating
the political scene at that time, Labour’s attitude to Europe counted for little.
But as the New Labour movement emerged in the 1990s under John Smith and
Tony Blair, the party’s attitude to international affairs in general began to
change. Blair in particular believed that Labour would have to give up its tradi-
tional isolationism and accept that the world was becoming increasingly inter-
dependent. Europe was here to stay and any modern state had to adapt to the
challenges of globalisation. Labour now looked in both directions in its new
internationalist outlook. As the relationship with the USA warmed after Labour
came to power, the party embraced the European Union. Opponents of closer
integration became an increasingly marginalised and irrelevant minority.
Labour inherited the Maastricht opt-out from the single currency from John
Major in 1997. The questions for them now were:
 when to join the single currency;
 how to prepare for entry;
 how to prepare public opinion for entry.
There were small differences in emphasis over timing between those who were
cautious and those who wanted to rush in as soon as possible. However, the
leadership was united in the belief that entry into the single currency was both
desirable and inevitable. By 2002, therefore, the nation waited for the Labour
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government to announce the date of a referendum. In the meantime Gordon
Brown and Tony Blair continued to spar over what constituted the ‘right
moment’. Both agreed that the conditions had to be favourable, but there
remained the question of what were these ‘conditions’?
Conservatives
Britain’s involvement with Europe has proved a painful experience for
the Conservative party producing a basic split in the party between two
considerations.
 Pragmatists in the party have long since believed that, like it or not,
Britain’s long-term best interests lie in Europe. Despite the country’s tradi-
tional links with the USA and the Commonwealth, Britain could not resist
the inevitable closer integration of Europe. Among the leading members of
this group have been Geoffrey Howe (cabinet minister in the 1980s) and
Michael Heseltine (a leading member of the ‘liberal’ wing of the party).
 A significant minority have been Euro-enthusiasts. They see no contradic-
tions in British involvement, are fundamentally pro-European and see the
single currency as the logical conclusion of integration. Key figures here
have been former prime ministers Ted Heath and John Major, and ex-
Chancellor, Kenneth Clark.
 Perhaps the largest group have been euro-sceptics. Led famously by
Margaret Thatcher (especially from 1989 onwards), this group supports
continued membership up to the terms of the Maastricht reforms of 1992.
However, they oppose any further political union which would lead to
further losses of sovereignty. They also believe that it is unlikely that condi-
tions will ever exist where Britain should join the single currency (though
some do not rule it out altogether).
 A small group of Euro-phobes wish to see Britain withdraw from the
European Union. Thatcher seemed to be joining this group after her
retirement from politics in 1997. She allied herself with such figures as Bill
Cash and John Redwood. It is suspected that Iain Duncan Smith, who
became leader in 2001, may have been a part of this group, but, as leader,
he cannot afford to admit to such an extreme view.
The complete failure of the Conservative party to heal its internal divisions
and to find some kind of compromise position which could at least paper over
the cracks, has placed it in danger of oblivion.
During the 1992–97 government of John Major the party tore itself apart 
over Europe. Cabinet collective responsibility broke down and the govern-
ment tottered from one crisis to the next. Major could not rely on any solid
support and was constantly undermined by the euro-sceptics and anti-
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Europeans. Major negotiated opt-outs from the Social Chapter and the single
currency at Maastricht in 1992, but this did not satisfy the sceptics. They took
every opportunity to make life difficult for Major, even on non-European
issues.
Labour’s crushing defeat of the Conservatives in 1997 had a number of causes,
but the split over Europe was of great importance. When the party continued
its internal feuding over the next four years, a second defeat became
inevitable. After 2001 Duncan Smith tried to move the party away from
Europe, but the expected referendum on the single currency threatens to re-
open the old wounds.
Liberal Democrats
The Liberal Democrats (and their predecessors the Liberal and Social
Democrat Parties) have always been largely united in their support for the
European Union and, more recently, British participation in the single
currency. There are a number of reasons for this enthusiastic support:
 Liberals are attracted by the freedoms created by a single market.
 The European Union offers strong protection for consumers, workers,
social security claimants and all those who wish to trade on fair terms.
These are ideals which Liberals support.
 The European Union political system seems to offer greater power to
regions. Liberals favour such decentralisation.
 European countries have a stronger tradition of human rights protection
than Britain. They therefore hope that the rights culture will be imported
into Britain with closer involvement.
There is something of a paradox in Liberal democrat support for the European
project. The democratic deficit which is said to exist in European political insti-
tutions should put Liberals off. They are strong democrats and so ought to be
suspicious of the centralised, rather unaccountable European bureaucracy. But
this does not outweigh what they perceive to be great advantages.
Furthermore, they believe that closer British involvement will be a strong
democratic influence on the other members.
It may be that, in a future referendum campaign on the single currency, the
Liberal democrats may tip the balance of power towards a ‘yes’ vote.
Nationalists
The Scottish and Welsh nationalists are strong supporters of closer political
integration in Europe. The believe that the European Union represents a
weakening of the nation-state. Since they wish to see transfers of power away
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from the British state to their own countries, Europe provides them with the
hope of greater autonomy.
Those nationalists who aim for full independence also see the EU as a means
by which they could become economically viable. On their own, Scotland and
Wales might not be able to sustain full economic independence, but in Europe
they would benefit fully from regional policies of the kind which have produced
an economic renaissance in the Republic of Ireland. With their own voice in
Europe, an independent Scotland or Wales would be able to negotiate advan-
tageous terms, rather than rely on the British government and its ministers.
Both the SNP and Plaid Cymru, therefore have campaigned hard for closer
political union and a single currency. The more integrated Britain is with
Europe, they hope, the more likelihood there is that they will be granted
greater independence.
Minor parties
Two small anti-European parties have made some impression in Britain. These
are the Referendum Party and the UK Independence party (UKIP).
The Referendum party was formed and financed by the multi-millionaire
James Goldsmith. He pumped an estimated £20 million into the 1997 election
campaign. Although the main platform of the party was to hold a referendum
on continued British membership, it was clear that its supporters were anti-
European. The party won no seats in 1997 and failed to make a significant
impact on the results. Goldsmith died shortly after the election and the party
disappeared.
Of a more permanent nature is UKIP, which is openly anti-European. This party
has a small, but determined membership and fought both the 1997 and 2001
elections. Like the Referendum party it did not affect the results significantly.
Indeed, if anything it helped to split the anti-Europe vote with the Conserva-
tives and so helped Labour and Liberal democrat candidates. Nevertheless, it
has survived and may gather strength in the future.
FURTHER POLITICAL EFFECTS OF MEMBERSHIP
The constitution
Membership of the EU and the gradual transfer of powers to Brussels has had a
dramatic effect on the British constitution. We can identify the following features.
1 A significant part of the constitution is now codified. Those elements which
deal with Britain’s relationship with the EU are contained in the Treaties and
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agreements which have been agreed. Thus the Treaty of Rome, the Single
European Act, and the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice are now,
effectively, part of the constitution. The terms of these agreements are binding
on parliament and government.
2 Because the agreements identified above and owing to the principle that
European law is superior to national laws, the sovereignty of parliament has
been eroded. While it is true that Britain can retrieve its full sovereignty by
leaving the EU, as long as we are a member, Europe can overrule parliament
on any issue which requires only a majority vote in the Council of Ministers. A
constitutional certainty which has existed for over three hundred years has,
therefore, been diminished.
3 Rights in Britain have always been more vulnerable than in the rest of Europe.
The power of government and the sovereignty of parliament have meant that
it has been difficult to safeguard the rights of citizens. The European Union has
introduced a wide range of rights for workers, consumers and recipients of
welfare benefits. Enforced by the European Court of Justice, various European
Acts are now effectively entrenched in British law.
4 British courts must now bow to the superior status of the European Court of
Justice where European laws are concerned. The House of Lords is no longer
the ultimate court of appeal in many cases. This role has now been transferred
to Europe.
Parliament
Britain has made remarkably few changes to the structure and operation of
parliament to accommodate membership of the European Union. Both the
Commons and the Lords have select committees whose role is to examine
proposals coming from the European Commission, but they have little
influence over ministers and are seen as the minimum concession which could
be made to membership.
Of course the great European issues are regularly debated in parliament.
Indeed, some of the great parliamentary moments of the 1990s were provided
by battles to approve of the Maastricht Treaty. In the future, conflict over the
single currency are likely to provide more periods of high drama.
However, the more specialised policy areas of the EU, such as the Common
Agricultural Policy, foreign policy, environmental protection and regional
development do not receive a great deal of debating time in parliament.
Discussion on these policies tends to take place within government other
institutions.
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Pressure groups
There are five main types of pressure group which have been most affected by
the EU. These are:
 trade unions;
 environmental groups;
 producer groups;
 farming interests;
 fishing interests.
Trade unions have been cautiously supportive of British involvement. They
have been encouraged especially by the beneficial influence the EU has had on
workers’ rights. Working hours, holiday entitlement, pension rights, health
and safety, part-time workers’ rights and women’s equality are all examples of
improvements to the conditions of workers which have emerged from the EU.
British unions have federated themselves with their European colleagues and
play their part in pressing the Commission for more worker-sympathetic legis-
lation. They are, of course, confronted by commercial and industrial interests,
but the EU has shown itself to be most sympathetic to workers’ rights.
Environmental problems do not usually recognise national borders, so the
environmental lobby, led by Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace (backed by
European Green parties) is anxious to place pressure of European institutions.
By influencing European legislation, environmentalists can hope to see
benefits throughout Europe, not just in a single member state.
The kind of issues where environmentalists have sought action are genetically
modified foods, coastal waters and river quality, species conservation,
emissions and nuclear safety. As with unions the main environmental pressure
groups are now European (as well as global) in their organisations.
Business groups in Britain have been largely in favour of membership, greater
integration and the single currency. The creation of the single market has
created new opportunities and reduced costs in general. However, the
European Union has also brought many new regulations over such features as
employment, health regulations, safety, consumer protection and trade condi-
tions. To some extent business groups (largely manufacturing and commercial
federations) have been engaged in holding back the tide of regulation,
though, realistically, they have tried to obtain concessions in these areas.
On the finance side, too, banking and other institutions have sought to place
pressure on the European Central Bank and the finance sections of the
Commission, again to reduce regulation and to open up markets.
Farmers have proved to be an especially powerful interest in the European
Union. It has to be remembered that European farming is more extensive
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than in Britain, but British farmers have, in some areas, ridden on the back
of their more powerful European partners. On occasions, however, British
farming interests have come into conflict with the rest of Europe. When
British beef exports were banned for example, following the BSE scare, the
National Farmers Union worked as hard as the government in trying to have
the ban lifted.
The Common Agricultural Policy remains the main target for the British
farming lobby. The CAP distributes subsidies, price supports and quotas
throughout the community. British farmers are in competition for these
benefits with other European farming groups. This leads to intense activity in
Brussels, especially when the Council of Agricultural Ministers is about to
meet. However the National Farmers Union also keeps a permanent organi-
sation in place to lobby the Commission.
Fishing interests are in a similar position to the farmers. They ally themselves
with other European fisherman to gain favourable policies for the industry as
a whole. These concern the conservation of fish stocks, subsidies for some
sectors of the industry and a variety of regulations concerning the way the fish
are caught. But they are also in competition with the fishing industries of other
countries. Fish quotas have to be distributed and the British campaign in
Brussels for their fair share.
In addition to these main organisations, there is also a large collection of lobby
groups operating in Europe in the fields of consumer protection, transport,
trade, welfare, rights, law and order and the like. The recognition that an
increasingly large number of decisions are now being made in Brussels has
forced British pressure groups to move their operations across the Channel and
to co-operate with their counterparts in other member states.
The media
The schism in British politics over Europe is reflected in the tabloid press.
While the Sun remains largely euro-sceptic, the Mirror is enthusiastic for both
integration and the single currency. When the referendum of the single
currency is held, it is clear that these and other tabloids will play a major role.
Not surprisingly the broadsheet newspapers take a more measured view. Tradi-
tional Conservative-supporting papers like the Telegraph, the Daily Mail and
the Express have argued against further integration, while the others, such as
the Times, Independent and Guardian have tended take a more detached view,
printing both sides of the case and refusing to make a firm commitment either
way. In the referendum to come, they will probably have to come off the fence.
In 2002 it seemed likely that most of the broadsheets are likely to favour entry
into the euro-zone.
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The broadcast media are required by law to be neutral as this is a partly
political issue. However, debate on Europe has become one of the most
common subjects for current affairs programmes. They may not be allowed to
lead public opinion, but they may prove to be the main source of information
for the electorate.
THE ECONOMY AND THE SINGLE CURRENCY
The effects on economic policy making of British membership in an increas-
ingly integrated Europe can be divided into three main aspects. These are:
firstly, the ways in which the British government no longer has freedom of
action because of the superiority of European laws; secondly, the need to meet
the so-called ‘convergence criteria’ which will enable Britain to join the single
currency system; finally, policy making must bear in mind the Labour
government’s five ‘economic tests’ which will determine the time when an
application to join the euro-zone could be made.
Policy making
A number of options in economic management have been taken out of the
hands of domestic governments, including Britain’s.
● The ability to introduce import tariffs to protect one of our home industries.
Britain must accept the fact that the EU is tariff free and that tariffs on goods
coming from outside the EU are determined in Brussels.
● Similarly there are strict limits upon the amount of subsidies which can be
given to certain industries. There are subsidies available from the EU, but the
destination of these funds is determined in the EU itself. So regional economic
policy is very much European controlled.
● Although member governments remain free to set their own levels of indirect
taxation, such as VAT and excise duties, it has become clear that they cannot
be allowed to vary greatly from levels which prevail in the rest of Europe.
Because there is now completely free trade, high levels of indirect taxation in
the UK compared to the rest of Europe would damage the sale of goods to
visitors from abroad. The tourist industry would suffer excessively.
● Financial markets in Europe are now extremely free and open. Though the
Bank of England can set its own interest rate and the government is free to
manage credit controls, in practice the British financial markets must be kept
reasonably in line with the rest of the EU.
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● Similarly, levels of income and corporate taxes (on profits) are still in the
hands of the national government. But, because both workers and businesses
now have completely free movement within the EU, Britain could not afford
to set higher than average tax levels. If we did we might experience a
movement of workers and businesses away from the UK to countries where
taxes are lower.
In summary, therefore, we can say that some aspects of independent economic
policy making have been removed, while others have become heavily influ-
enced by the realities of European integration.
Convergence
The countries which have wished to enter the single currency system have
been required to meet a number of ‘convergence criteria’. These ‘rules’ are
designed to ensure that the economies of member countries are reasonably in
step with each other. By being so ‘converged’ there is less disruption caused by
adopting the same single currency.
Britain has a long-term intention to join, so the Labour government which
came to power in 1997 decided to pursue the convergence criteria in readiness
for joining. The criteria include maximum levels of inflation and public
borrowing, low unemployment, low interest rates and reductions in the level
of accumulated or ‘national’ debt.
For Britain the targets on inflation, unemployment and interest rates seemed
to occur naturally as the economy recovered from recession and entered a
period of steadily growing prosperity. The high levels of government
borrowing, however, needed positive action. Faced with the need to increase
spending on public services in 1997–2000, Chancellor Gordon Brown chose,
nevertheless, to pay back large portions of the national debt and avoid any
short-term borrowing. In some ways he sacrificed some short-term spending
options, in order to meet the criteria on debt. In other words, he favoured
long-term benefits at the expense of short-term gains.
By 2000, therefore, Britain had achieved the criteria with a good deal to spare.
Since then it has been necessary to try to ensure that the economy did not
stray from the rules. Up to 2002 at least, this proved relatively comfortable. It
may not always be so.
The five economic tests
These are Britain’s own criteria for entry into the single currency. They are:
1 Membership must be favourable to inward investment into the UK (i.e.
foreign companies setting up in the UK).
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2 It must not threaten Britain’s leading role in financial markets.
3 Britain’s natural economic cycle will have to be reasonably in line with that of
the euro-zone. In other words the levels of growth, inflation, unemployment
and interest rates will need to be close to those existing in the rest of Europe.
4 Will there be a reasonable amount of flexibility to allow Britain to join on
favourable terms?
5 Will membership be of long-term benefit to the British economy, especially
terms of employment, growth and economic stability?
Many of these conditions do not require specific policy making, so they may not
influence economic management directly. However, they remain influential. It
may be that, as membership of the single currency seems to be imminent, the
government may attempt to manipulate the exchange value of sterling, the
level of public borrowing and the level of growth, so that Britain joins at the
most favourable moment, according to these membership conditions.
THE FUTURE OF BRITISH MEMBERSHIP
The single currency
If Britain joins in the future, it is likely to be permanent and will certainly have
far-reaching effects. It is, therefore, certainly the most important decision in
the foreseeable future.
The effects of membership include loss of control over the setting of interest
rates, much less flexibility in taxation policy and government fiscal budgeting,
little control over credit restrictions and a general harmonisation of economic
policy making with Europe as a whole. In other words it would represent a
major ‘sacrifice’ or ‘pooling’ (depending on one’s point of view) of sovereignty
for Britain. We would also have to accept that decisions made by the European
Central Bank and the Council of Finance Ministers will affect the performance
of the British economy.
On a more general level, membership of the euro-zone will be heavily
symbolic. It will be a powerful signal that Britain has finally abandoned its
suspicions of membership.
Political integration
The Blair government has made it clear that it will oppose any further political
integration unless the problem of the democratic deficit is tackled. Indeed, by
2002 Britain led the section of the EU which opposes further moves towards
federation.
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Should the Conservative party regain power, the prospects for closer union
will become even more remote. It will require a major shift in public opinion
for any British government to support a deeper union. So, for the time being
Britain wants the EU to remain an intergovernmental organisation, rather
than a supranational one.
Having said that, the Labour government has played a leading role in
promoting integration in foreign and defence policy and is broadly in favour
of further steps to harmonise policies on law and order, rights and
immigration. These have become especially pressing issues as enlargement is
just around the corner. In summary, therefore, current thinking is in favour of
more integration of policy, but much less so in terms of institutions.
One final issue should be clarified. Despite the persistence of a sizeable
minority on the right of British politics who want the country to leave the EU,
there is little prospect of departure. British membership appears to be here to
stay.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 What have been the main effects of British membership of the EU on
the political system?
2 How does membership of the EU affect the conduct of economic
policy making in Britain?
3 How has the issue of Europe influenced British party politics?
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